mirror of
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git
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bbd4646a2e
Also bump includes per suggestions from iwyu.
6054 lines
286 KiB
C++
6054 lines
286 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2022 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include <validation.h>
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#include <arith_uint256.h>
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#include <chain.h>
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#include <checkqueue.h>
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#include <clientversion.h>
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#include <consensus/amount.h>
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#include <consensus/consensus.h>
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#include <consensus/merkle.h>
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#include <consensus/tx_check.h>
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#include <consensus/tx_verify.h>
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#include <consensus/validation.h>
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#include <cuckoocache.h>
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#include <flatfile.h>
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#include <hash.h>
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#include <kernel/chain.h>
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#include <kernel/chainparams.h>
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#include <kernel/coinstats.h>
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#include <kernel/disconnected_transactions.h>
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#include <kernel/mempool_entry.h>
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#include <kernel/messagestartchars.h>
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#include <kernel/notifications_interface.h>
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#include <logging.h>
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#include <logging/timer.h>
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#include <node/blockstorage.h>
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#include <node/utxo_snapshot.h>
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#include <policy/policy.h>
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#include <policy/rbf.h>
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#include <policy/settings.h>
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#include <pow.h>
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#include <primitives/block.h>
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#include <primitives/transaction.h>
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#include <random.h>
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#include <reverse_iterator.h>
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#include <script/script.h>
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#include <script/sigcache.h>
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#include <signet.h>
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#include <tinyformat.h>
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#include <txdb.h>
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#include <txmempool.h>
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#include <uint256.h>
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#include <undo.h>
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#include <util/check.h> // For NDEBUG compile time check
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#include <util/fs.h>
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#include <util/fs_helpers.h>
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#include <util/hasher.h>
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#include <util/moneystr.h>
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#include <util/rbf.h>
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#include <util/signalinterrupt.h>
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#include <util/strencodings.h>
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#include <util/time.h>
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#include <util/trace.h>
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#include <util/translation.h>
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#include <validationinterface.h>
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#include <warnings.h>
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#include <algorithm>
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#include <cassert>
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#include <chrono>
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#include <deque>
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#include <numeric>
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#include <optional>
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#include <string>
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#include <tuple>
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#include <utility>
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using kernel::CCoinsStats;
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using kernel::CoinStatsHashType;
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using kernel::ComputeUTXOStats;
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using kernel::Notifications;
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using fsbridge::FopenFn;
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using node::BlockManager;
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using node::BlockMap;
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using node::CBlockIndexHeightOnlyComparator;
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using node::CBlockIndexWorkComparator;
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using node::fReindex;
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using node::SnapshotMetadata;
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/** Time to wait between writing blocks/block index to disk. */
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static constexpr std::chrono::hours DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL{1};
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/** Time to wait between flushing chainstate to disk. */
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static constexpr std::chrono::hours DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL{24};
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/** Maximum age of our tip for us to be considered current for fee estimation */
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static constexpr std::chrono::hours MAX_FEE_ESTIMATION_TIP_AGE{3};
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const std::vector<std::string> CHECKLEVEL_DOC {
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"level 0 reads the blocks from disk",
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"level 1 verifies block validity",
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"level 2 verifies undo data",
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"level 3 checks disconnection of tip blocks",
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"level 4 tries to reconnect the blocks",
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"each level includes the checks of the previous levels",
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};
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/** The number of blocks to keep below the deepest prune lock.
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* There is nothing special about this number. It is higher than what we
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* expect to see in regular mainnet reorgs, but not so high that it would
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* noticeably interfere with the pruning mechanism.
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* */
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static constexpr int PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER{10};
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GlobalMutex g_best_block_mutex;
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std::condition_variable g_best_block_cv;
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uint256 g_best_block;
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const CBlockIndex* Chainstate::FindForkInGlobalIndex(const CBlockLocator& locator) const
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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// Find the latest block common to locator and chain - we expect that
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// locator.vHave is sorted descending by height.
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for (const uint256& hash : locator.vHave) {
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const CBlockIndex* pindex{m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash)};
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if (pindex) {
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if (m_chain.Contains(pindex)) {
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return pindex;
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}
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if (pindex->GetAncestor(m_chain.Height()) == m_chain.Tip()) {
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return m_chain.Tip();
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}
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}
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}
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return m_chain.Genesis();
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}
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bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
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const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore,
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bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata,
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std::vector<CScriptCheck>* pvChecks = nullptr)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
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bool CheckFinalTxAtTip(const CBlockIndex& active_chain_tip, const CTransaction& tx)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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// CheckFinalTxAtTip() uses active_chain_tip.Height()+1 to evaluate
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// nLockTime because when IsFinalTx() is called within
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// AcceptBlock(), the height of the block *being*
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// evaluated is what is used. Thus if we want to know if a
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// transaction can be part of the *next* block, we need to call
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// IsFinalTx() with one more than active_chain_tip.Height().
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const int nBlockHeight = active_chain_tip.nHeight + 1;
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// BIP113 requires that time-locked transactions have nLockTime set to
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// less than the median time of the previous block they're contained in.
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// When the next block is created its previous block will be the current
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// chain tip, so we use that to calculate the median time passed to
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// IsFinalTx().
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const int64_t nBlockTime{active_chain_tip.GetMedianTimePast()};
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return IsFinalTx(tx, nBlockHeight, nBlockTime);
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}
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namespace {
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/**
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* A helper which calculates heights of inputs of a given transaction.
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*
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* @param[in] tip The current chain tip. If an input belongs to a mempool
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* transaction, we assume it will be confirmed in the next block.
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* @param[in] coins Any CCoinsView that provides access to the relevant coins.
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* @param[in] tx The transaction being evaluated.
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*
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* @returns A vector of input heights or nullopt, in case of an error.
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*/
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std::optional<std::vector<int>> CalculatePrevHeights(
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const CBlockIndex& tip,
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const CCoinsView& coins,
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const CTransaction& tx)
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{
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std::vector<int> prev_heights;
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prev_heights.resize(tx.vin.size());
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for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i) {
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const CTxIn& txin = tx.vin[i];
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Coin coin;
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if (!coins.GetCoin(txin.prevout, coin)) {
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LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: Missing input %d in transaction \'%s\'\n", __func__, i, tx.GetHash().GetHex());
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return std::nullopt;
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}
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if (coin.nHeight == MEMPOOL_HEIGHT) {
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// Assume all mempool transaction confirm in the next block.
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prev_heights[i] = tip.nHeight + 1;
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} else {
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prev_heights[i] = coin.nHeight;
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}
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}
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return prev_heights;
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}
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} // namespace
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std::optional<LockPoints> CalculateLockPointsAtTip(
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CBlockIndex* tip,
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const CCoinsView& coins_view,
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const CTransaction& tx)
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{
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assert(tip);
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auto prev_heights{CalculatePrevHeights(*tip, coins_view, tx)};
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if (!prev_heights.has_value()) return std::nullopt;
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CBlockIndex next_tip;
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next_tip.pprev = tip;
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// When SequenceLocks() is called within ConnectBlock(), the height
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// of the block *being* evaluated is what is used.
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// Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the
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// *next* block, we need to use one more than active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()
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next_tip.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1;
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const auto [min_height, min_time] = CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, prev_heights.value(), next_tip);
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// Also store the hash of the block with the highest height of
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// all the blocks which have sequence locked prevouts.
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// This hash needs to still be on the chain
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// for these LockPoint calculations to be valid
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// Note: It is impossible to correctly calculate a maxInputBlock
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// if any of the sequence locked inputs depend on unconfirmed txs,
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// except in the special case where the relative lock time/height
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// is 0, which is equivalent to no sequence lock. Since we assume
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// input height of tip+1 for mempool txs and test the resulting
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// min_height and min_time from CalculateSequenceLocks against tip+1.
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int max_input_height{0};
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for (const int height : prev_heights.value()) {
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// Can ignore mempool inputs since we'll fail if they had non-zero locks
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if (height != next_tip.nHeight) {
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max_input_height = std::max(max_input_height, height);
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}
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}
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// tip->GetAncestor(max_input_height) should never return a nullptr
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// because max_input_height is always less than the tip height.
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// It would, however, be a bad bug to continue execution, since a
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// LockPoints object with the maxInputBlock member set to nullptr
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// signifies no relative lock time.
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return LockPoints{min_height, min_time, Assert(tip->GetAncestor(max_input_height))};
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}
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bool CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(CBlockIndex* tip,
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const LockPoints& lock_points)
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{
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assert(tip != nullptr);
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CBlockIndex index;
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index.pprev = tip;
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// CheckSequenceLocksAtTip() uses active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()+1 to evaluate
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// height based locks because when SequenceLocks() is called within
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// ConnectBlock(), the height of the block *being*
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// evaluated is what is used.
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// Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the
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// *next* block, we need to use one more than active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()
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index.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1;
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return EvaluateSequenceLocks(index, {lock_points.height, lock_points.time});
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}
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// Returns the script flags which should be checked for a given block
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static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex& block_index, const ChainstateManager& chainman);
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static void LimitMempoolSize(CTxMemPool& pool, CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, pool.cs)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
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AssertLockHeld(pool.cs);
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int expired = pool.Expire(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - pool.m_expiry);
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if (expired != 0) {
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LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Expired %i transactions from the memory pool\n", expired);
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}
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std::vector<COutPoint> vNoSpendsRemaining;
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pool.TrimToSize(pool.m_max_size_bytes, &vNoSpendsRemaining);
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for (const COutPoint& removed : vNoSpendsRemaining)
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coins_cache.Uncache(removed);
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}
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static bool IsCurrentForFeeEstimation(Chainstate& active_chainstate) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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if (active_chainstate.m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
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return false;
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}
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if (active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()->GetBlockTime() < count_seconds(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - MAX_FEE_ESTIMATION_TIP_AGE))
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return false;
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if (active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() < active_chainstate.m_chainman.m_best_header->nHeight - 1) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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void Chainstate::MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(
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DisconnectedBlockTransactions& disconnectpool,
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bool fAddToMempool)
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{
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if (!m_mempool) return;
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
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std::vector<uint256> vHashUpdate;
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{
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// disconnectpool is ordered so that the front is the most recently-confirmed
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// transaction (the last tx of the block at the tip) in the disconnected chain.
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// Iterate disconnectpool in reverse, so that we add transactions
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// back to the mempool starting with the earliest transaction that had
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// been previously seen in a block.
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const auto queuedTx = disconnectpool.take();
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auto it = queuedTx.rbegin();
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while (it != queuedTx.rend()) {
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// ignore validation errors in resurrected transactions
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if (!fAddToMempool || (*it)->IsCoinBase() ||
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AcceptToMemoryPool(*this, *it, GetTime(),
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/*bypass_limits=*/true, /*test_accept=*/false).m_result_type !=
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MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
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// If the transaction doesn't make it in to the mempool, remove any
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// transactions that depend on it (which would now be orphans).
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m_mempool->removeRecursive(**it, MemPoolRemovalReason::REORG);
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} else if (m_mempool->exists(GenTxid::Txid((*it)->GetHash()))) {
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vHashUpdate.push_back((*it)->GetHash());
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}
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++it;
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}
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}
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// AcceptToMemoryPool/addUnchecked all assume that new mempool entries have
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// no in-mempool children, which is generally not true when adding
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// previously-confirmed transactions back to the mempool.
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// UpdateTransactionsFromBlock finds descendants of any transactions in
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// the disconnectpool that were added back and cleans up the mempool state.
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m_mempool->UpdateTransactionsFromBlock(vHashUpdate);
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// Predicate to use for filtering transactions in removeForReorg.
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// Checks whether the transaction is still final and, if it spends a coinbase output, mature.
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// Also updates valid entries' cached LockPoints if needed.
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// If false, the tx is still valid and its lockpoints are updated.
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// If true, the tx would be invalid in the next block; remove this entry and all of its descendants.
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const auto filter_final_and_mature = [this](CTxMemPool::txiter it)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_mempool->cs, ::cs_main) {
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AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
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AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
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const CTransaction& tx = it->GetTx();
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// The transaction must be final.
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if (!CheckFinalTxAtTip(*Assert(m_chain.Tip()), tx)) return true;
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const LockPoints& lp = it->GetLockPoints();
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// CheckSequenceLocksAtTip checks if the transaction will be final in the next block to be
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// created on top of the new chain.
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if (TestLockPointValidity(m_chain, lp)) {
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if (!CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), lp)) {
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return true;
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}
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} else {
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const CCoinsViewMemPool view_mempool{&CoinsTip(), *m_mempool};
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const std::optional<LockPoints> new_lock_points{CalculateLockPointsAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), view_mempool, tx)};
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if (new_lock_points.has_value() && CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), *new_lock_points)) {
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// Now update the mempool entry lockpoints as well.
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it->UpdateLockPoints(*new_lock_points);
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} else {
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return true;
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}
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}
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// If the transaction spends any coinbase outputs, it must be mature.
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if (it->GetSpendsCoinbase()) {
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for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
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if (m_mempool->exists(GenTxid::Txid(txin.prevout.hash))) continue;
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const Coin& coin{CoinsTip().AccessCoin(txin.prevout)};
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assert(!coin.IsSpent());
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const auto mempool_spend_height{m_chain.Tip()->nHeight + 1};
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if (coin.IsCoinBase() && mempool_spend_height - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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}
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// Transaction is still valid and cached LockPoints are updated.
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return false;
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};
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// We also need to remove any now-immature transactions
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m_mempool->removeForReorg(m_chain, filter_final_and_mature);
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// Re-limit mempool size, in case we added any transactions
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LimitMempoolSize(*m_mempool, this->CoinsTip());
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}
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/**
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* Checks to avoid mempool polluting consensus critical paths since cached
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* signature and script validity results will be reused if we validate this
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* transaction again during block validation.
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* */
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static bool CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
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const CCoinsViewCache& view, const CTxMemPool& pool,
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unsigned int flags, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip)
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EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, pool.cs)
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{
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AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
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AssertLockHeld(pool.cs);
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assert(!tx.IsCoinBase());
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for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
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const Coin& coin = view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
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// This coin was checked in PreChecks and MemPoolAccept
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// has been holding cs_main since then.
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Assume(!coin.IsSpent());
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if (coin.IsSpent()) return false;
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// If the Coin is available, there are 2 possibilities:
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// it is available in our current ChainstateActive UTXO set,
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// or it's a UTXO provided by a transaction in our mempool.
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// Ensure the scriptPubKeys in Coins from CoinsView are correct.
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const CTransactionRef& txFrom = pool.get(txin.prevout.hash);
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if (txFrom) {
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assert(txFrom->GetHash() == txin.prevout.hash);
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assert(txFrom->vout.size() > txin.prevout.n);
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assert(txFrom->vout[txin.prevout.n] == coin.out);
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} else {
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const Coin& coinFromUTXOSet = coins_tip.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
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assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent());
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assert(coinFromUTXOSet.out == coin.out);
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}
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}
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// Call CheckInputScripts() to cache signature and script validity against current tip consensus rules.
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return CheckInputScripts(tx, state, view, flags, /* cacheSigStore= */ true, /* cacheFullScriptStore= */ true, txdata);
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}
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namespace {
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class MemPoolAccept
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{
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public:
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explicit MemPoolAccept(CTxMemPool& mempool, Chainstate& active_chainstate) :
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m_pool(mempool),
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m_view(&m_dummy),
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m_viewmempool(&active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), m_pool),
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m_active_chainstate(active_chainstate)
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{
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}
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// We put the arguments we're handed into a struct, so we can pass them
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// around easier.
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struct ATMPArgs {
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const CChainParams& m_chainparams;
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const int64_t m_accept_time;
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const bool m_bypass_limits;
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/*
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* Return any outpoints which were not previously present in the coins
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* cache, but were added as a result of validating the tx for mempool
|
|
* acceptance. This allows the caller to optionally remove the cache
|
|
* additions if the associated transaction ends up being rejected by
|
|
* the mempool.
|
|
*/
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint>& m_coins_to_uncache;
|
|
const bool m_test_accept;
|
|
/** Whether we allow transactions to replace mempool transactions by BIP125 rules. If false,
|
|
* any transaction spending the same inputs as a transaction in the mempool is considered
|
|
* a conflict. */
|
|
const bool m_allow_replacement;
|
|
/** When true, the mempool will not be trimmed when any transactions are submitted in
|
|
* Finalize(). Instead, limits should be enforced at the end to ensure the package is not
|
|
* partially submitted.
|
|
*/
|
|
const bool m_package_submission;
|
|
/** When true, use package feerates instead of individual transaction feerates for fee-based
|
|
* policies such as mempool min fee and min relay fee.
|
|
*/
|
|
const bool m_package_feerates;
|
|
|
|
/** Parameters for single transaction mempool validation. */
|
|
static ATMPArgs SingleAccept(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time,
|
|
bool bypass_limits, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache,
|
|
bool test_accept) {
|
|
return ATMPArgs{/* m_chainparams */ chainparams,
|
|
/* m_accept_time */ accept_time,
|
|
/* m_bypass_limits */ bypass_limits,
|
|
/* m_coins_to_uncache */ coins_to_uncache,
|
|
/* m_test_accept */ test_accept,
|
|
/* m_allow_replacement */ true,
|
|
/* m_package_submission */ false,
|
|
/* m_package_feerates */ false,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parameters for test package mempool validation through testmempoolaccept. */
|
|
static ATMPArgs PackageTestAccept(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time,
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache) {
|
|
return ATMPArgs{/* m_chainparams */ chainparams,
|
|
/* m_accept_time */ accept_time,
|
|
/* m_bypass_limits */ false,
|
|
/* m_coins_to_uncache */ coins_to_uncache,
|
|
/* m_test_accept */ true,
|
|
/* m_allow_replacement */ false,
|
|
/* m_package_submission */ false, // not submitting to mempool
|
|
/* m_package_feerates */ false,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parameters for child-with-unconfirmed-parents package validation. */
|
|
static ATMPArgs PackageChildWithParents(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time,
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache) {
|
|
return ATMPArgs{/* m_chainparams */ chainparams,
|
|
/* m_accept_time */ accept_time,
|
|
/* m_bypass_limits */ false,
|
|
/* m_coins_to_uncache */ coins_to_uncache,
|
|
/* m_test_accept */ false,
|
|
/* m_allow_replacement */ false,
|
|
/* m_package_submission */ true,
|
|
/* m_package_feerates */ true,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parameters for a single transaction within a package. */
|
|
static ATMPArgs SingleInPackageAccept(const ATMPArgs& package_args) {
|
|
return ATMPArgs{/* m_chainparams */ package_args.m_chainparams,
|
|
/* m_accept_time */ package_args.m_accept_time,
|
|
/* m_bypass_limits */ false,
|
|
/* m_coins_to_uncache */ package_args.m_coins_to_uncache,
|
|
/* m_test_accept */ package_args.m_test_accept,
|
|
/* m_allow_replacement */ true,
|
|
/* m_package_submission */ true, // do not LimitMempoolSize in Finalize()
|
|
/* m_package_feerates */ false, // only 1 transaction
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
// Private ctor to avoid exposing details to clients and allowing the possibility of
|
|
// mixing up the order of the arguments. Use static functions above instead.
|
|
ATMPArgs(const CChainParams& chainparams,
|
|
int64_t accept_time,
|
|
bool bypass_limits,
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache,
|
|
bool test_accept,
|
|
bool allow_replacement,
|
|
bool package_submission,
|
|
bool package_feerates)
|
|
: m_chainparams{chainparams},
|
|
m_accept_time{accept_time},
|
|
m_bypass_limits{bypass_limits},
|
|
m_coins_to_uncache{coins_to_uncache},
|
|
m_test_accept{test_accept},
|
|
m_allow_replacement{allow_replacement},
|
|
m_package_submission{package_submission},
|
|
m_package_feerates{package_feerates}
|
|
{
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/** Clean up all non-chainstate coins from m_view and m_viewmempool. */
|
|
void CleanupTemporaryCoins() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Single transaction acceptance
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Multiple transaction acceptance. Transactions may or may not be interdependent, but must not
|
|
* conflict with each other, and the transactions cannot already be in the mempool. Parents must
|
|
* come before children if any dependencies exist.
|
|
*/
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Submission of a subpackage.
|
|
* If subpackage size == 1, calls AcceptSingleTransaction() with adjusted ATMPArgs to avoid
|
|
* package policy restrictions like no CPFP carve out (PackageMempoolChecks) and disabled RBF
|
|
* (m_allow_replacement), and creates a PackageMempoolAcceptResult wrapping the result.
|
|
*
|
|
* If subpackage size > 1, calls AcceptMultipleTransactions() with the provided ATMPArgs.
|
|
*
|
|
* Also cleans up all non-chainstate coins from m_view at the end.
|
|
*/
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Package (more specific than just multiple transactions) acceptance. Package must be a child
|
|
* with all of its unconfirmed parents, and topologically sorted.
|
|
*/
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptPackage(const Package& package, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
// All the intermediate state that gets passed between the various levels
|
|
// of checking a given transaction.
|
|
struct Workspace {
|
|
explicit Workspace(const CTransactionRef& ptx) : m_ptx(ptx), m_hash(ptx->GetHash()) {}
|
|
/** Txids of mempool transactions that this transaction directly conflicts with. */
|
|
std::set<uint256> m_conflicts;
|
|
/** Iterators to mempool entries that this transaction directly conflicts with. */
|
|
CTxMemPool::setEntries m_iters_conflicting;
|
|
/** Iterators to all mempool entries that would be replaced by this transaction, including
|
|
* those it directly conflicts with and their descendants. */
|
|
CTxMemPool::setEntries m_all_conflicting;
|
|
/** All mempool ancestors of this transaction. */
|
|
CTxMemPool::setEntries m_ancestors;
|
|
/** Mempool entry constructed for this transaction. Constructed in PreChecks() but not
|
|
* inserted into the mempool until Finalize(). */
|
|
std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry> m_entry;
|
|
/** Pointers to the transactions that have been removed from the mempool and replaced by
|
|
* this transaction, used to return to the MemPoolAccept caller. Only populated if
|
|
* validation is successful and the original transactions are removed. */
|
|
std::list<CTransactionRef> m_replaced_transactions;
|
|
|
|
/** Virtual size of the transaction as used by the mempool, calculated using serialized size
|
|
* of the transaction and sigops. */
|
|
int64_t m_vsize;
|
|
/** Fees paid by this transaction: total input amounts subtracted by total output amounts. */
|
|
CAmount m_base_fees;
|
|
/** Base fees + any fee delta set by the user with prioritisetransaction. */
|
|
CAmount m_modified_fees;
|
|
/** Total modified fees of all transactions being replaced. */
|
|
CAmount m_conflicting_fees{0};
|
|
/** Total virtual size of all transactions being replaced. */
|
|
size_t m_conflicting_size{0};
|
|
|
|
/** If we're doing package validation (i.e. m_package_feerates=true), the "effective"
|
|
* package feerate of this transaction is the total fees divided by the total size of
|
|
* transactions (which may include its ancestors and/or descendants). */
|
|
CFeeRate m_package_feerate{0};
|
|
|
|
const CTransactionRef& m_ptx;
|
|
/** Txid. */
|
|
const Txid& m_hash;
|
|
TxValidationState m_state;
|
|
/** A temporary cache containing serialized transaction data for signature verification.
