onionshare/docs/source/locale/bo/LC_MESSAGES/security.po

# SOME DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.
# Copyright (C) Micah Lee, et al.
# This file is distributed under the same license as the OnionShare package.
# FIRST AUTHOR <EMAIL@ADDRESS>, YEAR.
#
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"Project-Id-Version: OnionShare 2.6\n"
"Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n"
"POT-Creation-Date: 2023-09-05 11:30-0700\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
"Last-Translator: Automatically generated\n"
"Language-Team: none\n"
"Language: bo\n"
"MIME-Version: 1.0\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n"
"Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit\n"

#: ../../source/security.rst:2
msgid "Security Design"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:4
msgid "Read :ref:`how_it_works` first to get a handle on how OnionShare works."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:6
msgid "Like all software, OnionShare may contain bugs or vulnerabilities."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:9
msgid "What OnionShare protects against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:11
msgid ""
"**Third parties don't have access to anything that happens in OnionShare.** "
"Using OnionShare means hosting services directly on your computer. When "
"sharing your files with OnionShare, they are not uploaded to any third-party "
"server. If you make an OnionShare chat room, your computer acts as a server "
"for that too. This avoids the traditional model of having to trust the "
"computers of others."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:17
msgid ""
"**Network eavesdroppers can't spy on anything that happens in OnionShare in "
"transit.** The connection between the Tor onion service and Tor Browser is "
"end-to-end encrypted. This means network attackers can't eavesdrop on "
"anything except encrypted Tor traffic. Even if an eavesdropper is a "
"malicious rendezvous node used to connect the Tor Browser with OnionShare's "
"onion service, the traffic is encrypted using the onion service's private "
"key."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:23
msgid ""
"**Anonymity of OnionShare users are protected by Tor.** OnionShare and Tor "
"Browser protect the anonymity of the users. As long as the OnionShare user "
"anonymously communicates the OnionShare address with the Tor Browser users, "
"the Tor Browser users and eavesdroppers can't learn the identity of the "
"OnionShare user."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:28
msgid ""
"**If an attacker learns about the onion service, they still can't access "
"anything.** Prior attacks against the Tor network to enumerate onion "
"services allowed attackers to discover private ``.onion`` addresses. To "
"access an OnionShare service from its address, the private key used for "
"client authentication must be guessed (unless the service is already made "
"public by turning off the private key -- see :ref:`turn_off_private_key`)."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:33
msgid "What OnionShare doesn't protect against"
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:35
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be secure."
"** Communicating the OnionShare address to people is the responsibility of "
"the OnionShare user. If sent insecurely (such as through an e-mail message "
"monitored by an attacker), an eavesdropper can tell that OnionShare is being "
"used. Eavesdroppers can access services that are still up by loading their "
"addresses and/or lost key in the Tor Browser. Avoid this by communicating "
"the address securely, via encrypted text message (probably with disappearing "
"messages enabled), encrypted e-mail, or in person. This isn't necessary when "
"using OnionShare for something that isn't secret."
msgstr ""

#: ../../source/security.rst:42
msgid ""
"**Communicating the OnionShare address and private key might not be "
"anonymous.** Extra precaution must be taken to ensure the OnionShare address "
"is communicated anonymously. A new e-mail or chat account, only accessed "
"over Tor, can be used to share the address. This isn't necessary unless "
"anonymity is a goal."
msgstr ""