|
|
* Reused across PolicyScriptChecks and ConsensusScriptChecks. */
|
|
PrecomputedTransactionData m_precomputed_txdata;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Run the policy checks on a given transaction, excluding any script checks.
|
|
// Looks up inputs, calculates feerate, considers replacement, evaluates
|
|
// package limits, etc. As this function can be invoked for "free" by a peer,
|
|
// only tests that are fast should be done here (to avoid CPU DoS).
|
|
bool PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Run checks for mempool replace-by-fee.
|
|
bool ReplacementChecks(Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Enforce package mempool ancestor/descendant limits (distinct from individual
|
|
// ancestor/descendant limits done in PreChecks).
|
|
bool PackageMempoolChecks(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns,
|
|
int64_t total_vsize,
|
|
PackageValidationState& package_state) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Run the script checks using our policy flags. As this can be slow, we should
|
|
// only invoke this on transactions that have otherwise passed policy checks.
|
|
bool PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Re-run the script checks, using consensus flags, and try to cache the
|
|
// result in the scriptcache. This should be done after
|
|
// PolicyScriptChecks(). This requires that all inputs either be in our
|
|
// utxo set or in the mempool.
|
|
bool ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Try to add the transaction to the mempool, removing any conflicts first.
|
|
// Returns true if the transaction is in the mempool after any size
|
|
// limiting is performed, false otherwise.
|
|
bool Finalize(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Submit all transactions to the mempool and call ConsensusScriptChecks to add to the script
|
|
// cache - should only be called after successful validation of all transactions in the package.
|
|
// Does not call LimitMempoolSize(), so mempool max_size_bytes may be temporarily exceeded.
|
|
bool SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, PackageValidationState& package_state,
|
|
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Compare a package's feerate against minimum allowed.
|
|
bool CheckFeeRate(size_t package_size, CAmount package_fee, TxValidationState& state) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee().GetFee(package_size);
|
|
if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (package_fee < m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "min relay fee not met",
|
|
strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size)));
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
private:
|
|
CTxMemPool& m_pool;
|
|
CCoinsViewCache m_view;
|
|
CCoinsViewMemPool m_viewmempool;
|
|
CCoinsView m_dummy;
|
|
|
|
Chainstate& m_active_chainstate;
|
|
|
|
/** Whether the transaction(s) would replace any mempool transactions. If so, RBF rules apply. */
|
|
bool m_rbf{false};
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
const CTransactionRef& ptx = ws.m_ptx;
|
|
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
|
|
const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
|
|
|
|
// Copy/alias what we need out of args
|
|
const int64_t nAcceptTime = args.m_accept_time;
|
|
const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache = args.m_coins_to_uncache;
|
|
|
|
// Alias what we need out of ws
|
|
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
|
|
std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry>& entry = ws.m_entry;
|
|
|
|
if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state)) {
|
|
return false; // state filled in by CheckTransaction
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction
|
|
if (tx.IsCoinBase())
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "coinbase");
|
|
|
|
// Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest)
|
|
std::string reason;
|
|
if (m_pool.m_require_standard && !IsStandardTx(tx, m_pool.m_max_datacarrier_bytes, m_pool.m_permit_bare_multisig, m_pool.m_dust_relay_feerate, reason)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Transactions smaller than 65 non-witness bytes are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842.
|
|
if (::GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(tx)) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE)
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "tx-size-small");
|
|
|
|
// Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next
|
|
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
|
|
// be mined yet.
|
|
if (!CheckFinalTxAtTip(*Assert(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()), tx)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-final");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(tx.GetWitnessHash()))) {
|
|
// Exact transaction already exists in the mempool.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-in-mempool");
|
|
} else if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(tx.GetHash()))) {
|
|
// Transaction with the same non-witness data but different witness (same txid, different
|
|
// wtxid) already exists in the mempool.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-same-nonwitness-data-in-mempool");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions
|
|
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin)
|
|
{
|
|
const CTransaction* ptxConflicting = m_pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout);
|
|
if (ptxConflicting) {
|
|
if (!args.m_allow_replacement) {
|
|
// Transaction conflicts with a mempool tx, but we're not allowing replacements.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "bip125-replacement-disallowed");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ws.m_conflicts.count(ptxConflicting->GetHash()))
|
|
{
|
|
// Transactions that don't explicitly signal replaceability are
|
|
// *not* replaceable with the current logic, even if one of their
|
|
// unconfirmed ancestors signals replaceability. This diverges
|
|
// from BIP125's inherited signaling description (see CVE-2021-31876).
|
|
// Applications relying on first-seen mempool behavior should
|
|
// check all unconfirmed ancestors; otherwise an opt-in ancestor
|
|
// might be replaced, causing removal of this descendant.
|
|
//
|
|
// If replaceability signaling is ignored due to node setting,
|
|
// replacement is always allowed.
|
|
if (!m_pool.m_full_rbf && !SignalsOptInRBF(*ptxConflicting)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "txn-mempool-conflict");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ws.m_conflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_view.SetBackend(m_viewmempool);
|
|
|
|
const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip();
|
|
// do all inputs exist?
|
|
for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) {
|
|
if (!coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(txin.prevout)) {
|
|
coins_to_uncache.push_back(txin.prevout);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note: this call may add txin.prevout to the coins cache
|
|
// (coins_cache.cacheCoins) by way of FetchCoin(). It should be removed
|
|
// later (via coins_to_uncache) if this tx turns out to be invalid.
|
|
if (!m_view.HaveCoin(txin.prevout)) {
|
|
// Are inputs missing because we already have the tx?
|
|
for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) {
|
|
// Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs
|
|
if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-known");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This is const, but calls into the back end CoinsViews. The CCoinsViewDB at the bottom of the
|
|
// hierarchy brings the best block into scope. See CCoinsViewDB::GetBestBlock().
|
|
m_view.GetBestBlock();
|
|
|
|
// we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy (to protect
|
|
// against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being added
|
|
// to coins_to_uncache)
|
|
m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
|
|
|
|
assert(m_active_chainstate.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(m_view.GetBestBlock()) == m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip());
|
|
|
|
// Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in the next
|
|
// block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't
|
|
// be mined yet.
|
|
// Pass in m_view which has all of the relevant inputs cached. Note that, since m_view's
|
|
// backend was removed, it no longer pulls coins from the mempool.
|
|
const std::optional<LockPoints> lock_points{CalculateLockPointsAtTip(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), m_view, tx)};
|
|
if (!lock_points.has_value() || !CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), *lock_points)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-BIP68-final");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The mempool holds txs for the next block, so pass height+1 to CheckTxInputs
|
|
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1, ws.m_base_fees)) {
|
|
return false; // state filled in by CheckTxInputs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m_pool.m_require_standard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check for non-standard witnesses.
|
|
if (tx.HasWitness() && m_pool.m_require_standard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonstandard");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS);
|
|
|
|
// ws.m_modified_fees includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction
|
|
ws.m_modified_fees = ws.m_base_fees;
|
|
m_pool.ApplyDelta(hash, ws.m_modified_fees);
|
|
|
|
// Keep track of transactions that spend a coinbase, which we re-scan
|
|
// during reorgs to ensure COINBASE_MATURITY is still met.
|
|
bool fSpendsCoinbase = false;
|
|
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
|
|
const Coin &coin = m_view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout);
|
|
if (coin.IsCoinBase()) {
|
|
fSpendsCoinbase = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set entry_sequence to 0 when bypass_limits is used; this allows txs from a block
|
|
// reorg to be marked earlier than any child txs that were already in the mempool.
|
|
const uint64_t entry_sequence = bypass_limits ? 0 : m_pool.GetSequence();
|
|
entry.reset(new CTxMemPoolEntry(ptx, ws.m_base_fees, nAcceptTime, m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height(), entry_sequence,
|
|
fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lock_points.value()));
|
|
ws.m_vsize = entry->GetTxSize();
|
|
|
|
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST)
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops",
|
|
strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
|
|
|
|
// No individual transactions are allowed below the min relay feerate except from disconnected blocks.
|
|
// This requirement, unlike CheckFeeRate, cannot be bypassed using m_package_feerates because,
|
|
// while a tx could be package CPFP'd when entering the mempool, we do not have a DoS-resistant
|
|
// method of ensuring the tx remains bumped. For example, the fee-bumping child could disappear
|
|
// due to a replacement.
|
|
if (!bypass_limits && ws.m_modified_fees < m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(ws.m_vsize)) {
|
|
// Even though this is a fee-related failure, this result is TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, not
|
|
// TX_RECONSIDERABLE, because it cannot be bypassed using package validation.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "min relay fee not met",
|
|
strprintf("%d < %d", ws.m_modified_fees, m_pool.m_min_relay_feerate.GetFee(ws.m_vsize)));
|
|
}
|
|
// No individual transactions are allowed below the mempool min feerate except from disconnected
|
|
// blocks and transactions in a package. Package transactions will be checked using package
|
|
// feerate later.
|
|
if (!bypass_limits && !args.m_package_feerates && !CheckFeeRate(ws.m_vsize, ws.m_modified_fees, state)) return false;
|
|
|
|
ws.m_iters_conflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(ws.m_conflicts);
|
|
|
|
// Note that these modifications are only applicable to single transaction scenarios;
|
|
// carve-outs and package RBF are disabled for multi-transaction evaluations.
|
|
CTxMemPool::Limits maybe_rbf_limits = m_pool.m_limits;
|
|
|
|
// Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit.
|
|
if (ws.m_conflicts.size() == 1) {
|
|
// In general, when we receive an RBF transaction with mempool conflicts, we want to know whether we
|
|
// would meet the chain limits after the conflicts have been removed. However, there isn't a practical
|
|
// way to do this short of calculating the ancestor and descendant sets with an overlay cache of
|
|
// changed mempool entries. Due to both implementation and runtime complexity concerns, this isn't
|
|
// very realistic, thus we only ensure a limited set of transactions are RBF'able despite mempool
|
|
// conflicts here. Importantly, we need to ensure that some transactions which were accepted using
|
|
// the below carve-out are able to be RBF'ed, without impacting the security the carve-out provides
|
|
// for off-chain contract systems (see link in the comment below).
|
|
//
|
|
// Specifically, the subset of RBF transactions which we allow despite chain limits are those which
|
|
// conflict directly with exactly one other transaction (but may evict children of said transaction),
|
|
// and which are not adding any new mempool dependencies. Note that the "no new mempool dependencies"
|
|
// check is accomplished later, so we don't bother doing anything about it here, but if our
|
|
// policy changes, we may need to move that check to here instead of removing it wholesale.
|
|
//
|
|
// Such transactions are clearly not merging any existing packages, so we are only concerned with
|
|
// ensuring that (a) no package is growing past the package size (not count) limits and (b) we are
|
|
// not allowing something to effectively use the (below) carve-out spot when it shouldn't be allowed
|
|
// to.
|
|
//
|
|
// To check these we first check if we meet the RBF criteria, above, and increment the descendant
|
|
// limits by the direct conflict and its descendants (as these are recalculated in
|
|
// CalculateMempoolAncestors by assuming the new transaction being added is a new descendant, with no
|
|
// removals, of each parent's existing dependent set). The ancestor count limits are unmodified (as
|
|
// the ancestor limits should be the same for both our new transaction and any conflicts).
|
|
// We don't bother incrementing m_limit_descendants by the full removal count as that limit never comes
|
|
// into force here (as we're only adding a single transaction).
|
|
assert(ws.m_iters_conflicting.size() == 1);
|
|
CTxMemPool::txiter conflict = *ws.m_iters_conflicting.begin();
|
|
|
|
maybe_rbf_limits.descendant_count += 1;
|
|
maybe_rbf_limits.descendant_size_vbytes += conflict->GetSizeWithDescendants();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto ancestors{m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, maybe_rbf_limits)};
|
|
if (!ancestors) {
|
|
// If CalculateMemPoolAncestors fails second time, we want the original error string.
|
|
// Contracting/payment channels CPFP carve-out:
|
|
// If the new transaction is relatively small (up to 40k weight)
|
|
// and has at most one ancestor (ie ancestor limit of 2, including
|
|
// the new transaction), allow it if its parent has exactly the
|
|
// descendant limit descendants.
|
|
//
|
|
// This allows protocols which rely on distrusting counterparties
|
|
// being able to broadcast descendants of an unconfirmed transaction
|
|
// to be secure by simply only having two immediately-spendable
|
|
// outputs - one for each counterparty. For more info on the uses for
|
|
// this, see https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
|
|
CTxMemPool::Limits cpfp_carve_out_limits{
|
|
.ancestor_count = 2,
|
|
.ancestor_size_vbytes = maybe_rbf_limits.ancestor_size_vbytes,
|
|
.descendant_count = maybe_rbf_limits.descendant_count + 1,
|
|
.descendant_size_vbytes = maybe_rbf_limits.descendant_size_vbytes + EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT,
|
|
};
|
|
const auto error_message{util::ErrorString(ancestors).original};
|
|
if (ws.m_vsize > EXTRA_DESCENDANT_TX_SIZE_LIMIT) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-long-mempool-chain", error_message);
|
|
}
|
|
ancestors = m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*entry, cpfp_carve_out_limits);
|
|
if (!ancestors) return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-long-mempool-chain", error_message);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ws.m_ancestors = *ancestors;
|
|
|
|
// A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now
|
|
// that we have the set of all ancestors we can detect this
|
|
// pathological case by making sure ws.m_conflicts and ws.m_ancestors don't
|
|
// intersect.
|
|
if (const auto err_string{EntriesAndTxidsDisjoint(ws.m_ancestors, ws.m_conflicts, hash)}) {
|
|
// We classify this as a consensus error because a transaction depending on something it
|
|
// conflicts with would be inconsistent.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", *err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_rbf = !ws.m_conflicts.empty();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::ReplacementChecks(Workspace& ws)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
|
|
const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
|
|
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
|
|
|
|
CFeeRate newFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize);
|
|
// Enforce Rule #6. The replacement transaction must have a higher feerate than its direct conflicts.
|
|
// - The motivation for this check is to ensure that the replacement transaction is preferable for
|
|
// block-inclusion, compared to what would be removed from the mempool.
|
|
// - This logic predates ancestor feerate-based transaction selection, which is why it doesn't
|
|
// consider feerates of descendants.
|
|
// - Note: Ancestor feerate-based transaction selection has made this comparison insufficient to
|
|
// guarantee that this is incentive-compatible for miners, because it is possible for a
|
|
// descendant transaction of a direct conflict to pay a higher feerate than the transaction that
|
|
// might replace them, under these rules.
|
|
if (const auto err_string{PaysMoreThanConflicts(ws.m_iters_conflicting, newFeeRate, hash)}) {
|
|
// Even though this is a fee-related failure, this result is TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, not
|
|
// TX_RECONSIDERABLE, because it cannot be bypassed using package validation.
|
|
// This must be changed if package RBF is enabled.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee", *err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Calculate all conflicting entries and enforce Rule #5.
|
|
if (const auto err_string{GetEntriesForConflicts(tx, m_pool, ws.m_iters_conflicting, ws.m_all_conflicting)}) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY,
|
|
"too many potential replacements", *err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
// Enforce Rule #2.
|
|
if (const auto err_string{HasNoNewUnconfirmed(tx, m_pool, ws.m_iters_conflicting)}) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY,
|
|
"replacement-adds-unconfirmed", *err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
// Check if it's economically rational to mine this transaction rather than the ones it
|
|
// replaces and pays for its own relay fees. Enforce Rules #3 and #4.
|
|
for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : ws.m_all_conflicting) {
|
|
ws.m_conflicting_fees += it->GetModifiedFee();
|
|
ws.m_conflicting_size += it->GetTxSize();
|
|
}
|
|
if (const auto err_string{PaysForRBF(ws.m_conflicting_fees, ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize,
|
|
m_pool.m_incremental_relay_feerate, hash)}) {
|
|
// Even though this is a fee-related failure, this result is TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, not
|
|
// TX_RECONSIDERABLE, because it cannot be bypassed using package validation.
|
|
// This must be changed if package RBF is enabled.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "insufficient fee", *err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::PackageMempoolChecks(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns,
|
|
const int64_t total_vsize,
|
|
PackageValidationState& package_state)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// CheckPackageLimits expects the package transactions to not already be in the mempool.
|
|
assert(std::all_of(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), [this](const auto& tx)
|
|
{ return !m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(tx->GetHash()));}));
|
|
|
|
std::string err_string;
|
|
if (!m_pool.CheckPackageLimits(txns, total_vsize, err_string)) {
|
|
// This is a package-wide error, separate from an individual transaction error.
|
|
return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package-mempool-limits", err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
|
|
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
|
|
|
|
constexpr unsigned int scriptVerifyFlags = STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS;
|
|
|
|
// Check input scripts and signatures.
|
|
// This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
|
|
if (!CheckInputScripts(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata)) {
|
|
// SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK requires SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS, so we
|
|
// need to turn both off, and compare against just turning off CLEANSTACK
|
|
// to see if the failure is specifically due to witness validation.
|
|
TxValidationState state_dummy; // Want reported failures to be from first CheckInputScripts
|
|
if (!tx.HasWitness() && CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~(SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK), true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata) &&
|
|
!CheckInputScripts(tx, state_dummy, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags & ~SCRIPT_VERIFY_CLEANSTACK, true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata)) {
|
|
// Only the witness is missing, so the transaction itself may be fine.
|
|
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED,
|
|
state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage());
|
|
}
|
|
return false; // state filled in by CheckInputScripts
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
|
|
const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
|
|
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
|
|
|
|
// Check again against the current block tip's script verification
|
|
// flags to cache our script execution flags. This is, of course,
|
|
// useless if the next block has different script flags from the
|
|
// previous one, but because the cache tracks script flags for us it
|
|
// will auto-invalidate and we'll just have a few blocks of extra
|
|
// misses on soft-fork activation.
|
|
//
|
|
// This is also useful in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause
|
|
// transactions to pass as valid when they're actually invalid. For
|
|
// instance the STRICTENC flag was incorrectly allowing certain
|
|
// CHECKSIG NOT scripts to pass, even though they were invalid.
|
|
//
|
|
// There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating
|
|
// invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such
|
|
// transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack.
|
|
unsigned int currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), m_active_chainstate.m_chainman)};
|
|
if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(tx, state, m_view, m_pool, currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags,
|
|
ws.m_precomputed_txdata, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip())) {
|
|
LogPrintf("BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputScripts failed against latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s\n", hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
return Assume(false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::Finalize(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx;
|
|
const uint256& hash = ws.m_hash;
|
|
TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state;
|
|
const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits;
|
|
|
|
std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPoolEntry>& entry = ws.m_entry;
|
|
|
|
// Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool
|
|
for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : ws.m_all_conflicting)
|
|
{
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "replacing tx %s (wtxid=%s) with %s (wtxid=%s) for %s additional fees, %d delta bytes\n",
|
|
it->GetTx().GetHash().ToString(),
|
|
it->GetTx().GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
|
|
hash.ToString(),
|
|
tx.GetWitnessHash().ToString(),
|
|
FormatMoney(ws.m_modified_fees - ws.m_conflicting_fees),
|
|
(int)entry->GetTxSize() - (int)ws.m_conflicting_size);
|
|
TRACE7(mempool, replaced,
|
|
it->GetTx().GetHash().data(),
|
|
it->GetTxSize(),
|
|
it->GetFee(),
|
|
std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::duration<std::uint64_t>>(it->GetTime()).count(),
|
|
hash.data(),
|
|
entry->GetTxSize(),
|
|
entry->GetFee()
|
|
);
|
|
ws.m_replaced_transactions.push_back(it->GetSharedTx());
|
|
}
|
|
m_pool.RemoveStaged(ws.m_all_conflicting, false, MemPoolRemovalReason::REPLACED);
|
|
|
|
// This transaction should only count for fee estimation if:
|
|
// - it's not being re-added during a reorg which bypasses typical mempool fee limits
|
|
// - the node is not behind
|
|
// - the transaction is not dependent on any other transactions in the mempool
|
|
// - it's not part of a package. Since package relay is not currently supported, this
|
|
// transaction has not necessarily been accepted to miners' mempools.
|
|
bool validForFeeEstimation = !bypass_limits && !args.m_package_submission && IsCurrentForFeeEstimation(m_active_chainstate) && m_pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx);
|
|
|
|
// Store transaction in memory
|
|
m_pool.addUnchecked(*entry, ws.m_ancestors, validForFeeEstimation);
|
|
|
|
// trim mempool and check if tx was trimmed
|
|
// If we are validating a package, don't trim here because we could evict a previous transaction
|
|
// in the package. LimitMempoolSize() should be called at the very end to make sure the mempool
|
|
// is still within limits and package submission happens atomically.
|
|
if (!args.m_package_submission && !bypass_limits) {
|
|
LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
|
if (!m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(hash)))
|
|
// The tx no longer meets our (new) mempool minimum feerate but could be reconsidered in a package.
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "mempool full");
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool MemPoolAccept::SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces,
|
|
PackageValidationState& package_state,
|
|
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult>& results)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
// Sanity check: none of the transactions should be in the mempool, and none of the transactions
|
|
// should have a same-txid-different-witness equivalent in the mempool.
|
|
assert(std::all_of(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), [this](const auto& ws){
|
|
return !m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(ws.m_ptx->GetHash())); }));
|
|
|
|
bool all_submitted = true;
|
|
// ConsensusScriptChecks adds to the script cache and is therefore consensus-critical;
|
|
// CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache asserts that transactions only spend coins available from the
|
|
// mempool or UTXO set. Submit each transaction to the mempool immediately after calling
|
|
// ConsensusScriptChecks to make the outputs available for subsequent transactions.
|
|
for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) {
|
|
if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) {
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
|
|
// Since PolicyScriptChecks() passed, this should never fail.
|
|
Assume(false);
|
|
all_submitted = false;
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR,
|
|
strprintf("BUG! PolicyScriptChecks succeeded but ConsensusScriptChecks failed: %s",
|
|
ws.m_ptx->GetHash().ToString()));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Re-calculate mempool ancestors to call addUnchecked(). They may have changed since the
|
|
// last calculation done in PreChecks, since package ancestors have already been submitted.
|
|
{
|
|
auto ancestors{m_pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(*ws.m_entry, m_pool.m_limits)};
|
|
if(!ancestors) {
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
|
|
// Since PreChecks() and PackageMempoolChecks() both enforce limits, this should never fail.
|
|
Assume(false);
|
|
all_submitted = false;
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR,
|
|
strprintf("BUG! Mempool ancestors or descendants were underestimated: %s",
|
|
ws.m_ptx->GetHash().ToString()));
|
|
}
|
|
ws.m_ancestors = std::move(ancestors).value_or(ws.m_ancestors);
|
|
}
|
|
// If we call LimitMempoolSize() for each individual Finalize(), the mempool will not take
|
|
// the transaction's descendant feerate into account because it hasn't seen them yet. Also,
|
|
// we risk evicting a transaction that a subsequent package transaction depends on. Instead,
|
|
// allow the mempool to temporarily bypass limits, the maximum package size) while
|
|
// submitting transactions individually and then trim at the very end.
|
|
if (!Finalize(args, ws)) {
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
|
|
// Since LimitMempoolSize() won't be called, this should never fail.
|
|
Assume(false);
|
|
all_submitted = false;
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR,
|
|
strprintf("BUG! Adding to mempool failed: %s", ws.m_ptx->GetHash().ToString()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<Wtxid> all_package_wtxids;
|
|
all_package_wtxids.reserve(workspaces.size());
|
|
std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), std::back_inserter(all_package_wtxids),
|
|
[](const auto& ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(); });
|
|
|
|
// Add successful results. The returned results may change later if LimitMempoolSize() evicts them.
|
|
for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) {
|
|
const auto effective_feerate = args.m_package_feerates ? ws.m_package_feerate :
|
|
CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
|
|
const auto effective_feerate_wtxids = args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_wtxids :
|
|
std::vector<Wtxid>{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()};
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(),
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize,
|
|
ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, effective_feerate_wtxids));
|
|
GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(ws.m_ptx, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
|
|
}
|
|
return all_submitted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptSingleTransaction(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
LOCK(m_pool.cs); // mempool "read lock" (held through GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool())
|
|
|
|
Workspace ws(ptx);
|
|
const std::vector<Wtxid> single_wtxid{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()};
|
|
|
|
if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) {
|
|
if (ws.m_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE) {
|
|
// Failed for fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which tx was included.
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), single_wtxid);
|
|
}
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m_rbf && !ReplacementChecks(ws)) return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
|
|
|
|
// Perform the inexpensive checks first and avoid hashing and signature verification unless
|
|
// those checks pass, to mitigate CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks.
|
|
if (!PolicyScriptChecks(args, ws)) return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
|
|
|
|
if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state);
|
|
|
|
const CFeeRate effective_feerate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
|
|
// Tx was accepted, but not added
|
|
if (args.m_test_accept) {
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize,
|
|
ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, single_wtxid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!Finalize(args, ws)) {
|
|
// The only possible failure reason is fee-related (mempool full).
|
|
// Failed for fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which txns were included.
|
|
Assume(ws.m_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE);
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), {ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
GetMainSignals().TransactionAddedToMempool(ptx, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence());
|
|
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees,
|
|
effective_feerate, single_wtxid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptMultipleTransactions(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// These context-free package limits can be done before taking the mempool lock.
|
|
PackageValidationState package_state;
|
|
if (!IsWellFormedPackage(txns, package_state, /*require_sorted=*/true)) return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {});
|
|
|
|
std::vector<Workspace> workspaces{};
|
|
workspaces.reserve(txns.size());
|
|
std::transform(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), std::back_inserter(workspaces),
|
|
[](const auto& tx) { return Workspace(tx); });
|
|
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> results;
|
|
|
|
LOCK(m_pool.cs);
|
|
|
|
// Do all PreChecks first and fail fast to avoid running expensive script checks when unnecessary.
|
|
for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) {
|
|
if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) {
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
// Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx result; the rest are unfinished.
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
}
|
|
// Make the coins created by this transaction available for subsequent transactions in the
|
|
// package to spend. Since we already checked conflicts in the package and we don't allow
|
|
// replacements, we don't need to track the coins spent. Note that this logic will need to be
|
|
// updated if package replace-by-fee is allowed in the future.
|
|
assert(!args.m_allow_replacement);
|
|
m_viewmempool.PackageAddTransaction(ws.m_ptx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Transactions must meet two minimum feerates: the mempool minimum fee and min relay fee.
|
|
// For transactions consisting of exactly one child and its parents, it suffices to use the
|
|
// package feerate (total modified fees / total virtual size) to check this requirement.
|
|
// Note that this is an aggregate feerate; this function has not checked that there are transactions
|
|
// too low feerate to pay for themselves, or that the child transactions are higher feerate than
|
|
// their parents. Using aggregate feerate may allow "parents pay for child" behavior and permit
|
|
// a child that is below mempool minimum feerate. To avoid these behaviors, callers of
|
|
// AcceptMultipleTransactions need to restrict txns topology (e.g. to ancestor sets) and check
|
|
// the feerates of individuals and subsets.
|
|
const auto m_total_vsize = std::accumulate(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), int64_t{0},
|
|
[](int64_t sum, auto& ws) { return sum + ws.m_vsize; });
|
|
const auto m_total_modified_fees = std::accumulate(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), CAmount{0},
|
|
[](CAmount sum, auto& ws) { return sum + ws.m_modified_fees; });
|
|
const CFeeRate package_feerate(m_total_modified_fees, m_total_vsize);
|
|
std::vector<Wtxid> all_package_wtxids;
|
|
all_package_wtxids.reserve(workspaces.size());
|
|
std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), std::back_inserter(all_package_wtxids),
|
|
[](const auto& ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(); });
|
|
TxValidationState placeholder_state;
|
|
if (args.m_package_feerates &&
|
|
!CheckFeeRate(m_total_vsize, m_total_modified_fees, placeholder_state)) {
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {{workspaces.back().m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(),
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(placeholder_state, CFeeRate(m_total_modified_fees, m_total_vsize), all_package_wtxids)}});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Apply package mempool ancestor/descendant limits. Skip if there is only one transaction,
|
|
// because it's unnecessary. Also, CPFP carve out can increase the limit for individual
|
|
// transactions, but this exemption is not extended to packages in CheckPackageLimits().
|
|
std::string err_string;
|
|
if (txns.size() > 1 && !PackageMempoolChecks(txns, m_total_vsize, package_state)) {
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) {
|
|
ws.m_package_feerate = package_feerate;
|
|
if (!PolicyScriptChecks(args, ws)) {
|
|
// Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx result; the rest are unfinished.
|
|
package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state));
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
}
|
|
if (args.m_test_accept) {
|
|
const auto effective_feerate = args.m_package_feerates ? ws.m_package_feerate :
|
|
CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<uint32_t>(ws.m_vsize)};
|
|
const auto effective_feerate_wtxids = args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_wtxids :
|
|
std::vector<Wtxid>{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()};
|
|
results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(),
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(ws.m_replaced_transactions),
|
|
ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate,
|
|
effective_feerate_wtxids));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (args.m_test_accept) return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
|
|
if (!SubmitPackage(args, workspaces, package_state, results)) {
|
|
// PackageValidationState filled in by SubmitPackage().
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void MemPoolAccept::CleanupTemporaryCoins()
|
|
{
|
|
// There are 3 kinds of coins in m_view:
|
|
// (1) Temporary coins from the transactions in subpackage, constructed by m_viewmempool.
|
|
// (2) Mempool coins from transactions in the mempool, constructed by m_viewmempool.
|
|
// (3) Confirmed coins fetched from our current UTXO set.
|
|
//
|
|
// (1) Temporary coins need to be removed, regardless of whether the transaction was submitted.
|
|
// If the transaction was submitted to the mempool, m_viewmempool will be able to fetch them from
|
|
// there. If it wasn't submitted to mempool, it is incorrect to keep them - future calls may try
|
|
// to spend those coins that don't actually exist.
|
|
// (2) Mempool coins also need to be removed. If the mempool contents have changed as a result
|
|
// of submitting or replacing transactions, coins previously fetched from mempool may now be
|
|
// spent or nonexistent. Those coins need to be deleted from m_view.
|
|
// (3) Confirmed coins don't need to be removed. The chainstate has not changed (we are
|
|
// holding cs_main and no blocks have been processed) so the confirmed tx cannot disappear like
|
|
// a mempool tx can. The coin may now be spent after we submitted a tx to mempool, but
|
|
// we have already checked that the package does not have 2 transactions spending the same coin.
|
|
// Keeping them in m_view is an optimization to not re-fetch confirmed coins if we later look up
|
|
// inputs for this transaction again.
|
|
for (const auto& outpoint : m_viewmempool.GetNonBaseCoins()) {
|
|
// In addition to resetting m_viewmempool, we also need to manually delete these coins from
|
|
// m_view because it caches copies of the coins it fetched from m_viewmempool previously.
|
|
m_view.Uncache(outpoint);
|
|
}
|
|
// This deletes the temporary and mempool coins.
|
|
m_viewmempool.Reset();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs);
|
|
auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) {
|
|
if (subpackage.size() > 1) {
|
|
return AcceptMultipleTransactions(subpackage, args);
|
|
}
|
|
const auto& tx = subpackage.front();
|
|
ATMPArgs single_args = ATMPArgs::SingleInPackageAccept(args);
|
|
const auto single_res = AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, single_args);
|
|
PackageValidationState package_state_wrapped;
|
|
if (single_res.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
|
package_state_wrapped.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
}
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_wrapped, {{tx->GetWitnessHash(), single_res}});
|
|
}();
|
|
|
|
// Clean up m_view and m_viewmempool so that other subpackage evaluations don't have access to
|
|
// coins they shouldn't. Keep some coins in order to minimize re-fetching coins from the UTXO set.
|
|
CleanupTemporaryCoins();
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package, ATMPArgs& args)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
// Used if returning a PackageMempoolAcceptResult directly from this function.
|
|
PackageValidationState package_state_quit_early;
|
|
|
|
// Check that the package is well-formed. If it isn't, we won't try to validate any of the
|
|
// transactions and thus won't return any MempoolAcceptResults, just a package-wide error.
|
|
|
|
// Context-free package checks.
|
|
if (!IsWellFormedPackage(package, package_state_quit_early, /*require_sorted=*/true)) {
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All transactions in the package must be a parent of the last transaction. This is just an
|
|
// opportunity for us to fail fast on a context-free check without taking the mempool lock.
|
|
if (!IsChildWithParents(package)) {
|
|
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package-not-child-with-parents");
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// IsChildWithParents() guarantees the package is > 1 transactions.
|
|
assert(package.size() > 1);
|
|
// The package must be 1 child with all of its unconfirmed parents. The package is expected to
|
|
// be sorted, so the last transaction is the child.
|
|
const auto& child = package.back();
|
|
std::unordered_set<uint256, SaltedTxidHasher> unconfirmed_parent_txids;
|
|
std::transform(package.cbegin(), package.cend() - 1,
|
|
std::inserter(unconfirmed_parent_txids, unconfirmed_parent_txids.end()),
|
|
[](const auto& tx) { return tx->GetHash(); });
|
|
|
|
// All child inputs must refer to a preceding package transaction or a confirmed UTXO. The only
|
|
// way to verify this is to look up the child's inputs in our current coins view (not including
|
|
// mempool), and enforce that all parents not present in the package be available at chain tip.
|
|
// Since this check can bring new coins into the coins cache, keep track of these coins and
|
|
// uncache them if we don't end up submitting this package to the mempool.
|
|
const CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip_cache = m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip();
|
|
for (const auto& input : child->vin) {
|
|
if (!coins_tip_cache.HaveCoinInCache(input.prevout)) {
|
|
args.m_coins_to_uncache.push_back(input.prevout);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Using the MemPoolAccept m_view cache allows us to look up these same coins faster later.
|
|
// This should be connecting directly to CoinsTip, not to m_viewmempool, because we specifically
|
|
// require inputs to be confirmed if they aren't in the package.
|
|
m_view.SetBackend(m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
|
const auto package_or_confirmed = [this, &unconfirmed_parent_txids](const auto& input) {
|
|
return unconfirmed_parent_txids.count(input.prevout.hash) > 0 || m_view.HaveCoin(input.prevout);
|
|
};
|
|
if (!std::all_of(child->vin.cbegin(), child->vin.cend(), package_or_confirmed)) {
|
|
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package-not-child-with-unconfirmed-parents");
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {});
|
|
}
|
|
// Protect against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being added to
|
|
// coins_to_uncache. The backend will be connected again when needed in PreChecks.
|
|
m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy);
|
|
|
|
LOCK(m_pool.cs);
|
|
// Stores results from which we will create the returned PackageMempoolAcceptResult.
|
|
// A result may be changed if a mempool transaction is evicted later due to LimitMempoolSize().
|
|
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> results_final;
|
|
// Results from individual validation which will be returned if no other result is available for
|
|
// this transaction. "Nonfinal" because if a transaction fails by itself but succeeds later
|
|
// (i.e. when evaluated with a fee-bumping child), the result in this map may be discarded.
|
|
std::map<uint256, MempoolAcceptResult> individual_results_nonfinal;
|
|
bool quit_early{false};
|
|
std::vector<CTransactionRef> txns_package_eval;
|
|
for (const auto& tx : package) {
|
|
const auto& wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash();
|
|
const auto& txid = tx->GetHash();
|
|
// There are 3 possibilities: already in mempool, same-txid-diff-wtxid already in mempool,
|
|
// or not in mempool. An already confirmed tx is treated as one not in mempool, because all
|
|
// we know is that the inputs aren't available.
|
|
if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(wtxid))) {
|
|
// Exact transaction already exists in the mempool.
|
|
// Node operators are free to set their mempool policies however they please, nodes may receive
|
|
// transactions in different orders, and malicious counterparties may try to take advantage of
|
|
// policy differences to pin or delay propagation of transactions. As such, it's possible for
|
|
// some package transaction(s) to already be in the mempool, and we don't want to reject the
|
|
// entire package in that case (as that could be a censorship vector). De-duplicate the
|
|
// transactions that are already in the mempool, and only call AcceptMultipleTransactions() with
|
|
// the new transactions. This ensures we don't double-count transaction counts and sizes when
|
|
// checking ancestor/descendant limits, or double-count transaction fees for fee-related policy.
|
|
const auto& entry{*Assert(m_pool.GetEntry(txid))};
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTx(entry.GetTxSize(), entry.GetFee()));
|
|
} else if (m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(txid))) {
|
|
// Transaction with the same non-witness data but different witness (same txid,
|
|
// different wtxid) already exists in the mempool.
|
|
//
|
|
// We don't allow replacement transactions right now, so just swap the package
|
|
// transaction for the mempool one. Note that we are ignoring the validity of the
|
|
// package transaction passed in.
|
|
// TODO: allow witness replacement in packages.
|
|
const auto& entry{*Assert(m_pool.GetEntry(txid))};
|
|
// Provide the wtxid of the mempool tx so that the caller can look it up in the mempool.
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTxDifferentWitness(entry.GetTx().GetWitnessHash()));
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Transaction does not already exist in the mempool.
|
|
// Try submitting the transaction on its own.
|
|
const auto single_package_res = AcceptSubPackage({tx}, args);
|
|
const auto& single_res = single_package_res.m_tx_results.at(wtxid);
|
|
if (single_res.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
|
// The transaction succeeded on its own and is now in the mempool. Don't include it
|
|
// in package validation, because its fees should only be "used" once.
|
|
assert(m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(wtxid)));
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, single_res);
|
|
} else if (single_res.m_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE &&
|
|
single_res.m_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
|
|
// Package validation policy only differs from individual policy in its evaluation
|
|
// of feerate. For example, if a transaction fails here due to violation of a
|
|
// consensus rule, the result will not change when it is submitted as part of a
|
|
// package. To minimize the amount of repeated work, unless the transaction fails
|
|
// due to feerate or missing inputs (its parent is a previous transaction in the
|
|
// package that failed due to feerate), don't run package validation. Note that this
|
|
// decision might not make sense if different types of packages are allowed in the
|
|
// future. Continue individually validating the rest of the transactions, because
|
|
// some of them may still be valid.
|
|
quit_early = true;
|
|
package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(wtxid, single_res);
|
|
} else {
|
|
individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(wtxid, single_res);
|
|
txns_package_eval.push_back(tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto multi_submission_result = quit_early || txns_package_eval.empty() ? PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {}) :
|
|
AcceptSubPackage(txns_package_eval, args);
|
|
PackageValidationState& package_state_final = multi_submission_result.m_state;
|
|
|
|
// Make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size.
|
|
// Package transactions that were submitted to mempool or already in mempool may be evicted.
|
|
LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
|
|
|
for (const auto& tx : package) {
|
|
const auto& wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash();
|
|
if (multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.count(wtxid) > 0) {
|
|
// We shouldn't have re-submitted if the tx result was already in results_final.
|
|
Assume(results_final.count(wtxid) == 0);
|
|
// If it was submitted, check to see if the tx is still in the mempool. It could have
|
|
// been evicted due to LimitMempoolSize() above.
|
|
const auto& txresult = multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.at(wtxid);
|
|
if (txresult.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID && !m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Wtxid(wtxid))) {
|
|
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
|
|
mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
|
|
} else {
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, txresult);
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (const auto it{results_final.find(wtxid)}; it != results_final.end()) {
|
|
// Already-in-mempool transaction. Check to see if it's still there, as it could have
|
|
// been evicted when LimitMempoolSize() was called.
|
|
Assume(it->second.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
|
Assume(individual_results_nonfinal.count(wtxid) == 0);
|
|
// Query by txid to include the same-txid-different-witness ones.
|
|
if (!m_pool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(tx->GetHash()))) {
|
|
package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed");
|
|
TxValidationState mempool_full_state;
|
|
mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full");
|
|
// Replace the previous result.
|
|
results_final.erase(wtxid);
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state));
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (const auto it{individual_results_nonfinal.find(wtxid)}; it != individual_results_nonfinal.end()) {
|
|
Assume(it->second.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID);
|
|
// Interesting result from previous processing.
|
|
results_final.emplace(wtxid, it->second);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Assume(results_final.size() == package.size());
|
|
return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_final, std::move(results_final));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // anon namespace
|
|
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult AcceptToMemoryPool(Chainstate& active_chainstate, const CTransactionRef& tx,
|
|
int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits, bool test_accept)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
const CChainParams& chainparams{active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetParams()};
|
|
assert(active_chainstate.GetMempool() != nullptr);
|
|
CTxMemPool& pool{*active_chainstate.GetMempool()};
|
|
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache;
|
|
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::SingleAccept(chainparams, accept_time, bypass_limits, coins_to_uncache, test_accept);
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult result = MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptSingleTransaction(tx, args);
|
|
if (result.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
|
// Remove coins that were not present in the coins cache before calling
|
|
// AcceptSingleTransaction(); this is to prevent memory DoS in case we receive a large
|
|
// number of invalid transactions that attempt to overrun the in-memory coins cache
|
|
// (`CCoinsViewCache::cacheCoins`).
|
|
|
|
for (const COutPoint& hashTx : coins_to_uncache)
|
|
active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(hashTx);
|
|
TRACE2(mempool, rejected,
|
|
tx->GetHash().data(),
|
|
result.m_state.GetRejectReason().c_str()
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
// After we've (potentially) uncached entries, ensure our coins cache is still within its size limits
|
|
BlockValidationState state_dummy;
|
|
active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state_dummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PackageMempoolAcceptResult ProcessNewPackage(Chainstate& active_chainstate, CTxMemPool& pool,
|
|
const Package& package, bool test_accept)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
assert(!package.empty());
|
|
assert(std::all_of(package.cbegin(), package.cend(), [](const auto& tx){return tx != nullptr;}));
|
|
|
|
std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache;
|
|
const CChainParams& chainparams = active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetParams();
|
|
auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) {
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (test_accept) {
|
|
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageTestAccept(chainparams, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache);
|
|
return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptMultipleTransactions(package, args);
|
|
} else {
|
|
auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageChildWithParents(chainparams, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache);
|
|
return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptPackage(package, args);
|
|
}
|
|
}();
|
|
|
|
// Uncache coins pertaining to transactions that were not submitted to the mempool.
|
|
if (test_accept || result.m_state.IsInvalid()) {
|
|
for (const COutPoint& hashTx : coins_to_uncache) {
|
|
active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(hashTx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Ensure the coins cache is still within limits.
|
|
BlockValidationState state_dummy;
|
|
active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state_dummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CAmount GetBlockSubsidy(int nHeight, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams)
|
|
{
|
|
int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;
|
|
// Force block reward to zero when right shift is undefined.
|
|
if (halvings >= 64)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
CAmount nSubsidy = 50 * COIN;
|
|
// Subsidy is cut in half every 210,000 blocks which will occur approximately every 4 years.
|
|
nSubsidy >>= halvings;
|
|
return nSubsidy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CoinsViews::CoinsViews(DBParams db_params, CoinsViewOptions options)
|
|
: m_dbview{std::move(db_params), std::move(options)},
|
|
m_catcherview(&m_dbview) {}
|
|
|
|
void CoinsViews::InitCache()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
m_cacheview = std::make_unique<CCoinsViewCache>(&m_catcherview);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate::Chainstate(
|
|
CTxMemPool* mempool,
|
|
BlockManager& blockman,
|
|
ChainstateManager& chainman,
|
|
std::optional<uint256> from_snapshot_blockhash)
|
|
: m_mempool(mempool),
|
|
m_blockman(blockman),
|
|
m_chainman(chainman),
|
|
m_from_snapshot_blockhash(from_snapshot_blockhash) {}
|
|
|
|
const CBlockIndex* Chainstate::SnapshotBase()
|
|
{
|
|
if (!m_from_snapshot_blockhash) return nullptr;
|
|
if (!m_cached_snapshot_base) m_cached_snapshot_base = Assert(m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(*m_from_snapshot_blockhash));
|
|
return m_cached_snapshot_base;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::InitCoinsDB(
|
|
size_t cache_size_bytes,
|
|
bool in_memory,
|
|
bool should_wipe,
|
|
fs::path leveldb_name)
|
|
{
|
|
if (m_from_snapshot_blockhash) {
|
|
leveldb_name += node::SNAPSHOT_CHAINSTATE_SUFFIX;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_coins_views = std::make_unique<CoinsViews>(
|
|
DBParams{
|
|
.path = m_chainman.m_options.datadir / leveldb_name,
|
|
.cache_bytes = cache_size_bytes,
|
|
.memory_only = in_memory,
|
|
.wipe_data = should_wipe,
|
|
.obfuscate = true,
|
|
.options = m_chainman.m_options.coins_db},
|
|
m_chainman.m_options.coins_view);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::InitCoinsCache(size_t cache_size_bytes)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
assert(m_coins_views != nullptr);
|
|
m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = cache_size_bytes;
|
|
m_coins_views->InitCache();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Note that though this is marked const, we may end up modifying `m_cached_finished_ibd`, which
|
|
// is a performance-related implementation detail. This function must be marked
|
|
// `const` so that `CValidationInterface` clients (which are given a `const Chainstate*`)
|
|
// can call it.
|
|
//
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::IsInitialBlockDownload() const
|
|
{
|
|
// Optimization: pre-test latch before taking the lock.
|
|
if (m_cached_finished_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_cached_finished_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
|
|
return false;
|
|
if (m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
CChain& chain{ActiveChain()};
|
|
if (chain.Tip() == nullptr) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (chain.Tip()->nChainWork < MinimumChainWork()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (chain.Tip()->Time() < Now<NodeSeconds>() - m_options.max_tip_age) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrintf("Leaving InitialBlockDownload (latching to false)\n");
|
|
m_cached_finished_ibd.store(true, std::memory_order_relaxed);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::CheckForkWarningConditions()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// Before we get past initial download, we cannot reliably alert about forks
|
|
// (we assume we don't get stuck on a fork before finishing our initial sync)
|
|
if (m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m_chainman.m_best_invalid && m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork > m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork + (GetBlockProof(*m_chain.Tip()) * 6)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: Warning: Found invalid chain at least ~6 blocks longer than our best chain.\nChain state database corruption likely.\n", __func__);
|
|
SetfLargeWorkInvalidChainFound(true);
|
|
} else {
|
|
SetfLargeWorkInvalidChainFound(false);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Called both upon regular invalid block discovery *and* InvalidateBlock
|
|
void Chainstate::InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex* pindexNew)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (!m_chainman.m_best_invalid || pindexNew->nChainWork > m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork) {
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew;
|
|
}
|
|
if (m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr && m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindexNew->nHeight) == pindexNew) {
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_header = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: invalid block=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n", __func__,
|
|
pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexNew->nHeight,
|
|
log(pindexNew->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0), FormatISO8601DateTime(pindexNew->GetBlockTime()));
|
|
CBlockIndex *tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
assert (tip);
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: current best=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n", __func__,
|
|
tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), m_chain.Height(), log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0),
|
|
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()));
|
|
CheckForkWarningConditions();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Same as InvalidChainFound, above, except not called directly from InvalidateBlock,
|
|
// which does its own setBlockIndexCandidates management.
|
|
void Chainstate::InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex* pindex, const BlockValidationState& state)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
|
|
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
|
|
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.insert(pindex);
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex);
|
|
InvalidChainFound(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void UpdateCoins(const CTransaction& tx, CCoinsViewCache& inputs, CTxUndo &txundo, int nHeight)
|
|
{
|
|
// mark inputs spent
|
|
if (!tx.IsCoinBase()) {
|
|
txundo.vprevout.reserve(tx.vin.size());
|
|
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) {
|
|
txundo.vprevout.emplace_back();
|
|
bool is_spent = inputs.SpendCoin(txin.prevout, &txundo.vprevout.back());
|
|
assert(is_spent);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// add outputs
|
|
AddCoins(inputs, tx, nHeight);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool CScriptCheck::operator()() {
|
|
const CScript &scriptSig = ptxTo->vin[nIn].scriptSig;
|
|
const CScriptWitness *witness = &ptxTo->vin[nIn].scriptWitness;
|
|
return VerifyScript(scriptSig, m_tx_out.scriptPubKey, witness, nFlags, CachingTransactionSignatureChecker(ptxTo, nIn, m_tx_out.nValue, cacheStore, *txdata), &error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CuckooCache::cache<uint256, SignatureCacheHasher> g_scriptExecutionCache;
|
|
static CSHA256 g_scriptExecutionCacheHasher;
|
|
|
|
bool InitScriptExecutionCache(size_t max_size_bytes)
|
|
{
|
|
// Setup the salted hasher
|
|
uint256 nonce = GetRandHash();
|
|
// We want the nonce to be 64 bytes long to force the hasher to process
|
|
// this chunk, which makes later hash computations more efficient. We
|
|
// just write our 32-byte entropy twice to fill the 64 bytes.
|
|
g_scriptExecutionCacheHasher.Write(nonce.begin(), 32);
|
|
g_scriptExecutionCacheHasher.Write(nonce.begin(), 32);
|
|
|
|
auto setup_results = g_scriptExecutionCache.setup_bytes(max_size_bytes);
|
|
if (!setup_results) return false;
|
|
|
|
const auto [num_elems, approx_size_bytes] = *setup_results;
|
|
LogPrintf("Using %zu MiB out of %zu MiB requested for script execution cache, able to store %zu elements\n",
|
|
approx_size_bytes >> 20, max_size_bytes >> 20, num_elems);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Check whether all of this transaction's input scripts succeed.
|
|
*
|
|
* This involves ECDSA signature checks so can be computationally intensive. This function should
|
|
* only be called after the cheap sanity checks in CheckTxInputs passed.
|
|
*
|
|
* If pvChecks is not nullptr, script checks are pushed onto it instead of being performed inline. Any
|
|
* script checks which are not necessary (eg due to script execution cache hits) are, obviously,
|
|
* not pushed onto pvChecks/run.
|
|
*
|
|
* Setting cacheSigStore/cacheFullScriptStore to false will remove elements from the corresponding cache
|
|
* which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache
|
|
* entry again.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking
|
|
* callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases.
|
|
*
|
|
* Non-static (and re-declared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp
|
|
*/
|
|
bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state,
|
|
const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, unsigned int flags, bool cacheSigStore,
|
|
bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata,
|
|
std::vector<CScriptCheck>* pvChecks)
|
|
{
|
|
if (tx.IsCoinBase()) return true;
|
|
|
|
if (pvChecks) {
|
|
pvChecks->reserve(tx.vin.size());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// First check if script executions have been cached with the same
|
|
// flags. Note that this assumes that the inputs provided are
|
|
// correct (ie that the transaction hash which is in tx's prevouts
|
|
// properly commits to the scriptPubKey in the inputs view of that
|
|
// transaction).
|
|
uint256 hashCacheEntry;
|
|
CSHA256 hasher = g_scriptExecutionCacheHasher;
|
|
hasher.Write(UCharCast(tx.GetWitnessHash().begin()), 32).Write((unsigned char*)&flags, sizeof(flags)).Finalize(hashCacheEntry.begin());
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main); //TODO: Remove this requirement by making CuckooCache not require external locks
|
|
if (g_scriptExecutionCache.contains(hashCacheEntry, !cacheFullScriptStore)) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!txdata.m_spent_outputs_ready) {
|
|
std::vector<CTxOut> spent_outputs;
|
|
spent_outputs.reserve(tx.vin.size());
|
|
|
|
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) {
|
|
const COutPoint& prevout = txin.prevout;
|
|
const Coin& coin = inputs.AccessCoin(prevout);
|
|
assert(!coin.IsSpent());
|
|
spent_outputs.emplace_back(coin.out);
|
|
}
|
|
txdata.Init(tx, std::move(spent_outputs));
|
|
}
|
|
assert(txdata.m_spent_outputs.size() == tx.vin.size());
|
|
|
|
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) {
|
|
|
|
// We very carefully only pass in things to CScriptCheck which
|
|
// are clearly committed to by tx' witness hash. This provides
|
|
// a sanity check that our caching is not introducing consensus
|
|
// failures through additional data in, eg, the coins being
|
|
// spent being checked as a part of CScriptCheck.
|
|
|
|
// Verify signature
|
|
CScriptCheck check(txdata.m_spent_outputs[i], tx, i, flags, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
|
|
if (pvChecks) {
|
|
pvChecks->emplace_back(std::move(check));
|
|
} else if (!check()) {
|
|
if (flags & STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS) {
|
|
// Check whether the failure was caused by a
|
|
// non-mandatory script verification check, such as
|
|
// non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy
|
|
// arguments; if so, ensure we return NOT_STANDARD
|
|
// instead of CONSENSUS to avoid downstream users
|
|
// splitting the network between upgraded and
|
|
// non-upgraded nodes by banning CONSENSUS-failing
|
|
// data providers.
|
|
CScriptCheck check2(txdata.m_spent_outputs[i], tx, i,
|
|
flags & ~STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS, cacheSigStore, &txdata);
|
|
if (check2())
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("non-mandatory-script-verify-flag (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
|
}
|
|
// MANDATORY flag failures correspond to
|
|
// TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS. Because CONSENSUS
|
|
// failures are the most serious case of validation
|
|
// failures, we may need to consider using
|
|
// RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE for any script failure that
|
|
// could be due to non-upgraded nodes which we may want to
|
|
// support, to avoid splitting the network (but this
|
|
// depends on the details of how net_processing handles
|
|
// such errors).
|
|
return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("mandatory-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(check.GetScriptError())));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cacheFullScriptStore && !pvChecks) {
|
|
// We executed all of the provided scripts, and were told to
|
|
// cache the result. Do so now.
|
|
g_scriptExecutionCache.insert(hashCacheEntry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool FatalError(Notifications& notifications, BlockValidationState& state, const std::string& strMessage, const bilingual_str& userMessage)
|
|
{
|
|
notifications.fatalError(strMessage, userMessage);
|
|
return state.Error(strMessage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Restore the UTXO in a Coin at a given COutPoint
|
|
* @param undo The Coin to be restored.
|
|
* @param view The coins view to which to apply the changes.
|
|
* @param out The out point that corresponds to the tx input.
|
|
* @return A DisconnectResult as an int
|
|
*/
|
|
int ApplyTxInUndo(Coin&& undo, CCoinsViewCache& view, const COutPoint& out)
|
|
{
|
|
bool fClean = true;
|
|
|
|
if (view.HaveCoin(out)) fClean = false; // overwriting transaction output
|
|
|
|
if (undo.nHeight == 0) {
|
|
// Missing undo metadata (height and coinbase). Older versions included this
|
|
// information only in undo records for the last spend of a transactions'
|
|
// outputs. This implies that it must be present for some other output of the same tx.
|
|
const Coin& alternate = AccessByTxid(view, out.hash);
|
|
if (!alternate.IsSpent()) {
|
|
undo.nHeight = alternate.nHeight;
|
|
undo.fCoinBase = alternate.fCoinBase;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return DISCONNECT_FAILED; // adding output for transaction without known metadata
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If the coin already exists as an unspent coin in the cache, then the
|
|
// possible_overwrite parameter to AddCoin must be set to true. We have
|
|
// already checked whether an unspent coin exists above using HaveCoin, so
|
|
// we don't need to guess. When fClean is false, an unspent coin already
|
|
// existed and it is an overwrite.
|
|
view.AddCoin(out, std::move(undo), !fClean);
|
|
|
|
return fClean ? DISCONNECT_OK : DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Undo the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented by coins.
|
|
* When FAILED is returned, view is left in an indeterminate state. */
|
|
DisconnectResult Chainstate::DisconnectBlock(const CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindex, CCoinsViewCache& view)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
bool fClean = true;
|
|
|
|
CBlockUndo blockUndo;
|
|
if (!m_blockman.UndoReadFromDisk(blockUndo, *pindex)) {
|
|
error("DisconnectBlock(): failure reading undo data");
|
|
return DISCONNECT_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (blockUndo.vtxundo.size() + 1 != block.vtx.size()) {
|
|
error("DisconnectBlock(): block and undo data inconsistent");
|
|
return DISCONNECT_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Ignore blocks that contain transactions which are 'overwritten' by later transactions,
|
|
// unless those are already completely spent.
|
|
// See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/22596 for additional information.
|
|
// Note: the blocks specified here are different than the ones used in ConnectBlock because DisconnectBlock
|
|
// unwinds the blocks in reverse. As a result, the inconsistency is not discovered until the earlier
|
|
// blocks with the duplicate coinbase transactions are disconnected.
|
|
bool fEnforceBIP30 = !((pindex->nHeight==91722 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000271a2dc26e7667f8419f2e15416dc6955e5a6c6cdf3f2574dd08e")) ||
|
|
(pindex->nHeight==91812 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000af0aed4792b1acee3d966af36cf5def14935db8de83d6f9306f2f")));
|
|
|
|
// undo transactions in reverse order
|
|
for (int i = block.vtx.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
const CTransaction &tx = *(block.vtx[i]);
|
|
uint256 hash = tx.GetHash();
|
|
bool is_coinbase = tx.IsCoinBase();
|
|
bool is_bip30_exception = (is_coinbase && !fEnforceBIP30);
|
|
|
|
// Check that all outputs are available and match the outputs in the block itself
|
|
// exactly.
|
|
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx.vout.size(); o++) {
|
|
if (!tx.vout[o].scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable()) {
|
|
COutPoint out(hash, o);
|
|
Coin coin;
|
|
bool is_spent = view.SpendCoin(out, &coin);
|
|
if (!is_spent || tx.vout[o] != coin.out || pindex->nHeight != coin.nHeight || is_coinbase != coin.fCoinBase) {
|
|
if (!is_bip30_exception) {
|
|
fClean = false; // transaction output mismatch
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// restore inputs
|
|
if (i > 0) { // not coinbases
|
|
CTxUndo &txundo = blockUndo.vtxundo[i-1];
|
|
if (txundo.vprevout.size() != tx.vin.size()) {
|
|
error("DisconnectBlock(): transaction and undo data inconsistent");
|
|
return DISCONNECT_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
for (unsigned int j = tx.vin.size(); j > 0;) {
|
|
--j;
|
|
const COutPoint& out = tx.vin[j].prevout;
|
|
int res = ApplyTxInUndo(std::move(txundo.vprevout[j]), view, out);
|
|
if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) return DISCONNECT_FAILED;
|
|
fClean = fClean && res != DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN;
|
|
}
|
|
// At this point, all of txundo.vprevout should have been moved out.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// move best block pointer to prevout block
|
|
view.SetBestBlock(pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash());
|
|
|
|
return fClean ? DISCONNECT_OK : DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CCheckQueue<CScriptCheck> scriptcheckqueue(128);
|
|
|
|
void StartScriptCheckWorkerThreads(int threads_num)
|
|
{
|
|
scriptcheckqueue.StartWorkerThreads(threads_num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void StopScriptCheckWorkerThreads()
|
|
{
|
|
scriptcheckqueue.StopWorkerThreads();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Threshold condition checker that triggers when unknown versionbits are seen on the network.
|
|
*/
|
|
class WarningBitsConditionChecker : public AbstractThresholdConditionChecker
|
|
{
|
|
private:
|
|
const ChainstateManager& m_chainman;
|
|
int m_bit;
|
|
|
|
public:
|
|
explicit WarningBitsConditionChecker(const ChainstateManager& chainman, int bit) : m_chainman{chainman}, m_bit(bit) {}
|
|
|
|
int64_t BeginTime(const Consensus::Params& params) const override { return 0; }
|
|
int64_t EndTime(const Consensus::Params& params) const override { return std::numeric_limits<int64_t>::max(); }
|
|
int Period(const Consensus::Params& params) const override { return params.nMinerConfirmationWindow; }
|
|
int Threshold(const Consensus::Params& params) const override { return params.nRuleChangeActivationThreshold; }
|
|
|
|
bool Condition(const CBlockIndex* pindex, const Consensus::Params& params) const override
|
|
{
|
|
return pindex->nHeight >= params.MinBIP9WarningHeight &&
|
|
((pindex->nVersion & VERSIONBITS_TOP_MASK) == VERSIONBITS_TOP_BITS) &&
|
|
((pindex->nVersion >> m_bit) & 1) != 0 &&
|
|
((m_chainman.m_versionbitscache.ComputeBlockVersion(pindex->pprev, params) >> m_bit) & 1) == 0;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex& block_index, const ChainstateManager& chainman)
|
|
{
|
|
const Consensus::Params& consensusparams = chainman.GetConsensus();
|
|
|
|
// BIP16 didn't become active until Apr 1 2012 (on mainnet, and
|
|
// retroactively applied to testnet)
|
|
// However, only one historical block violated the P2SH rules (on both
|
|
// mainnet and testnet).
|
|
// Similarly, only one historical block violated the TAPROOT rules on
|
|
// mainnet.
|
|
// For simplicity, always leave P2SH+WITNESS+TAPROOT on except for the two
|
|
// violating blocks.
|
|
uint32_t flags{SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_TAPROOT};
|
|
const auto it{consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.find(*Assert(block_index.phashBlock))};
|
|
if (it != consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.end()) {
|
|
flags = it->second;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce the DERSIG (BIP66) rule
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) {
|
|
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (BIP65)
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV)) {
|
|
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112)
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
|
|
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce BIP147 NULLDUMMY (activated simultaneously with segwit)
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
|
flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_NULLDUMMY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return flags;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_check{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_forks{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_connect{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_verify{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_undo{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_index{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_total{};
|
|
static int64_t num_blocks_total = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** Apply the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented by coins.
|
|
* Validity checks that depend on the UTXO set are also done; ConnectBlock()
|
|
* can fail if those validity checks fail (among other reasons). */
|
|
bool Chainstate::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex,
|
|
CCoinsViewCache& view, bool fJustCheck)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
assert(pindex);
|
|
|
|
uint256 block_hash{block.GetHash()};
|
|
assert(*pindex->phashBlock == block_hash);
|
|
const bool parallel_script_checks{scriptcheckqueue.HasThreads()};
|
|
|
|
const auto time_start{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
const CChainParams& params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
|
|
|
|
// Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in
|
|
// NOTE: We don't currently (re-)invoke ContextualCheckBlock() or
|
|
// ContextualCheckBlockHeader() here. This means that if we add a new
|
|
// consensus rule that is enforced in one of those two functions, then we
|
|
// may have let in a block that violates the rule prior to updating the
|
|
// software, and we would NOT be enforcing the rule here. Fully solving
|
|
// upgrade from one software version to the next after a consensus rule
|
|
// change is potentially tricky and issue-specific (see NeedsRedownload()
|
|
// for one approach that was used for BIP 141 deployment).
|
|
// Also, currently the rule against blocks more than 2 hours in the future
|
|
// is enforced in ContextualCheckBlockHeader(); we wouldn't want to
|
|
// re-enforce that rule here (at least until we make it impossible for
|
|
// m_adjusted_time_callback() to go backward).
|
|
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, params.GetConsensus(), !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck)) {
|
|
if (state.GetResult() == BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
|
|
// We don't write down blocks to disk if they may have been
|
|
// corrupted, so this should be impossible unless we're having hardware
|
|
// problems.
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Corrupt block found indicating potential hardware failure; shutting down");
|
|
}
|
|
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block
|
|
uint256 hashPrevBlock = pindex->pprev == nullptr ? uint256() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash();
|
|
assert(hashPrevBlock == view.GetBestBlock());
|
|
|
|
num_blocks_total++;
|
|
|
|
// Special case for the genesis block, skipping connection of its transactions
|
|
// (its coinbase is unspendable)
|
|
if (block_hash == params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) {
|
|
if (!fJustCheck)
|
|
view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash());
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool fScriptChecks = true;
|
|
if (!m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock().IsNull()) {
|
|
// We've been configured with the hash of a block which has been externally verified to have a valid history.
|
|
// A suitable default value is included with the software and updated from time to time. Because validity
|
|
// relative to a piece of software is an objective fact these defaults can be easily reviewed.
|
|
// This setting doesn't force the selection of any particular chain but makes validating some faster by
|
|
// effectively caching the result of part of the verification.
|
|
BlockMap::const_iterator it{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock())};
|
|
if (it != m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
|
|
if (it->second.GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex &&
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex &&
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_header->nChainWork >= m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) {
|
|
// This block is a member of the assumed verified chain and an ancestor of the best header.
|
|
// Script verification is skipped when connecting blocks under the
|
|
// assumevalid block. Assuming the assumevalid block is valid this
|
|
// is safe because block merkle hashes are still computed and checked,
|
|
// Of course, if an assumed valid block is invalid due to false scriptSigs
|
|
// this optimization would allow an invalid chain to be accepted.
|
|
// The equivalent time check discourages hash power from extorting the network via DOS attack
|
|
// into accepting an invalid block through telling users they must manually set assumevalid.
|
|
// Requiring a software change or burying the invalid block, regardless of the setting, makes
|
|
// it hard to hide the implication of the demand. This also avoids having release candidates
|
|
// that are hardly doing any signature verification at all in testing without having to
|
|
// artificially set the default assumed verified block further back.
|
|
// The test against the minimum chain work prevents the skipping when denied access to any chain at
|
|
// least as good as the expected chain.
|
|
fScriptChecks = (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*m_chainman.m_best_header, *pindex, *m_chainman.m_best_header, params.GetConsensus()) <= 60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const auto time_1{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_check += time_1 - time_start;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Sanity checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_1 - time_start),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_check),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_check) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
// Do not allow blocks that contain transactions which 'overwrite' older transactions,
|
|
// unless those are already completely spent.
|
|
// If such overwrites are allowed, coinbases and transactions depending upon those
|
|
// can be duplicated to remove the ability to spend the first instance -- even after
|
|
// being sent to another address.
|
|
// See BIP30, CVE-2012-1909, and http://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information.
|
|
// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
|
|
// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
|
|
// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
|
|
// initial block download.
|
|
bool fEnforceBIP30 = !IsBIP30Repeat(*pindex);
|
|
|
|
// Once BIP34 activated it was not possible to create new duplicate coinbases and thus other than starting
|
|
// with the 2 existing duplicate coinbase pairs, not possible to create overwriting txs. But by the
|
|
// time BIP34 activated, in each of the existing pairs the duplicate coinbase had overwritten the first
|
|
// before the first had been spent. Since those coinbases are sufficiently buried it's no longer possible to create further
|
|
// duplicate transactions descending from the known pairs either.
|
|
// If we're on the known chain at height greater than where BIP34 activated, we can save the db accesses needed for the BIP30 check.
|
|
|
|
// BIP34 requires that a block at height X (block X) has its coinbase
|
|
// scriptSig start with a CScriptNum of X (indicated height X). The above
|
|
// logic of no longer requiring BIP30 once BIP34 activates is flawed in the
|
|
// case that there is a block X before the BIP34 height of 227,931 which has
|
|
// an indicated height Y where Y is greater than X. The coinbase for block
|
|
// X would also be a valid coinbase for block Y, which could be a BIP30
|
|
// violation. An exhaustive search of all mainnet coinbases before the
|
|
// BIP34 height which have an indicated height greater than the block height
|
|
// reveals many occurrences. The 3 lowest indicated heights found are
|
|
// 209,921, 490,897, and 1,983,702 and thus coinbases for blocks at these 3
|
|
// heights would be the first opportunity for BIP30 to be violated.
|
|
|
|
// The search reveals a great many blocks which have an indicated height
|
|
// greater than 1,983,702, so we simply remove the optimization to skip
|
|
// BIP30 checking for blocks at height 1,983,702 or higher. Before we reach
|
|
// that block in another 25 years or so, we should take advantage of a
|
|
// future consensus change to do a new and improved version of BIP34 that
|
|
// will actually prevent ever creating any duplicate coinbases in the
|
|
// future.
|
|
static constexpr int BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT = 1983702;
|
|
|
|
// There is no potential to create a duplicate coinbase at block 209,921
|
|
// because this is still before the BIP34 height and so explicit BIP30
|
|
// checking is still active.
|
|
|
|
// The final case is block 176,684 which has an indicated height of
|
|
// 490,897. Unfortunately, this issue was not discovered until about 2 weeks
|
|
// before block 490,897 so there was not much opportunity to address this
|
|
// case other than to carefully analyze it and determine it would not be a
|
|
// problem. Block 490,897 was, in fact, mined with a different coinbase than
|
|
// block 176,684, but it is important to note that even if it hadn't been or
|
|
// is remined on an alternate fork with a duplicate coinbase, we would still
|
|
// not run into a BIP30 violation. This is because the coinbase for 176,684
|
|
// is spent in block 185,956 in transaction
|
|
// d4f7fbbf92f4a3014a230b2dc70b8058d02eb36ac06b4a0736d9d60eaa9e8781. This
|
|
// spending transaction can't be duplicated because it also spends coinbase
|
|
// 0328dd85c331237f18e781d692c92de57649529bd5edf1d01036daea32ffde29. This
|
|
// coinbase has an indicated height of over 4.2 billion, and wouldn't be
|
|
// duplicatable until that height, and it's currently impossible to create a
|
|
// chain that long. Nevertheless we may wish to consider a future soft fork
|
|
// which retroactively prevents block 490,897 from creating a duplicate
|
|
// coinbase. The two historical BIP30 violations often provide a confusing
|
|
// edge case when manipulating the UTXO and it would be simpler not to have
|
|
// another edge case to deal with.
|
|
|
|
// testnet3 has no blocks before the BIP34 height with indicated heights
|
|
// post BIP34 before approximately height 486,000,000. After block
|
|
// 1,983,702 testnet3 starts doing unnecessary BIP30 checking again.
|
|
assert(pindex->pprev);
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexBIP34height = pindex->pprev->GetAncestor(params.GetConsensus().BIP34Height);
|
|
//Only continue to enforce if we're below BIP34 activation height or the block hash at that height doesn't correspond.
|
|
fEnforceBIP30 = fEnforceBIP30 && (!pindexBIP34height || !(pindexBIP34height->GetBlockHash() == params.GetConsensus().BIP34Hash));
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Remove BIP30 checking from block height 1,983,702 on, once we have a
|
|
// consensus change that ensures coinbases at those heights cannot
|
|
// duplicate earlier coinbases.
|
|
if (fEnforceBIP30 || pindex->nHeight >= BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT) {
|
|
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
|
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
|
|
if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): tried to overwrite transaction\n");
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-BIP30");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce BIP68 (sequence locks)
|
|
int nLockTimeFlags = 0;
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
|
|
nLockTimeFlags |= LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get the script flags for this block
|
|
unsigned int flags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*pindex, m_chainman)};
|
|
|
|
const auto time_2{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_forks += time_2 - time_1;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Fork checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_2 - time_1),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_forks),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_forks) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
CBlockUndo blockundo;
|
|
|
|
// Precomputed transaction data pointers must not be invalidated
|
|
// until after `control` has run the script checks (potentially
|
|
// in multiple threads). Preallocate the vector size so a new allocation
|
|
// doesn't invalidate pointers into the vector, and keep txsdata in scope
|
|
// for as long as `control`.
|
|
CCheckQueueControl<CScriptCheck> control(fScriptChecks && parallel_script_checks ? &scriptcheckqueue : nullptr);
|
|
std::vector<PrecomputedTransactionData> txsdata(block.vtx.size());
|
|
|
|
std::vector<int> prevheights;
|
|
CAmount nFees = 0;
|
|
int nInputs = 0;
|
|
int64_t nSigOpsCost = 0;
|
|
blockundo.vtxundo.reserve(block.vtx.size() - 1);
|
|
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
|
|
{
|
|
const CTransaction &tx = *(block.vtx[i]);
|
|
|
|
nInputs += tx.vin.size();
|
|
|
|
if (!tx.IsCoinBase())
|
|
{
|
|
CAmount txfee = 0;
|
|
TxValidationState tx_state;
|
|
if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) {
|
|
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
|
|
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
|
|
tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
|
|
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckTxInputs: %s, %s", __func__, tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
nFees += txfee;
|
|
if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: accumulated fee in the block out of range.\n", __func__);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that transaction is BIP68 final
|
|
// BIP68 lock checks (as opposed to nLockTime checks) must
|
|
// be in ConnectBlock because they require the UTXO set
|
|
prevheights.resize(tx.vin.size());
|
|
for (size_t j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++) {
|
|
prevheights[j] = view.AccessCoin(tx.vin[j].prevout).nHeight;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, prevheights, *pindex)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: contains a non-BIP68-final transaction\n", __func__);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// GetTransactionSigOpCost counts 3 types of sigops:
|
|
// * legacy (always)
|
|
// * p2sh (when P2SH enabled in flags and excludes coinbase)
|
|
// * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase)
|
|
nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags);
|
|
if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): too many sigops\n");
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tx.IsCoinBase())
|
|
{
|
|
std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks;
|
|
bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */
|
|
TxValidationState tx_state;
|
|
if (fScriptChecks && !CheckInputScripts(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txsdata[i], parallel_script_checks ? &vChecks : nullptr)) {
|
|
// Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure
|
|
state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS,
|
|
tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage());
|
|
return error("ConnectBlock(): CheckInputScripts on %s failed with %s",
|
|
tx.GetHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
control.Add(std::move(vChecks));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CTxUndo undoDummy;
|
|
if (i > 0) {
|
|
blockundo.vtxundo.emplace_back();
|
|
}
|
|
UpdateCoins(tx, view, i == 0 ? undoDummy : blockundo.vtxundo.back(), pindex->nHeight);
|
|
}
|
|
const auto time_3{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_connect += time_3 - time_2;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect %u transactions: %.2fms (%.3fms/tx, %.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", (unsigned)block.vtx.size(),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2) / block.vtx.size(),
|
|
nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2) / (nInputs - 1),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_connect),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_connect) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, params.GetConsensus());
|
|
if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: ConnectBlock(): coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)\n", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-amount");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!control.Wait()) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: CheckQueue failed\n", __func__);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "block-validation-failed");
|
|
}
|
|
const auto time_4{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_verify += time_4 - time_2;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1,
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_2),
|
|
nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_2) / (nInputs - 1),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_verify),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_verify) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
if (fJustCheck)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
if (!m_blockman.WriteUndoDataForBlock(blockundo, state, *pindex)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const auto time_5{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_undo += time_5 - time_4;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Write undo data: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_5 - time_4),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_undo),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_undo) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
if (!pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS)) {
|
|
pindex->RaiseValidity(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS);
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// add this block to the view's block chain
|
|
view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash());
|
|
|
|
const auto time_6{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_index += time_6 - time_5;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Index writing: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_5),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_index),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_index) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
TRACE6(validation, block_connected,
|
|
block_hash.data(),
|
|
pindex->nHeight,
|
|
block.vtx.size(),
|
|
nInputs,
|
|
nSigOpsCost,
|
|
time_5 - time_start // in microseconds (µs)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CoinsCacheSizeState Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
return this->GetCoinsCacheSizeState(
|
|
m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes,
|
|
m_mempool ? m_mempool->m_max_size_bytes : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CoinsCacheSizeState Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState(
|
|
size_t max_coins_cache_size_bytes,
|
|
size_t max_mempool_size_bytes)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
const int64_t nMempoolUsage = m_mempool ? m_mempool->DynamicMemoryUsage() : 0;
|
|
int64_t cacheSize = CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
|
|
int64_t nTotalSpace =
|
|
max_coins_cache_size_bytes + std::max<int64_t>(int64_t(max_mempool_size_bytes) - nMempoolUsage, 0);
|
|
|
|
//! No need to periodic flush if at least this much space still available.
|
|
static constexpr int64_t MAX_BLOCK_COINSDB_USAGE_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10MB
|
|
int64_t large_threshold =
|
|
std::max((9 * nTotalSpace) / 10, nTotalSpace - MAX_BLOCK_COINSDB_USAGE_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
if (cacheSize > nTotalSpace) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Cache size (%s) exceeds total space (%s)\n", cacheSize, nTotalSpace);
|
|
return CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL;
|
|
} else if (cacheSize > large_threshold) {
|
|
return CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE;
|
|
}
|
|
return CoinsCacheSizeState::OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::FlushStateToDisk(
|
|
BlockValidationState &state,
|
|
FlushStateMode mode,
|
|
int nManualPruneHeight)
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
assert(this->CanFlushToDisk());
|
|
std::set<int> setFilesToPrune;
|
|
bool full_flush_completed = false;
|
|
|
|
const size_t coins_count = CoinsTip().GetCacheSize();
|
|
const size_t coins_mem_usage = CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
{
|
|
bool fFlushForPrune = false;
|
|
bool fDoFullFlush = false;
|
|
|
|
CoinsCacheSizeState cache_state = GetCoinsCacheSizeState();
|
|
LOCK(m_blockman.cs_LastBlockFile);
|
|
if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() && (m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning || nManualPruneHeight > 0) && !fReindex) {
|
|
// make sure we don't prune above any of the prune locks bestblocks
|
|
// pruning is height-based
|
|
int last_prune{m_chain.Height()}; // last height we can prune
|
|
std::optional<std::string> limiting_lock; // prune lock that actually was the limiting factor, only used for logging
|
|
|
|
for (const auto& prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) {
|
|
if (prune_lock.second.height_first == std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) continue;
|
|
// Remove the buffer and one additional block here to get actual height that is outside of the buffer
|
|
const int lock_height{prune_lock.second.height_first - PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER - 1};
|
|
last_prune = std::max(1, std::min(last_prune, lock_height));
|
|
if (last_prune == lock_height) {
|
|
limiting_lock = prune_lock.first;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (limiting_lock) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s limited pruning to height %d\n", limiting_lock.value(), last_prune);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (nManualPruneHeight > 0) {
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("find files to prune (manual)", BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
m_blockman.FindFilesToPruneManual(
|
|
setFilesToPrune,
|
|
std::min(last_prune, nManualPruneHeight),
|
|
*this, m_chainman);
|
|
} else {
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("find files to prune", BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
m_blockman.FindFilesToPrune(setFilesToPrune, last_prune, *this, m_chainman);
|
|
m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!setFilesToPrune.empty()) {
|
|
fFlushForPrune = true;
|
|
if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned) {
|
|
m_blockman.m_block_tree_db->WriteFlag("prunedblockfiles", true);
|
|
m_blockman.m_have_pruned = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
const auto nNow{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
// Avoid writing/flushing immediately after startup.
|
|
if (m_last_write == decltype(m_last_write){}) {
|
|
m_last_write = nNow;
|
|
}
|
|
if (m_last_flush == decltype(m_last_flush){}) {
|
|
m_last_flush = nNow;
|
|
}
|
|
// The cache is large and we're within 10% and 10 MiB of the limit, but we have time now (not in the middle of a block processing).
|
|
bool fCacheLarge = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC && cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE;
|
|
// The cache is over the limit, we have to write now.
|
|
bool fCacheCritical = mode == FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED && cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL;
|
|
// It's been a while since we wrote the block index to disk. Do this frequently, so we don't need to redownload after a crash.
|
|
bool fPeriodicWrite = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC && nNow > m_last_write + DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL;
|
|
// It's been very long since we flushed the cache. Do this infrequently, to optimize cache usage.
|
|
bool fPeriodicFlush = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC && nNow > m_last_flush + DATABASE_FLUSH_INTERVAL;
|
|
// Combine all conditions that result in a full cache flush.
|
|
fDoFullFlush = (mode == FlushStateMode::ALWAYS) || fCacheLarge || fCacheCritical || fPeriodicFlush || fFlushForPrune;
|
|
// Write blocks and block index to disk.
|
|
if (fDoFullFlush || fPeriodicWrite) {
|
|
// Ensure we can write block index
|
|
if (!CheckDiskSpace(m_blockman.m_opts.blocks_dir)) {
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Disk space is too low!", _("Disk space is too low!"));
|
|
}
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("write block and undo data to disk", BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
// First make sure all block and undo data is flushed to disk.
|
|
// TODO: Handle return error, or add detailed comment why it is
|
|
// safe to not return an error upon failure.
|
|
if (!m_blockman.FlushChainstateBlockFile(m_chain.Height())) {
|
|
LogPrintLevel(BCLog::VALIDATION, BCLog::Level::Warning, "%s: Failed to flush block file.\n", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Then update all block file information (which may refer to block and undo files).
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("write block index to disk", BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
if (!m_blockman.WriteBlockIndexDB()) {
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Failed to write to block index database");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Finally remove any pruned files
|
|
if (fFlushForPrune) {
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("unlink pruned files", BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
m_blockman.UnlinkPrunedFiles(setFilesToPrune);
|
|
}
|
|
m_last_write = nNow;
|
|
}
|
|
// Flush best chain related state. This can only be done if the blocks / block index write was also done.
|
|
if (fDoFullFlush && !CoinsTip().GetBestBlock().IsNull()) {
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY(strprintf("write coins cache to disk (%d coins, %.2fkB)",
|
|
coins_count, coins_mem_usage / 1000), BCLog::BENCH);
|
|
|
|
// Typical Coin structures on disk are around 48 bytes in size.
|
|
// Pushing a new one to the database can cause it to be written
|
|
// twice (once in the log, and once in the tables). This is already
|
|
// an overestimation, as most will delete an existing entry or
|
|
// overwrite one. Still, use a conservative safety factor of 2.
|
|
if (!CheckDiskSpace(m_chainman.m_options.datadir, 48 * 2 * 2 * CoinsTip().GetCacheSize())) {
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Disk space is too low!", _("Disk space is too low!"));
|
|
}
|
|
// Flush the chainstate (which may refer to block index entries).
|
|
if (!CoinsTip().Flush())
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Failed to write to coin database");
|
|
m_last_flush = nNow;
|
|
full_flush_completed = true;
|
|
TRACE5(utxocache, flush,
|
|
int64_t{Ticks<std::chrono::microseconds>(SteadyClock::now() - nNow)},
|
|
(uint32_t)mode,
|
|
(uint64_t)coins_count,
|
|
(uint64_t)coins_mem_usage,
|
|
(bool)fFlushForPrune);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (full_flush_completed) {
|
|
// Update best block in wallet (so we can detect restored wallets).
|
|
GetMainSignals().ChainStateFlushed(this->GetRole(), m_chain.GetLocator());
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const std::runtime_error& e) {
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, std::string("System error while flushing: ") + e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::ForceFlushStateToDisk()
|
|
{
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::ALWAYS)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::PruneAndFlush()
|
|
{
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = true;
|
|
if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Private helper function that concatenates warning messages. */
|
|
static void AppendWarning(bilingual_str& res, const bilingual_str& warn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!res.empty()) res += Untranslated(", ");
|
|
res += warn;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void UpdateTipLog(
|
|
const CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip,
|
|
const CBlockIndex* tip,
|
|
const CChainParams& params,
|
|
const std::string& func_name,
|
|
const std::string& prefix,
|
|
const std::string& warning_messages) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
LogPrintf("%s%s: new best=%s height=%d version=0x%08x log2_work=%f tx=%lu date='%s' progress=%f cache=%.1fMiB(%utxo)%s\n",
|
|
prefix, func_name,
|
|
tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), tip->nHeight, tip->nVersion,
|
|
log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble()) / log(2.0), (unsigned long)tip->nChainTx,
|
|
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()),
|
|
GuessVerificationProgress(params.TxData(), tip),
|
|
coins_tip.DynamicMemoryUsage() * (1.0 / (1 << 20)),
|
|
coins_tip.GetCacheSize(),
|
|
!warning_messages.empty() ? strprintf(" warning='%s'", warning_messages) : "");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::UpdateTip(const CBlockIndex* pindexNew)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
const auto& coins_tip = this->CoinsTip();
|
|
|
|
const CChainParams& params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
|
|
|
|
// The remainder of the function isn't relevant if we are not acting on
|
|
// the active chainstate, so return if need be.
|
|
if (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) {
|
|
// Only log every so often so that we don't bury log messages at the tip.
|
|
constexpr int BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL = 2000;
|
|
if (pindexNew->nHeight % BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL == 0) {
|
|
UpdateTipLog(coins_tip, pindexNew, params, __func__, "[background validation] ", "");
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// New best block
|
|
if (m_mempool) {
|
|
m_mempool->AddTransactionsUpdated(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(g_best_block_mutex);
|
|
g_best_block = pindexNew->GetBlockHash();
|
|
g_best_block_cv.notify_all();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bilingual_str warning_messages;
|
|
if (!m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindex = pindexNew;
|
|
for (int bit = 0; bit < VERSIONBITS_NUM_BITS; bit++) {
|
|
WarningBitsConditionChecker checker(m_chainman, bit);
|
|
ThresholdState state = checker.GetStateFor(pindex, params.GetConsensus(), m_chainman.m_warningcache.at(bit));
|
|
if (state == ThresholdState::ACTIVE || state == ThresholdState::LOCKED_IN) {
|
|
const bilingual_str warning = strprintf(_("Unknown new rules activated (versionbit %i)"), bit);
|
|
if (state == ThresholdState::ACTIVE) {
|
|
m_chainman.GetNotifications().warning(warning);
|
|
} else {
|
|
AppendWarning(warning_messages, warning);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
UpdateTipLog(coins_tip, pindexNew, params, __func__, "", warning_messages.original);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Disconnect m_chain's tip.
|
|
* After calling, the mempool will be in an inconsistent state, with
|
|
* transactions from disconnected blocks being added to disconnectpool. You
|
|
* should make the mempool consistent again by calling MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg.
|
|
* with cs_main held.
|
|
*
|
|
* If disconnectpool is nullptr, then no disconnected transactions are added to
|
|
* disconnectpool (note that the caller is responsible for mempool consistency
|
|
* in any case).
|
|
*/
|
|
bool Chainstate::DisconnectTip(BlockValidationState& state, DisconnectedBlockTransactions* disconnectpool)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
|
|
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexDelete = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
assert(pindexDelete);
|
|
assert(pindexDelete->pprev);
|
|
// Read block from disk.
|
|
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
|
|
CBlock& block = *pblock;
|
|
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindexDelete)) {
|
|
return error("DisconnectTip(): Failed to read block");
|
|
}
|
|
// Apply the block atomically to the chain state.
|
|
const auto time_start{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
{
|
|
CCoinsViewCache view(&CoinsTip());
|
|
assert(view.GetBestBlock() == pindexDelete->GetBlockHash());
|
|
if (DisconnectBlock(block, pindexDelete, view) != DISCONNECT_OK)
|
|
return error("DisconnectTip(): DisconnectBlock %s failed", pindexDelete->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
bool flushed = view.Flush();
|
|
assert(flushed);
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, "- Disconnect block: %.2fms\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(SteadyClock::now() - time_start));
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Prune locks that began at or after the tip should be moved backward so they get a chance to reorg
|
|
const int max_height_first{pindexDelete->nHeight - 1};
|
|
for (auto& prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) {
|
|
if (prune_lock.second.height_first <= max_height_first) continue;
|
|
|
|
prune_lock.second.height_first = max_height_first;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s prune lock moved back to %d\n", prune_lock.first, max_height_first);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Write the chain state to disk, if necessary.
|
|
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (disconnectpool && m_mempool) {
|
|
// Save transactions to re-add to mempool at end of reorg. If any entries are evicted for
|
|
// exceeding memory limits, remove them and their descendants from the mempool.
|
|
for (auto&& evicted_tx : disconnectpool->AddTransactionsFromBlock(block.vtx)) {
|
|
m_mempool->removeRecursive(*evicted_tx, MemPoolRemovalReason::REORG);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_chain.SetTip(*pindexDelete->pprev);
|
|
|
|
UpdateTip(pindexDelete->pprev);
|
|
// Let wallets know transactions went from 1-confirmed to
|
|
// 0-confirmed or conflicted:
|
|
GetMainSignals().BlockDisconnected(pblock, pindexDelete);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_connect_total{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_flush{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_chainstate{};
|
|
static SteadyClock::duration time_post_connect{};
|
|
|
|
struct PerBlockConnectTrace {
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr;
|
|
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock;
|
|
PerBlockConnectTrace() = default;
|
|
};
|
|
/**
|
|
* Used to track blocks whose transactions were applied to the UTXO state as a
|
|
* part of a single ActivateBestChainStep call.
|
|
*
|
|
* This class is single-use, once you call GetBlocksConnected() you have to throw
|
|
* it away and make a new one.
|
|
*/
|
|
class ConnectTrace {
|
|
private:
|
|
std::vector<PerBlockConnectTrace> blocksConnected;
|
|
|
|
public:
|
|
explicit ConnectTrace() : blocksConnected(1) {}
|
|
|
|
void BlockConnected(CBlockIndex* pindex, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock) {
|
|
assert(!blocksConnected.back().pindex);
|
|
assert(pindex);
|
|
assert(pblock);
|
|
blocksConnected.back().pindex = pindex;
|
|
blocksConnected.back().pblock = std::move(pblock);
|
|
blocksConnected.emplace_back();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<PerBlockConnectTrace>& GetBlocksConnected() {
|
|
// We always keep one extra block at the end of our list because
|
|
// blocks are added after all the conflicted transactions have
|
|
// been filled in. Thus, the last entry should always be an empty
|
|
// one waiting for the transactions from the next block. We pop
|
|
// the last entry here to make sure the list we return is sane.
|
|
assert(!blocksConnected.back().pindex);
|
|
blocksConnected.pop_back();
|
|
return blocksConnected;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Connect a new block to m_chain. pblock is either nullptr or a pointer to a CBlock
|
|
* corresponding to pindexNew, to bypass loading it again from disk.
|
|
*
|
|
* The block is added to connectTrace if connection succeeds.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool Chainstate::ConnectTip(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindexNew, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, ConnectTrace& connectTrace, DisconnectedBlockTransactions& disconnectpool)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
|
|
|
|
assert(pindexNew->pprev == m_chain.Tip());
|
|
// Read block from disk.
|
|
const auto time_1{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pthisBlock;
|
|
if (!pblock) {
|
|
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockNew = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
|
|
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockNew, *pindexNew)) {
|
|
return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Failed to read block");
|
|
}
|
|
pthisBlock = pblockNew;
|
|
} else {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Using cached block\n");
|
|
pthisBlock = pblock;
|
|
}
|
|
const CBlock& blockConnecting = *pthisBlock;
|
|
// Apply the block atomically to the chain state.
|
|
const auto time_2{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
SteadyClock::time_point time_3;
|
|
// When adding aggregate statistics in the future, keep in mind that
|
|
// num_blocks_total may be zero until the ConnectBlock() call below.
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Load block from disk: %.2fms\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_2 - time_1));
|
|
{
|
|
CCoinsViewCache view(&CoinsTip());
|
|
bool rv = ConnectBlock(blockConnecting, state, pindexNew, view);
|
|
GetMainSignals().BlockChecked(blockConnecting, state);
|
|
if (!rv) {
|
|
if (state.IsInvalid())
|
|
InvalidBlockFound(pindexNew, state);
|
|
return error("%s: ConnectBlock %s failed, %s", __func__, pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
time_3 = SteadyClock::now();
|
|
time_connect_total += time_3 - time_2;
|
|
assert(num_blocks_total > 0);
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect total: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_connect_total),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_connect_total) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
bool flushed = view.Flush();
|
|
assert(flushed);
|
|
}
|
|
const auto time_4{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_flush += time_4 - time_3;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Flush: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_3),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_flush),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_flush) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
// Write the chain state to disk, if necessary.
|
|
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
const auto time_5{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_chainstate += time_5 - time_4;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Writing chainstate: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_5 - time_4),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_chainstate),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_chainstate) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
// Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool.;
|
|
if (m_mempool) {
|
|
m_mempool->removeForBlock(blockConnecting.vtx, pindexNew->nHeight);
|
|
disconnectpool.removeForBlock(blockConnecting.vtx);
|
|
}
|
|
// Update m_chain & related variables.
|
|
m_chain.SetTip(*pindexNew);
|
|
UpdateTip(pindexNew);
|
|
|
|
const auto time_6{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
time_post_connect += time_6 - time_5;
|
|
time_total += time_6 - time_1;
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect postprocess: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_5),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_post_connect),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_post_connect) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::BENCH, "- Connect block: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n",
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_1),
|
|
Ticks<SecondsDouble>(time_total),
|
|
Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_total) / num_blocks_total);
|
|
|
|
// If we are the background validation chainstate, check to see if we are done
|
|
// validating the snapshot (i.e. our tip has reached the snapshot's base block).
|
|
if (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) {
|
|
// This call may set `m_disabled`, which is referenced immediately afterwards in
|
|
// ActivateBestChain, so that we stop connecting blocks past the snapshot base.
|
|
m_chainman.MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connectTrace.BlockConnected(pindexNew, std::move(pthisBlock));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Return the tip of the chain with the most work in it, that isn't
|
|
* known to be invalid (it's however far from certain to be valid).
|
|
*/
|
|
CBlockIndex* Chainstate::FindMostWorkChain()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
do {
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexNew = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Find the best candidate header.
|
|
{
|
|
std::set<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndexWorkComparator>::reverse_iterator it = setBlockIndexCandidates.rbegin();
|
|
if (it == setBlockIndexCandidates.rend())
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
pindexNew = *it;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check whether all blocks on the path between the currently active chain and the candidate are valid.
|
|
// Just going until the active chain is an optimization, as we know all blocks in it are valid already.
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexTest = pindexNew;
|
|
bool fInvalidAncestor = false;
|
|
while (pindexTest && !m_chain.Contains(pindexTest)) {
|
|
assert(pindexTest->HaveNumChainTxs() || pindexTest->nHeight == 0);
|
|
|
|
// Pruned nodes may have entries in setBlockIndexCandidates for
|
|
// which block files have been deleted. Remove those as candidates
|
|
// for the most work chain if we come across them; we can't switch
|
|
// to a chain unless we have all the non-active-chain parent blocks.
|
|
bool fFailedChain = pindexTest->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK;
|
|
bool fMissingData = !(pindexTest->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA);
|
|
if (fFailedChain || fMissingData) {
|
|
// Candidate chain is not usable (either invalid or missing data)
|
|
if (fFailedChain && (m_chainman.m_best_invalid == nullptr || pindexNew->nChainWork > m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) {
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew;
|
|
}
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexFailed = pindexNew;
|
|
// Remove the entire chain from the set.
|
|
while (pindexTest != pindexFailed) {
|
|
if (fFailedChain) {
|
|
pindexFailed->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexFailed);
|
|
} else if (fMissingData) {
|
|
// If we're missing data, then add back to m_blocks_unlinked,
|
|
// so that if the block arrives in the future we can try adding
|
|
// to setBlockIndexCandidates again.
|
|
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert(
|
|
std::make_pair(pindexFailed->pprev, pindexFailed));
|
|
}
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexFailed);
|
|
pindexFailed = pindexFailed->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexTest);
|
|
fInvalidAncestor = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
pindexTest = pindexTest->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!fInvalidAncestor)
|
|
return pindexNew;
|
|
} while(true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Delete all entries in setBlockIndexCandidates that are worse than the current tip. */
|
|
void Chainstate::PruneBlockIndexCandidates() {
|
|
// Note that we can't delete the current block itself, as we may need to return to it later in case a
|
|
// reorganization to a better block fails.
|
|
std::set<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndexWorkComparator>::iterator it = setBlockIndexCandidates.begin();
|
|
while (it != setBlockIndexCandidates.end() && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(*it, m_chain.Tip())) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(it++);
|
|
}
|
|
// Either the current tip or a successor of it we're working towards is left in setBlockIndexCandidates.
|
|
assert(!setBlockIndexCandidates.empty());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Try to make some progress towards making pindexMostWork the active block.
|
|
* pblock is either nullptr or a pointer to a CBlock corresponding to pindexMostWork.
|
|
*
|
|
* @returns true unless a system error occurred
|
|
*/
|
|
bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChainStep(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindexMostWork, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, bool& fInvalidFound, ConnectTrace& connectTrace)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs);
|
|
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexOldTip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(pindexMostWork);
|
|
|
|
// Disconnect active blocks which are no longer in the best chain.
|
|
bool fBlocksDisconnected = false;
|
|
DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool{MAX_DISCONNECTED_TX_POOL_BYTES};
|
|
while (m_chain.Tip() && m_chain.Tip() != pindexFork) {
|
|
if (!DisconnectTip(state, &disconnectpool)) {
|
|
// This is likely a fatal error, but keep the mempool consistent,
|
|
// just in case. Only remove from the mempool in this case.
|
|
MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, false);
|
|
|
|
// If we're unable to disconnect a block during normal operation,
|
|
// then that is a failure of our local system -- we should abort
|
|
// rather than stay on a less work chain.
|
|
FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, "Failed to disconnect block; see debug.log for details");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
fBlocksDisconnected = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build list of new blocks to connect (in descending height order).
|
|
std::vector<CBlockIndex*> vpindexToConnect;
|
|
bool fContinue = true;
|
|
int nHeight = pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : -1;
|
|
while (fContinue && nHeight != pindexMostWork->nHeight) {
|
|
// Don't iterate the entire list of potential improvements toward the best tip, as we likely only need
|
|
// a few blocks along the way.
|
|
int nTargetHeight = std::min(nHeight + 32, pindexMostWork->nHeight);
|
|
vpindexToConnect.clear();
|
|
vpindexToConnect.reserve(nTargetHeight - nHeight);
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexIter = pindexMostWork->GetAncestor(nTargetHeight);
|
|
while (pindexIter && pindexIter->nHeight != nHeight) {
|
|
vpindexToConnect.push_back(pindexIter);
|
|
pindexIter = pindexIter->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
nHeight = nTargetHeight;
|
|
|
|
// Connect new blocks.
|
|
for (CBlockIndex* pindexConnect : reverse_iterate(vpindexToConnect)) {
|
|
if (!ConnectTip(state, pindexConnect, pindexConnect == pindexMostWork ? pblock : std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>(), connectTrace, disconnectpool)) {
|
|
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
|
|
// The block violates a consensus rule.
|
|
if (state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
|
|
InvalidChainFound(vpindexToConnect.front());
|
|
}
|
|
state = BlockValidationState();
|
|
fInvalidFound = true;
|
|
fContinue = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// A system error occurred (disk space, database error, ...).
|
|
// Make the mempool consistent with the current tip, just in case
|
|
// any observers try to use it before shutdown.
|
|
MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, false);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
|
|
if (!pindexOldTip || m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > pindexOldTip->nChainWork) {
|
|
// We're in a better position than we were. Return temporarily to release the lock.
|
|
fContinue = false;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (fBlocksDisconnected) {
|
|
// If any blocks were disconnected, disconnectpool may be non empty. Add
|
|
// any disconnected transactions back to the mempool.
|
|
MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, true);
|
|
}
|
|
if (m_mempool) m_mempool->check(this->CoinsTip(), this->m_chain.Height() + 1);
|
|
|
|
CheckForkWarningConditions();
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SynchronizationState GetSynchronizationState(bool init)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!init) return SynchronizationState::POST_INIT;
|
|
if (::fReindex) return SynchronizationState::INIT_REINDEX;
|
|
return SynchronizationState::INIT_DOWNLOAD;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool NotifyHeaderTip(ChainstateManager& chainman) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
bool fNotify = false;
|
|
bool fInitialBlockDownload = false;
|
|
static CBlockIndex* pindexHeaderOld = nullptr;
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexHeader = nullptr;
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
pindexHeader = chainman.m_best_header;
|
|
|
|
if (pindexHeader != pindexHeaderOld) {
|
|
fNotify = true;
|
|
fInitialBlockDownload = chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload();
|
|
pindexHeaderOld = pindexHeader;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Send block tip changed notifications without cs_main
|
|
if (fNotify) {
|
|
chainman.GetNotifications().headerTip(GetSynchronizationState(fInitialBlockDownload), pindexHeader->nHeight, pindexHeader->nTime, false);
|
|
}
|
|
return fNotify;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void LimitValidationInterfaceQueue() LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) {
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
if (GetMainSignals().CallbacksPending() > 10) {
|
|
SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChain(BlockValidationState& state, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
|
|
|
|
// Note that while we're often called here from ProcessNewBlock, this is
|
|
// far from a guarantee. Things in the P2P/RPC will often end up calling
|
|
// us in the middle of ProcessNewBlock - do not assume pblock is set
|
|
// sanely for performance or correctness!
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// ABC maintains a fair degree of expensive-to-calculate internal state
|
|
// because this function periodically releases cs_main so that it does not lock up other threads for too long
|
|
// during large connects - and to allow for e.g. the callback queue to drain
|
|
// we use m_chainstate_mutex to enforce mutual exclusion so that only one caller may execute this function at a time
|
|
LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex);
|
|
|
|
// Belt-and-suspenders check that we aren't attempting to advance the background
|
|
// chainstate past the snapshot base block.
|
|
if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_disabled)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("m_disabled is set - this chainstate should not be in operation. "
|
|
"Please report this as a bug. %s\n", PACKAGE_BUGREPORT);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexMostWork = nullptr;
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexNewTip = nullptr;
|
|
bool exited_ibd{false};
|
|
do {
|
|
// Block until the validation queue drains. This should largely
|
|
// never happen in normal operation, however may happen during
|
|
// reindex, causing memory blowup if we run too far ahead.
|
|
// Note that if a validationinterface callback ends up calling
|
|
// ActivateBestChain this may lead to a deadlock! We should
|
|
// probably have a DEBUG_LOCKORDER test for this in the future.
|
|
LimitValidationInterfaceQueue();
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
// Lock transaction pool for at least as long as it takes for connectTrace to be consumed
|
|
LOCK(MempoolMutex());
|
|
const bool was_in_ibd = m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload();
|
|
CBlockIndex* starting_tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
bool blocks_connected = false;
|
|
do {
|
|
// We absolutely may not unlock cs_main until we've made forward progress
|
|
// (with the exception of shutdown due to hardware issues, low disk space, etc).
|
|
ConnectTrace connectTrace; // Destructed before cs_main is unlocked
|
|
|
|
if (pindexMostWork == nullptr) {
|
|
pindexMostWork = FindMostWorkChain();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Whether we have anything to do at all.
|
|
if (pindexMostWork == nullptr || pindexMostWork == m_chain.Tip()) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool fInvalidFound = false;
|
|
std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> nullBlockPtr;
|
|
if (!ActivateBestChainStep(state, pindexMostWork, pblock && pblock->GetHash() == pindexMostWork->GetBlockHash() ? pblock : nullBlockPtr, fInvalidFound, connectTrace)) {
|
|
// A system error occurred
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
blocks_connected = true;
|
|
|
|
if (fInvalidFound) {
|
|
// Wipe cache, we may need another branch now.
|
|
pindexMostWork = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
pindexNewTip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
|
|
for (const PerBlockConnectTrace& trace : connectTrace.GetBlocksConnected()) {
|
|
assert(trace.pblock && trace.pindex);
|
|
GetMainSignals().BlockConnected(this->GetRole(), trace.pblock, trace.pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// This will have been toggled in
|
|
// ActivateBestChainStep -> ConnectTip -> MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation,
|
|
// if at all, so we should catch it here.
|
|
//
|
|
// Break this do-while to ensure we don't advance past the base snapshot.
|
|
if (m_disabled) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} while (!m_chain.Tip() || (starting_tip && CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(m_chain.Tip(), starting_tip)));
|
|
if (!blocks_connected) return true;
|
|
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(starting_tip);
|
|
bool still_in_ibd = m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload();
|
|
|
|
if (was_in_ibd && !still_in_ibd) {
|
|
// Active chainstate has exited IBD.
|
|
exited_ibd = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Notify external listeners about the new tip.
|
|
// Enqueue while holding cs_main to ensure that UpdatedBlockTip is called in the order in which blocks are connected
|
|
if (this == &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate() && pindexFork != pindexNewTip) {
|
|
// Notify ValidationInterface subscribers
|
|
GetMainSignals().UpdatedBlockTip(pindexNewTip, pindexFork, still_in_ibd);
|
|
|
|
// Always notify the UI if a new block tip was connected
|
|
if (kernel::IsInterrupted(m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip(GetSynchronizationState(still_in_ibd), *pindexNewTip))) {
|
|
// Just breaking and returning success for now. This could
|
|
// be changed to bubble up the kernel::Interrupted value to
|
|
// the caller so the caller could distinguish between
|
|
// completed and interrupted operations.
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// When we reach this point, we switched to a new tip (stored in pindexNewTip).
|
|
|
|
if (exited_ibd) {
|
|
// If a background chainstate is in use, we may need to rebalance our
|
|
// allocation of caches once a chainstate exits initial block download.
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
m_chainman.MaybeRebalanceCaches();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_disabled)) {
|
|
// Background chainstate has reached the snapshot base block, so exit.
|
|
|
|
// Restart indexes to resume indexing for all blocks unique to the snapshot
|
|
// chain. This resumes indexing "in order" from where the indexing on the
|
|
// background validation chain left off.
|
|
//
|
|
// This cannot be done while holding cs_main (within
|
|
// MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation) or a cs_main deadlock will occur.
|
|
if (m_chainman.restart_indexes) {
|
|
m_chainman.restart_indexes();
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// We check interrupt only after giving ActivateBestChainStep a chance to run once so that we
|
|
// never interrupt before connecting the genesis block during LoadChainTip(). Previously this
|
|
// caused an assert() failure during interrupt in such cases as the UTXO DB flushing checks
|
|
// that the best block hash is non-null.
|
|
if (m_chainman.m_interrupt) break;
|
|
} while (pindexNewTip != pindexMostWork);
|
|
|
|
m_chainman.CheckBlockIndex();
|
|
|
|
// Write changes periodically to disk, after relay.
|
|
if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::PreciousBlock(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
if (pindex->nChainWork < m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork) {
|
|
// Nothing to do, this block is not at the tip.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > m_chainman.nLastPreciousChainwork) {
|
|
// The chain has been extended since the last call, reset the counter.
|
|
m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId = -1;
|
|
}
|
|
m_chainman.nLastPreciousChainwork = m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork;
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex);
|
|
pindex->nSequenceId = m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId;
|
|
if (m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId > std::numeric_limits<int32_t>::min()) {
|
|
// We can't keep reducing the counter if somebody really wants to
|
|
// call preciousblock 2**31-1 times on the same set of tips...
|
|
m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId--;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
|
|
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ActivateBestChain(state, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::InvalidateBlock(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex);
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// Genesis block can't be invalidated
|
|
assert(pindex);
|
|
if (pindex->nHeight == 0) return false;
|
|
|
|
CBlockIndex* to_mark_failed = pindex;
|
|
bool pindex_was_in_chain = false;
|
|
int disconnected = 0;
|
|
|
|
// We do not allow ActivateBestChain() to run while InvalidateBlock() is
|
|
// running, as that could cause the tip to change while we disconnect
|
|
// blocks.
|
|
LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex);
|
|
|
|
// We'll be acquiring and releasing cs_main below, to allow the validation
|
|
// callbacks to run. However, we should keep the block index in a
|
|
// consistent state as we disconnect blocks -- in particular we need to
|
|
// add equal-work blocks to setBlockIndexCandidates as we disconnect.
|
|
// To avoid walking the block index repeatedly in search of candidates,
|
|
// build a map once so that we can look up candidate blocks by chain
|
|
// work as we go.
|
|
std::multimap<const arith_uint256, CBlockIndex *> candidate_blocks_by_work;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
for (auto& entry : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
|
|
CBlockIndex* candidate = &entry.second;
|
|
// We don't need to put anything in our active chain into the
|
|
// multimap, because those candidates will be found and considered
|
|
// as we disconnect.
|
|
// Instead, consider only non-active-chain blocks that have at
|
|
// least as much work as where we expect the new tip to end up.
|
|
if (!m_chain.Contains(candidate) &&
|
|
!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate, pindex->pprev) &&
|
|
candidate->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) &&
|
|
candidate->HaveNumChainTxs()) {
|
|
candidate_blocks_by_work.insert(std::make_pair(candidate->nChainWork, candidate));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Disconnect (descendants of) pindex, and mark them invalid.
|
|
while (true) {
|
|
if (m_chainman.m_interrupt) break;
|
|
|
|
// Make sure the queue of validation callbacks doesn't grow unboundedly.
|
|
LimitValidationInterfaceQueue();
|
|
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
// Lock for as long as disconnectpool is in scope to make sure MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg is
|
|
// called after DisconnectTip without unlocking in between
|
|
LOCK(MempoolMutex());
|
|
if (!m_chain.Contains(pindex)) break;
|
|
pindex_was_in_chain = true;
|
|
CBlockIndex *invalid_walk_tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
|
|
// ActivateBestChain considers blocks already in m_chain
|
|
// unconditionally valid already, so force disconnect away from it.
|
|
DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool{MAX_DISCONNECTED_TX_POOL_BYTES};
|
|
bool ret = DisconnectTip(state, &disconnectpool);
|
|
// DisconnectTip will add transactions to disconnectpool.
|
|
// Adjust the mempool to be consistent with the new tip, adding
|
|
// transactions back to the mempool if disconnecting was successful,
|
|
// and we're not doing a very deep invalidation (in which case
|
|
// keeping the mempool up to date is probably futile anyway).
|
|
MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, /* fAddToMempool = */ (++disconnected <= 10) && ret);
|
|
if (!ret) return false;
|
|
assert(invalid_walk_tip->pprev == m_chain.Tip());
|
|
|
|
// We immediately mark the disconnected blocks as invalid.
|
|
// This prevents a case where pruned nodes may fail to invalidateblock
|
|
// and be left unable to start as they have no tip candidates (as there
|
|
// are no blocks that meet the "have data and are not invalid per
|
|
// nStatus" criteria for inclusion in setBlockIndexCandidates).
|
|
invalid_walk_tip->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(invalid_walk_tip);
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(invalid_walk_tip);
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(invalid_walk_tip->pprev);
|
|
if (invalid_walk_tip->pprev == to_mark_failed && (to_mark_failed->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID)) {
|
|
// We only want to mark the last disconnected block as BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; its children
|
|
// need to be BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD instead.
|
|
to_mark_failed->nStatus = (to_mark_failed->nStatus ^ BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) | BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(to_mark_failed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Add any equal or more work headers to setBlockIndexCandidates
|
|
auto candidate_it = candidate_blocks_by_work.lower_bound(invalid_walk_tip->pprev->nChainWork);
|
|
while (candidate_it != candidate_blocks_by_work.end()) {
|
|
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate_it->second, invalid_walk_tip->pprev)) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(candidate_it->second);
|
|
candidate_it = candidate_blocks_by_work.erase(candidate_it);
|
|
} else {
|
|
++candidate_it;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Track the last disconnected block, so we can correct its BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD status in future
|
|
// iterations, or, if it's the last one, call InvalidChainFound on it.
|
|
to_mark_failed = invalid_walk_tip;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_chainman.CheckBlockIndex();
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_chain.Contains(to_mark_failed)) {
|
|
// If the to-be-marked invalid block is in the active chain, something is interfering and we can't proceed.
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Mark pindex (or the last disconnected block) as invalid, even when it never was in the main chain
|
|
to_mark_failed->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(to_mark_failed);
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(to_mark_failed);
|
|
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.insert(to_mark_failed);
|
|
|
|
// If any new blocks somehow arrived while we were disconnecting
|
|
// (above), then the pre-calculation of what should go into
|
|
// setBlockIndexCandidates may have missed entries. This would
|
|
// technically be an inconsistency in the block index, but if we clean
|
|
// it up here, this should be an essentially unobservable error.
|
|
// Loop back over all block index entries and add any missing entries
|
|
// to setBlockIndexCandidates.
|
|
for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
|
|
if (block_index.IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && block_index.HaveNumChainTxs() && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(&block_index, m_chain.Tip())) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(&block_index);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
InvalidChainFound(to_mark_failed);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Only notify about a new block tip if the active chain was modified.
|
|
if (pindex_was_in_chain) {
|
|
// Ignoring return value for now, this could be changed to bubble up
|
|
// kernel::Interrupted value to the caller so the caller could
|
|
// distinguish between completed and interrupted operations. It might
|
|
// also make sense for the blockTip notification to have an enum
|
|
// parameter indicating the source of the tip change so hooks can
|
|
// distinguish user-initiated invalidateblock changes from other
|
|
// changes.
|
|
(void)m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip(GetSynchronizationState(m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()), *to_mark_failed->pprev);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::ResetBlockFailureFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex) {
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
int nHeight = pindex->nHeight;
|
|
|
|
// Remove the invalidity flag from this block and all its descendants.
|
|
for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
|
|
if (!block_index.IsValid() && block_index.GetAncestor(nHeight) == pindex) {
|
|
block_index.nStatus &= ~BLOCK_FAILED_MASK;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(&block_index);
|
|
if (block_index.IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && block_index.HaveNumChainTxs() && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(m_chain.Tip(), &block_index)) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(&block_index);
|
|
}
|
|
if (&block_index == m_chainman.m_best_invalid) {
|
|
// Reset invalid block marker if it was pointing to one of those.
|
|
m_chainman.m_best_invalid = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.erase(&block_index);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Remove the invalidity flag from all ancestors too.
|
|
while (pindex != nullptr) {
|
|
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
|
|
pindex->nStatus &= ~BLOCK_FAILED_MASK;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
|
|
m_chainman.m_failed_blocks.erase(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
pindex = pindex->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(CBlockIndex* pindex)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
// The block only is a candidate for the most-work-chain if it has the same
|
|
// or more work than our current tip.
|
|
if (m_chain.Tip() != nullptr && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(pindex, m_chain.Tip())) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool is_active_chainstate = this == &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate();
|
|
if (is_active_chainstate) {
|
|
// The active chainstate should always add entries that have more
|
|
// work than the tip.
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
|
|
} else if (!m_disabled) {
|
|
// For the background chainstate, we only consider connecting blocks
|
|
// towards the snapshot base (which can't be nullptr or else we'll
|
|
// never make progress).
|
|
const CBlockIndex* snapshot_base{Assert(m_chainman.GetSnapshotBaseBlock())};
|
|
if (snapshot_base->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) {
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark a block as having its data received and checked (up to BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS). */
|
|
void ChainstateManager::ReceivedBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, CBlockIndex* pindexNew, const FlatFilePos& pos)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
pindexNew->nTx = block.vtx.size();
|
|
pindexNew->nChainTx = 0;
|
|
pindexNew->nFile = pos.nFile;
|
|
pindexNew->nDataPos = pos.nPos;
|
|
pindexNew->nUndoPos = 0;
|
|
pindexNew->nStatus |= BLOCK_HAVE_DATA;
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindexNew, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
|
pindexNew->nStatus |= BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS;
|
|
}
|
|
pindexNew->RaiseValidity(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS);
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexNew);
|
|
|
|
if (pindexNew->pprev == nullptr || pindexNew->pprev->HaveNumChainTxs()) {
|
|
// If pindexNew is the genesis block or all parents are BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS.
|
|
std::deque<CBlockIndex*> queue;
|
|
queue.push_back(pindexNew);
|
|
|
|
// Recursively process any descendant blocks that now may be eligible to be connected.
|
|
while (!queue.empty()) {
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindex = queue.front();
|
|
queue.pop_front();
|
|
pindex->nChainTx = (pindex->pprev ? pindex->pprev->nChainTx : 0) + pindex->nTx;
|
|
pindex->nSequenceId = nBlockSequenceId++;
|
|
for (Chainstate *c : GetAll()) {
|
|
c->TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator, std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator> range = m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex);
|
|
while (range.first != range.second) {
|
|
std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator it = range.first;
|
|
queue.push_back(it->second);
|
|
range.first++;
|
|
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.erase(it);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (pindexNew->pprev && pindexNew->pprev->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE)) {
|
|
m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert(std::make_pair(pindexNew->pprev, pindexNew));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW = true)
|
|
{
|
|
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
|
|
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "high-hash", "proof of work failed");
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot)
|
|
{
|
|
// These are checks that are independent of context.
|
|
|
|
if (block.fChecked)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
// Check that the header is valid (particularly PoW). This is mostly
|
|
// redundant with the call in AcceptBlockHeader.
|
|
if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, consensusParams, fCheckPOW))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// Signet only: check block solution
|
|
if (consensusParams.signet_blocks && fCheckPOW && !CheckSignetBlockSolution(block, consensusParams)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-signet-blksig", "signet block signature validation failure");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check the merkle root.
|
|
if (fCheckMerkleRoot) {
|
|
bool mutated;
|
|
uint256 hashMerkleRoot2 = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated);
|
|
if (block.hashMerkleRoot != hashMerkleRoot2)
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txnmrklroot", "hashMerkleRoot mismatch");
|
|
|
|
// Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences
|
|
// of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block,
|
|
// while still invalidating it.
|
|
if (mutated)
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-txns-duplicate", "duplicate transaction");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any
|
|
// transaction validation, as otherwise we may mark the header as invalid
|
|
// because we receive the wrong transactions for it.
|
|
// Note that witness malleability is checked in ContextualCheckBlock, so no
|
|
// checks that use witness data may be performed here.
|
|
|
|
// Size limits
|
|
if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(block)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed");
|
|
|
|
// First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be
|
|
if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase())
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase");
|
|
for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++)
|
|
if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase())
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase");
|
|
|
|
// Check transactions
|
|
// Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144)
|
|
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
|
TxValidationState tx_state;
|
|
if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, tx_state)) {
|
|
// CheckBlock() does context-free validation checks. The only
|
|
// possible failures are consensus failures.
|
|
assert(tx_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(),
|
|
strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
unsigned int nSigOps = 0;
|
|
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx)
|
|
{
|
|
nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx);
|
|
}
|
|
if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST)
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount");
|
|
|
|
if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot)
|
|
block.fChecked = true;
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::UpdateUncommittedBlockStructures(CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) const
|
|
{
|
|
int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
|
|
static const std::vector<unsigned char> nonce(32, 0x00);
|
|
if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT) && !block.vtx[0]->HasWitness()) {
|
|
CMutableTransaction tx(*block.vtx[0]);
|
|
tx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1);
|
|
tx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = nonce;
|
|
block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(tx));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<unsigned char> ChainstateManager::GenerateCoinbaseCommitment(CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) const
|
|
{
|
|
std::vector<unsigned char> commitment;
|
|
int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
|
|
std::vector<unsigned char> ret(32, 0x00);
|
|
if (commitpos == NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
|
|
uint256 witnessroot = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, nullptr);
|
|
CHash256().Write(witnessroot).Write(ret).Finalize(witnessroot);
|
|
CTxOut out;
|
|
out.nValue = 0;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey.resize(MINIMUM_WITNESS_COMMITMENT);
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[0] = OP_RETURN;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[1] = 0x24;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[2] = 0xaa;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[3] = 0x21;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[4] = 0xa9;
|
|
out.scriptPubKey[5] = 0xed;
|
|
memcpy(&out.scriptPubKey[6], witnessroot.begin(), 32);
|
|
commitment = std::vector<unsigned char>(out.scriptPubKey.begin(), out.scriptPubKey.end());
|
|
CMutableTransaction tx(*block.vtx[0]);
|
|
tx.vout.push_back(out);
|
|
block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(tx));
|
|
}
|
|
UpdateUncommittedBlockStructures(block, pindexPrev);
|
|
return commitment;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool HasValidProofOfWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams)
|
|
{
|
|
return std::all_of(headers.cbegin(), headers.cend(),
|
|
[&](const auto& header) { return CheckProofOfWork(header.GetHash(), header.nBits, consensusParams);});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arith_uint256 CalculateHeadersWork(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers)
|
|
{
|
|
arith_uint256 total_work{0};
|
|
for (const CBlockHeader& header : headers) {
|
|
CBlockIndex dummy(header);
|
|
total_work += GetBlockProof(dummy);
|
|
}
|
|
return total_work;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Context-dependent validity checks.
|
|
* By "context", we mean only the previous block headers, but not the UTXO
|
|
* set; UTXO-related validity checks are done in ConnectBlock().
|
|
* NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we
|
|
* should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are
|
|
* enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment
|
|
* in ConnectBlock().
|
|
* Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here!
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, BlockManager& blockman, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev, NodeClock::time_point now) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
assert(pindexPrev != nullptr);
|
|
const int nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
|
|
|
|
// Check proof of work
|
|
const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = chainman.GetConsensus();
|
|
if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work");
|
|
|
|
// Check against checkpoints
|
|
if (chainman.m_options.checkpoints_enabled) {
|
|
// Don't accept any forks from the main chain prior to last checkpoint.
|
|
// GetLastCheckpoint finds the last checkpoint in MapCheckpoints that's in our
|
|
// BlockIndex().
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pcheckpoint = blockman.GetLastCheckpoint(chainman.GetParams().Checkpoints());
|
|
if (pcheckpoint && nHeight < pcheckpoint->nHeight) {
|
|
LogPrintf("ERROR: %s: forked chain older than last checkpoint (height %d)\n", __func__, nHeight);
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT, "bad-fork-prior-to-checkpoint");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check timestamp against prev
|
|
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
|
|
|
|
// Check timestamp
|
|
if (block.Time() > now + std::chrono::seconds{MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME}) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Reject blocks with outdated version
|
|
if ((block.nVersion < 2 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB)) ||
|
|
(block.nVersion < 3 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) ||
|
|
(block.nVersion < 4 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV))) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
|
|
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we
|
|
* should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are
|
|
* enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment
|
|
* in ConnectBlock().
|
|
* Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here!
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev)
|
|
{
|
|
const int nHeight = pindexPrev == nullptr ? 0 : pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
|
|
|
|
// Enforce BIP113 (Median Time Past).
|
|
bool enforce_locktime_median_time_past{false};
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) {
|
|
assert(pindexPrev != nullptr);
|
|
enforce_locktime_median_time_past = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const int64_t nLockTimeCutoff{enforce_locktime_median_time_past ?
|
|
pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast() :
|
|
block.GetBlockTime()};
|
|
|
|
// Check that all transactions are finalized
|
|
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
|
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Enforce rule that the coinbase starts with serialized block height
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB))
|
|
{
|
|
CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight;
|
|
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() ||
|
|
!std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Validation for witness commitments.
|
|
// * We compute the witness hash (which is the hash including witnesses) of all the block's transactions, except the
|
|
// coinbase (where 0x0000....0000 is used instead).
|
|
// * The coinbase scriptWitness is a stack of a single 32-byte vector, containing a witness reserved value (unconstrained).
|
|
// * We build a merkle tree with all those witness hashes as leaves (similar to the hashMerkleRoot in the block header).
|
|
// * There must be at least one output whose scriptPubKey is a single 36-byte push, the first 4 bytes of which are
|
|
// {0xaa, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xed}, and the following 32 bytes are SHA256^2(witness root, witness reserved value). In case there are
|
|
// multiple, the last one is used.
|
|
bool fHaveWitness = false;
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
|
int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block);
|
|
if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) {
|
|
bool malleated = false;
|
|
uint256 hashWitness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block, &malleated);
|
|
// The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself
|
|
// already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the
|
|
// witness tree.
|
|
if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.size() != 1 || block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0].size() != 32) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonce-size", strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__));
|
|
}
|
|
CHash256().Write(hashWitness).Write(block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0]).Finalize(hashWitness);
|
|
if (memcmp(hashWitness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "bad-witness-merkle-match", strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__));
|
|
}
|
|
fHaveWitness = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam
|
|
if (!fHaveWitness) {
|
|
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
|
|
if (tx->HasWitness()) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, "unexpected-witness", strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// After the coinbase witness reserved value and commitment are verified,
|
|
// we can check if the block weight passes (before we've checked the
|
|
// coinbase witness, it would be possible for the weight to be too
|
|
// large by filling up the coinbase witness, which doesn't change
|
|
// the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently
|
|
// failed).
|
|
if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) {
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex** ppindex, bool min_pow_checked)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// Check for duplicate
|
|
uint256 hash = block.GetHash();
|
|
BlockMap::iterator miSelf{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(hash)};
|
|
if (hash != GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) {
|
|
if (miSelf != m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
|
|
// Block header is already known.
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex = &(miSelf->second);
|
|
if (ppindex)
|
|
*ppindex = pindex;
|
|
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: block %s is marked invalid\n", __func__, hash.ToString());
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate");
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, GetConsensus())) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n", __func__, hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Get prev block index
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr;
|
|
BlockMap::iterator mi{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock)};
|
|
if (mi == m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "header %s has prev block not found: %s\n", hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, "prev-blk-not-found");
|
|
}
|
|
pindexPrev = &((*mi).second);
|
|
if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "header %s has prev block invalid: %s\n", hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, m_blockman, *this, pindexPrev, m_options.adjusted_time_callback())) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n", __func__, hash.ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Determine if this block descends from any block which has been found
|
|
* invalid (m_failed_blocks), then mark pindexPrev and any blocks between
|
|
* them as failed. For example:
|
|
*
|
|
* D3
|
|
* /
|
|
* B2 - C2
|
|
* / \
|
|
* A D2 - E2 - F2
|
|
* \
|
|
* B1 - C1 - D1 - E1
|
|
*
|
|
* In the case that we attempted to reorg from E1 to F2, only to find
|
|
* C2 to be invalid, we would mark D2, E2, and F2 as BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD
|
|
* but NOT D3 (it was not in any of our candidate sets at the time).
|
|
*
|
|
* In any case D3 will also be marked as BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD at restart
|
|
* in LoadBlockIndex.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!pindexPrev->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS)) {
|
|
// The above does not mean "invalid": it checks if the previous block
|
|
// hasn't been validated up to BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS. This is a performance
|
|
// optimization, in the common case of adding a new block to the tip,
|
|
// we don't need to iterate over the failed blocks list.
|
|
for (const CBlockIndex* failedit : m_failed_blocks) {
|
|
if (pindexPrev->GetAncestor(failedit->nHeight) == failedit) {
|
|
assert(failedit->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID);
|
|
CBlockIndex* invalid_walk = pindexPrev;
|
|
while (invalid_walk != failedit) {
|
|
invalid_walk->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_CHILD;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(invalid_walk);
|
|
invalid_walk = invalid_walk->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "header %s has prev block invalid: %s\n", hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!min_pow_checked) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: not adding new block header %s, missing anti-dos proof-of-work validation\n", __func__, hash.ToString());
|
|
return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_HEADER_LOW_WORK, "too-little-chainwork");
|
|
}
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex{m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_best_header)};
|
|
|
|
if (ppindex)
|
|
*ppindex = pindex;
|
|
|
|
// Since this is the earliest point at which we have determined that a
|
|
// header is both new and valid, log here.
|
|
//
|
|
// These messages are valuable for detecting potential selfish mining behavior;
|
|
// if multiple displacing headers are seen near simultaneously across many
|
|
// nodes in the network, this might be an indication of selfish mining. Having
|
|
// this log by default when not in IBD ensures broad availability of this data
|
|
// in case investigation is merited.
|
|
const auto msg = strprintf(
|
|
"Saw new header hash=%s height=%d", hash.ToString(), pindex->nHeight);
|
|
|
|
if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
|
|
LogPrintLevel(BCLog::VALIDATION, BCLog::Level::Debug, "%s\n", msg);
|
|
} else {
|
|
LogPrintf("%s\n", msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Exposed wrapper for AcceptBlockHeader
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlockHeaders(const std::vector<CBlockHeader>& headers, bool min_pow_checked, BlockValidationState& state, const CBlockIndex** ppindex)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
for (const CBlockHeader& header : headers) {
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; // Use a temp pindex instead of ppindex to avoid a const_cast
|
|
bool accepted{AcceptBlockHeader(header, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked)};
|
|
CheckBlockIndex();
|
|
|
|
if (!accepted) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ppindex) {
|
|
*ppindex = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (NotifyHeaderTip(*this)) {
|
|
if (IsInitialBlockDownload() && ppindex && *ppindex) {
|
|
const CBlockIndex& last_accepted{**ppindex};
|
|
const int64_t blocks_left{(GetTime() - last_accepted.GetBlockTime()) / GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing};
|
|
const double progress{100.0 * last_accepted.nHeight / (last_accepted.nHeight + blocks_left)};
|
|
LogPrintf("Synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n", last_accepted.nHeight, progress);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::ReportHeadersPresync(const arith_uint256& work, int64_t height, int64_t timestamp)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
// Don't report headers presync progress if we already have a post-minchainwork header chain.
|
|
// This means we lose reporting for potentially legitimate, but unlikely, deep reorgs, but
|
|
// prevent attackers that spam low-work headers from filling our logs.
|
|
if (m_best_header->nChainWork >= UintToArith256(GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork)) return;
|
|
// Rate limit headers presync updates to 4 per second, as these are not subject to DoS
|
|
// protection.
|
|
auto now = std::chrono::steady_clock::now();
|
|
if (now < m_last_presync_update + std::chrono::milliseconds{250}) return;
|
|
m_last_presync_update = now;
|
|
}
|
|
bool initial_download = IsInitialBlockDownload();
|
|
GetNotifications().headerTip(GetSynchronizationState(initial_download), height, timestamp, /*presync=*/true);
|
|
if (initial_download) {
|
|
const int64_t blocks_left{(GetTime() - timestamp) / GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing};
|
|
const double progress{100.0 * height / (height + blocks_left)};
|
|
LogPrintf("Pre-synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n", height, progress);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Store block on disk. If dbp is non-nullptr, the file is known to already reside on disk */
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex** ppindex, bool fRequested, const FlatFilePos* dbp, bool* fNewBlock, bool min_pow_checked)
|
|
{
|
|
const CBlock& block = *pblock;
|
|
|
|
if (fNewBlock) *fNewBlock = false;
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindexDummy = nullptr;
|
|
CBlockIndex *&pindex = ppindex ? *ppindex : pindexDummy;
|
|
|
|
bool accepted_header{AcceptBlockHeader(block, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked)};
|
|
CheckBlockIndex();
|
|
|
|
if (!accepted_header)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
// Check all requested blocks that we do not already have for validity and
|
|
// save them to disk. Skip processing of unrequested blocks as an anti-DoS
|
|
// measure, unless the blocks have more work than the active chain tip, and
|
|
// aren't too far ahead of it, so are likely to be attached soon.
|
|
bool fAlreadyHave = pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA;
|
|
bool fHasMoreOrSameWork = (ActiveTip() ? pindex->nChainWork >= ActiveTip()->nChainWork : true);
|
|
// Blocks that are too out-of-order needlessly limit the effectiveness of
|
|
// pruning, because pruning will not delete block files that contain any
|
|
// blocks which are too close in height to the tip. Apply this test
|
|
// regardless of whether pruning is enabled; it should generally be safe to
|
|
// not process unrequested blocks.
|
|
bool fTooFarAhead{pindex->nHeight > ActiveHeight() + int(MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP)};
|
|
|
|
// TODO: Decouple this function from the block download logic by removing fRequested
|
|
// This requires some new chain data structure to efficiently look up if a
|
|
// block is in a chain leading to a candidate for best tip, despite not
|
|
// being such a candidate itself.
|
|
// Note that this would break the getblockfrompeer RPC
|
|
|
|
// TODO: deal better with return value and error conditions for duplicate
|
|
// and unrequested blocks.
|
|
if (fAlreadyHave) return true;
|
|
if (!fRequested) { // If we didn't ask for it:
|
|
if (pindex->nTx != 0) return true; // This is a previously-processed block that was pruned
|
|
if (!fHasMoreOrSameWork) return true; // Don't process less-work chains
|
|
if (fTooFarAhead) return true; // Block height is too high
|
|
|
|
// Protect against DoS attacks from low-work chains.
|
|
// If our tip is behind, a peer could try to send us
|
|
// low-work blocks on a fake chain that we would never
|
|
// request; don't process these.
|
|
if (pindex->nChainWork < MinimumChainWork()) return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const CChainParams& params{GetParams()};
|
|
|
|
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, params.GetConsensus()) ||
|
|
!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, *this, pindex->pprev)) {
|
|
if (state.IsInvalid() && state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) {
|
|
pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID;
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
return error("%s: %s", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Header is valid/has work, merkle tree and segwit merkle tree are good...RELAY NOW
|
|
// (but if it does not build on our best tip, let the SendMessages loop relay it)
|
|
if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && ActiveTip() == pindex->pprev)
|
|
GetMainSignals().NewPoWValidBlock(pindex, pblock);
|
|
|
|
// Write block to history file
|
|
if (fNewBlock) *fNewBlock = true;
|
|
try {
|
|
FlatFilePos blockPos{m_blockman.SaveBlockToDisk(block, pindex->nHeight, dbp)};
|
|
if (blockPos.IsNull()) {
|
|
state.Error(strprintf("%s: Failed to find position to write new block to disk", __func__));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos);
|
|
} catch (const std::runtime_error& e) {
|
|
return FatalError(GetNotifications(), state, std::string("System error: ") + e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TODO: FlushStateToDisk() handles flushing of both block and chainstate
|
|
// data, so we should move this to ChainstateManager so that we can be more
|
|
// intelligent about how we flush.
|
|
// For now, since FlushStateMode::NONE is used, all that can happen is that
|
|
// the block files may be pruned, so we can just call this on one
|
|
// chainstate (particularly if we haven't implemented pruning with
|
|
// background validation yet).
|
|
ActiveChainstate().FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE);
|
|
|
|
CheckBlockIndex();
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& block, bool force_processing, bool min_pow_checked, bool* new_block)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr;
|
|
if (new_block) *new_block = false;
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
|
|
// CheckBlock() does not support multi-threaded block validation because CBlock::fChecked can cause data race.
|
|
// Therefore, the following critical section must include the CheckBlock() call as well.
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// Skipping AcceptBlock() for CheckBlock() failures means that we will never mark a block as invalid if
|
|
// CheckBlock() fails. This is protective against consensus failure if there are any unknown forms of block
|
|
// malleability that cause CheckBlock() to fail; see e.g. CVE-2012-2459 and
|
|
// https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html. Because CheckBlock() is
|
|
// not very expensive, the anti-DoS benefits of caching failure (of a definitely-invalid block) are not substantial.
|
|
bool ret = CheckBlock(*block, state, GetConsensus());
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
// Store to disk
|
|
ret = AcceptBlock(block, state, &pindex, force_processing, nullptr, new_block, min_pow_checked);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
GetMainSignals().BlockChecked(*block, state);
|
|
return error("%s: AcceptBlock FAILED (%s)", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NotifyHeaderTip(*this);
|
|
|
|
BlockValidationState state; // Only used to report errors, not invalidity - ignore it
|
|
if (!ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(state, block)) {
|
|
return error("%s: ActivateBestChain failed (%s)", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate* bg_chain{WITH_LOCK(cs_main, return BackgroundSyncInProgress() ? m_ibd_chainstate.get() : nullptr)};
|
|
BlockValidationState bg_state;
|
|
if (bg_chain && !bg_chain->ActivateBestChain(bg_state, block)) {
|
|
return error("%s: [background] ActivateBestChain failed (%s)", __func__, bg_state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MempoolAcceptResult ChainstateManager::ProcessTransaction(const CTransactionRef& tx, bool test_accept)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
Chainstate& active_chainstate = ActiveChainstate();
|
|
if (!active_chainstate.GetMempool()) {
|
|
TxValidationState state;
|
|
state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL, "no-mempool");
|
|
return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(state);
|
|
}
|
|
auto result = AcceptToMemoryPool(active_chainstate, tx, GetTime(), /*bypass_limits=*/ false, test_accept);
|
|
active_chainstate.GetMempool()->check(active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool TestBlockValidity(BlockValidationState& state,
|
|
const CChainParams& chainparams,
|
|
Chainstate& chainstate,
|
|
const CBlock& block,
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexPrev,
|
|
const std::function<NodeClock::time_point()>& adjusted_time_callback,
|
|
bool fCheckPOW,
|
|
bool fCheckMerkleRoot)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
assert(pindexPrev && pindexPrev == chainstate.m_chain.Tip());
|
|
CCoinsViewCache viewNew(&chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
|
uint256 block_hash(block.GetHash());
|
|
CBlockIndex indexDummy(block);
|
|
indexDummy.pprev = pindexPrev;
|
|
indexDummy.nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1;
|
|
indexDummy.phashBlock = &block_hash;
|
|
|
|
// NOTE: CheckBlockHeader is called by CheckBlock
|
|
if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainstate.m_blockman, chainstate.m_chainman, pindexPrev, adjusted_time_callback()))
|
|
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
if (!CheckBlock(block, state, chainparams.GetConsensus(), fCheckPOW, fCheckMerkleRoot))
|
|
return error("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, chainstate.m_chainman, pindexPrev))
|
|
return error("%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlock: %s", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
if (!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, &indexDummy, viewNew, true)) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
assert(state.IsValid());
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This function is called from the RPC code for pruneblockchain */
|
|
void PruneBlockFilesManual(Chainstate& active_chainstate, int nManualPruneHeight)
|
|
{
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
if (!active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(
|
|
state, FlushStateMode::NONE, nManualPruneHeight)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: failed to flush state (%s)\n", __func__, state.ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::LoadChainTip()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = CoinsTip();
|
|
assert(!coins_cache.GetBestBlock().IsNull()); // Never called when the coins view is empty
|
|
const CBlockIndex* tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
|
|
if (tip && tip->GetBlockHash() == coins_cache.GetBestBlock()) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Load pointer to end of best chain
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(coins_cache.GetBestBlock());
|
|
if (!pindex) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
m_chain.SetTip(*pindex);
|
|
PruneBlockIndexCandidates();
|
|
|
|
tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
LogPrintf("Loaded best chain: hashBestChain=%s height=%d date=%s progress=%f\n",
|
|
tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(),
|
|
m_chain.Height(),
|
|
FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()),
|
|
GuessVerificationProgress(m_chainman.GetParams().TxData(), tip));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CVerifyDB::CVerifyDB(Notifications& notifications)
|
|
: m_notifications{notifications}
|
|
{
|
|
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), 0, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CVerifyDB::~CVerifyDB()
|
|
{
|
|
m_notifications.progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
VerifyDBResult CVerifyDB::VerifyDB(
|
|
Chainstate& chainstate,
|
|
const Consensus::Params& consensus_params,
|
|
CCoinsView& coinsview,
|
|
int nCheckLevel, int nCheckDepth)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
if (chainstate.m_chain.Tip() == nullptr || chainstate.m_chain.Tip()->pprev == nullptr) {
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify blocks in the best chain
|
|
if (nCheckDepth <= 0 || nCheckDepth > chainstate.m_chain.Height()) {
|
|
nCheckDepth = chainstate.m_chain.Height();
|
|
}
|
|
nCheckLevel = std::max(0, std::min(4, nCheckLevel));
|
|
LogPrintf("Verifying last %i blocks at level %i\n", nCheckDepth, nCheckLevel);
|
|
CCoinsViewCache coins(&coinsview);
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex;
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFailure = nullptr;
|
|
int nGoodTransactions = 0;
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
int reportDone = 0;
|
|
bool skipped_no_block_data{false};
|
|
bool skipped_l3_checks{false};
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification progress: 0%%\n");
|
|
|
|
const bool is_snapshot_cs{chainstate.m_from_snapshot_blockhash};
|
|
|
|
for (pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Tip(); pindex && pindex->pprev; pindex = pindex->pprev) {
|
|
const int percentageDone = std::max(1, std::min(99, (int)(((double)(chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight)) / (double)nCheckDepth * (nCheckLevel >= 4 ? 50 : 100))));
|
|
if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) {
|
|
// report every 10% step
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification progress: %d%%\n", percentageDone);
|
|
reportDone = percentageDone / 10;
|
|
}
|
|
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone, false);
|
|
if (pindex->nHeight <= chainstate.m_chain.Height() - nCheckDepth) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if ((chainstate.m_blockman.IsPruneMode() || is_snapshot_cs) && !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) {
|
|
// If pruning or running under an assumeutxo snapshot, only go
|
|
// back as far as we have data.
|
|
LogPrintf("VerifyDB(): block verification stopping at height %d (no data). This could be due to pruning or use of an assumeutxo snapshot.\n", pindex->nHeight);
|
|
skipped_no_block_data = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
CBlock block;
|
|
// check level 0: read from disk
|
|
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
// check level 1: verify block validity
|
|
if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state, consensus_params)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n",
|
|
pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
// check level 2: verify undo validity
|
|
if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) {
|
|
CBlockUndo undo;
|
|
if (!pindex->GetUndoPos().IsNull()) {
|
|
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.UndoReadFromDisk(undo, *pindex)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: found bad undo data at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// check level 3: check for inconsistencies during memory-only disconnect of tip blocks
|
|
size_t curr_coins_usage = coins.DynamicMemoryUsage() + chainstate.CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage();
|
|
|
|
if (nCheckLevel >= 3) {
|
|
if (curr_coins_usage <= chainstate.m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes) {
|
|
assert(coins.GetBestBlock() == pindex->GetBlockHash());
|
|
DisconnectResult res = chainstate.DisconnectBlock(block, pindex, coins);
|
|
if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: irrecoverable inconsistency in block data at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
if (res == DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN) {
|
|
nGoodTransactions = 0;
|
|
pindexFailure = pindex;
|
|
} else {
|
|
nGoodTransactions += block.vtx.size();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
skipped_l3_checks = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (chainstate.m_chainman.m_interrupt) return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindexFailure) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: coin database inconsistencies found (last %i blocks, %i good transactions before that)\n", chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindexFailure->nHeight + 1, nGoodTransactions);
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
if (skipped_l3_checks) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Skipped verification of level >=3 (insufficient database cache size). Consider increasing -dbcache.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// store block count as we move pindex at check level >= 4
|
|
int block_count = chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight;
|
|
|
|
// check level 4: try reconnecting blocks
|
|
if (nCheckLevel >= 4 && !skipped_l3_checks) {
|
|
while (pindex != chainstate.m_chain.Tip()) {
|
|
const int percentageDone = std::max(1, std::min(99, 100 - (int)(((double)(chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight)) / (double)nCheckDepth * 50)));
|
|
if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) {
|
|
// report every 10% step
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification progress: %d%%\n", percentageDone);
|
|
reportDone = percentageDone / 10;
|
|
}
|
|
m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone, false);
|
|
pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Next(pindex);
|
|
CBlock block;
|
|
if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, pindex, coins)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification error: found unconnectable block at %d, hash=%s (%s)\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString());
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB;
|
|
}
|
|
if (chainstate.m_chainman.m_interrupt) return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("Verification: No coin database inconsistencies in last %i blocks (%i transactions)\n", block_count, nGoodTransactions);
|
|
|
|
if (skipped_l3_checks) {
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_L3_CHECKS;
|
|
}
|
|
if (skipped_no_block_data) {
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_MISSING_BLOCKS;
|
|
}
|
|
return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Apply the effects of a block on the utxo cache, ignoring that it may already have been applied. */
|
|
bool Chainstate::RollforwardBlock(const CBlockIndex* pindex, CCoinsViewCache& inputs)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
// TODO: merge with ConnectBlock
|
|
CBlock block;
|
|
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindex)) {
|
|
return error("ReplayBlock(): ReadBlockFromDisk failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (const CTransactionRef& tx : block.vtx) {
|
|
if (!tx->IsCoinBase()) {
|
|
for (const CTxIn &txin : tx->vin) {
|
|
inputs.SpendCoin(txin.prevout);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Pass check = true as every addition may be an overwrite.
|
|
AddCoins(inputs, *tx, pindex->nHeight, true);
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::ReplayBlocks()
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
CCoinsView& db = this->CoinsDB();
|
|
CCoinsViewCache cache(&db);
|
|
|
|
std::vector<uint256> hashHeads = db.GetHeadBlocks();
|
|
if (hashHeads.empty()) return true; // We're already in a consistent state.
|
|
if (hashHeads.size() != 2) return error("ReplayBlocks(): unknown inconsistent state");
|
|
|
|
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(_("Replaying blocks…"), 0, false);
|
|
LogPrintf("Replaying blocks\n");
|
|
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexOld = nullptr; // Old tip during the interrupted flush.
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexNew; // New tip during the interrupted flush.
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = nullptr; // Latest block common to both the old and the new tip.
|
|
|
|
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(hashHeads[0]) == 0) {
|
|
return error("ReplayBlocks(): reorganization to unknown block requested");
|
|
}
|
|
pindexNew = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[0]]);
|
|
|
|
if (!hashHeads[1].IsNull()) { // The old tip is allowed to be 0, indicating it's the first flush.
|
|
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(hashHeads[1]) == 0) {
|
|
return error("ReplayBlocks(): reorganization from unknown block requested");
|
|
}
|
|
pindexOld = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[1]]);
|
|
pindexFork = LastCommonAncestor(pindexOld, pindexNew);
|
|
assert(pindexFork != nullptr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Rollback along the old branch.
|
|
while (pindexOld != pindexFork) {
|
|
if (pindexOld->nHeight > 0) { // Never disconnect the genesis block.
|
|
CBlock block;
|
|
if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(block, *pindexOld)) {
|
|
return error("RollbackBlock(): ReadBlockFromDisk() failed at %d, hash=%s", pindexOld->nHeight, pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrintf("Rolling back %s (%i)\n", pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexOld->nHeight);
|
|
DisconnectResult res = DisconnectBlock(block, pindexOld, cache);
|
|
if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) {
|
|
return error("RollbackBlock(): DisconnectBlock failed at %d, hash=%s", pindexOld->nHeight, pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString());
|
|
}
|
|
// If DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN is returned, it means a non-existing UTXO was deleted, or an existing UTXO was
|
|
// overwritten. It corresponds to cases where the block-to-be-disconnect never had all its operations
|
|
// applied to the UTXO set. However, as both writing a UTXO and deleting a UTXO are idempotent operations,
|
|
// the result is still a version of the UTXO set with the effects of that block undone.
|
|
}
|
|
pindexOld = pindexOld->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Roll forward from the forking point to the new tip.
|
|
int nForkHeight = pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : 0;
|
|
for (int nHeight = nForkHeight + 1; nHeight <= pindexNew->nHeight; ++nHeight) {
|
|
const CBlockIndex& pindex{*Assert(pindexNew->GetAncestor(nHeight))};
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("Rolling forward %s (%i)\n", pindex.GetBlockHash().ToString(), nHeight);
|
|
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(_("Replaying blocks…"), (int)((nHeight - nForkHeight) * 100.0 / (pindexNew->nHeight - nForkHeight)), false);
|
|
if (!RollforwardBlock(&pindex, cache)) return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cache.SetBestBlock(pindexNew->GetBlockHash());
|
|
cache.Flush();
|
|
m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::NeedsRedownload() const
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// At and above m_params.SegwitHeight, segwit consensus rules must be validated
|
|
CBlockIndex* block{m_chain.Tip()};
|
|
|
|
while (block != nullptr && DeploymentActiveAt(*block, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
|
if (!(block->nStatus & BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS)) {
|
|
// block is insufficiently validated for a segwit client
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
block = block->pprev;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void Chainstate::ClearBlockIndexCandidates()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
setBlockIndexCandidates.clear();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::LoadBlockIndex()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
// Load block index from databases
|
|
bool needs_init = fReindex;
|
|
if (!fReindex) {
|
|
bool ret{m_blockman.LoadBlockIndexDB(SnapshotBlockhash())};
|
|
if (!ret) return false;
|
|
|
|
m_blockman.ScanAndUnlinkAlreadyPrunedFiles();
|
|
|
|
std::vector<CBlockIndex*> vSortedByHeight{m_blockman.GetAllBlockIndices()};
|
|
std::sort(vSortedByHeight.begin(), vSortedByHeight.end(),
|
|
CBlockIndexHeightOnlyComparator());
|
|
|
|
for (CBlockIndex* pindex : vSortedByHeight) {
|
|
if (m_interrupt) return false;
|
|
// If we have an assumeutxo-based chainstate, then the snapshot
|
|
// block will be a candidate for the tip, but it may not be
|
|
// VALID_TRANSACTIONS (eg if we haven't yet downloaded the block),
|
|
// so we special-case the snapshot block as a potential candidate
|
|
// here.
|
|
if (pindex == GetSnapshotBaseBlock() ||
|
|
(pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) &&
|
|
(pindex->HaveNumChainTxs() || pindex->pprev == nullptr))) {
|
|
|
|
for (Chainstate* chainstate : GetAll()) {
|
|
chainstate->TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(pindex);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK && (!m_best_invalid || pindex->nChainWork > m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) {
|
|
m_best_invalid = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE) && (m_best_header == nullptr || CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(m_best_header, pindex)))
|
|
m_best_header = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
needs_init = m_blockman.m_block_index.empty();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (needs_init) {
|
|
// Everything here is for *new* reindex/DBs. Thus, though
|
|
// LoadBlockIndexDB may have set fReindex if we shut down
|
|
// mid-reindex previously, we don't check fReindex and
|
|
// instead only check it prior to LoadBlockIndexDB to set
|
|
// needs_init.
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("Initializing databases...\n");
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::LoadGenesisBlock()
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
const CChainParams& params{m_chainman.GetParams()};
|
|
|
|
// Check whether we're already initialized by checking for genesis in
|
|
// m_blockman.m_block_index. Note that we can't use m_chain here, since it is
|
|
// set based on the coins db, not the block index db, which is the only
|
|
// thing loaded at this point.
|
|
if (m_blockman.m_block_index.count(params.GenesisBlock().GetHash()))
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const CBlock& block = params.GenesisBlock();
|
|
FlatFilePos blockPos{m_blockman.SaveBlockToDisk(block, 0, nullptr)};
|
|
if (blockPos.IsNull()) {
|
|
return error("%s: writing genesis block to disk failed", __func__);
|
|
}
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_chainman.m_best_header);
|
|
m_chainman.ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos);
|
|
} catch (const std::runtime_error& e) {
|
|
return error("%s: failed to write genesis block: %s", __func__, e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::LoadExternalBlockFile(
|
|
AutoFile& file_in,
|
|
FlatFilePos* dbp,
|
|
std::multimap<uint256, FlatFilePos>* blocks_with_unknown_parent)
|
|
{
|
|
// Either both should be specified (-reindex), or neither (-loadblock).
|
|
assert(!dbp == !blocks_with_unknown_parent);
|
|
|
|
const auto start{SteadyClock::now()};
|
|
const CChainParams& params{GetParams()};
|
|
|
|
int nLoaded = 0;
|
|
try {
|
|
BufferedFile blkdat{file_in, 2 * MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE, MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE + 8};
|
|
// nRewind indicates where to resume scanning in case something goes wrong,
|
|
// such as a block fails to deserialize.
|
|
uint64_t nRewind = blkdat.GetPos();
|
|
while (!blkdat.eof()) {
|
|
if (m_interrupt) return;
|
|
|
|
blkdat.SetPos(nRewind);
|
|
nRewind++; // start one byte further next time, in case of failure
|
|
blkdat.SetLimit(); // remove former limit
|
|
unsigned int nSize = 0;
|
|
try {
|
|
// locate a header
|
|
MessageStartChars buf;
|
|
blkdat.FindByte(std::byte(params.MessageStart()[0]));
|
|
nRewind = blkdat.GetPos() + 1;
|
|
blkdat >> buf;
|
|
if (buf != params.MessageStart()) {
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// read size
|
|
blkdat >> nSize;
|
|
if (nSize < 80 || nSize > MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE)
|
|
continue;
|
|
} catch (const std::exception&) {
|
|
// no valid block header found; don't complain
|
|
// (this happens at the end of every blk.dat file)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
// read block header
|
|
const uint64_t nBlockPos{blkdat.GetPos()};
|
|
if (dbp)
|
|
dbp->nPos = nBlockPos;
|
|
blkdat.SetLimit(nBlockPos + nSize);
|
|
CBlockHeader header;
|
|
blkdat >> header;
|
|
const uint256 hash{header.GetHash()};
|
|
// Skip the rest of this block (this may read from disk into memory); position to the marker before the
|
|
// next block, but it's still possible to rewind to the start of the current block (without a disk read).
|
|
nRewind = nBlockPos + nSize;
|
|
blkdat.SkipTo(nRewind);
|
|
|
|
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock{}; // needs to remain available after the cs_main lock is released to avoid duplicate reads from disk
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
// detect out of order blocks, and store them for later
|
|
if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock && !m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(header.hashPrevBlock)) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: Out of order block %s, parent %s not known\n", __func__, hash.ToString(),
|
|
header.hashPrevBlock.ToString());
|
|
if (dbp && blocks_with_unknown_parent) {
|
|
blocks_with_unknown_parent->emplace(header.hashPrevBlock, *dbp);
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// process in case the block isn't known yet
|
|
const CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash);
|
|
if (!pindex || (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) == 0) {
|
|
// This block can be processed immediately; rewind to its start, read and deserialize it.
|
|
blkdat.SetPos(nBlockPos);
|
|
pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
|
|
blkdat >> TX_WITH_WITNESS(*pblock);
|
|
nRewind = blkdat.GetPos();
|
|
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
if (AcceptBlock(pblock, state, nullptr, true, dbp, nullptr, true)) {
|
|
nLoaded++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (state.IsError()) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock && pindex->nHeight % 1000 == 0) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX, "Block Import: already had block %s at height %d\n", hash.ToString(), pindex->nHeight);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Activate the genesis block so normal node progress can continue
|
|
if (hash == params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) {
|
|
bool genesis_activation_failure = false;
|
|
for (auto c : GetAll()) {
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
if (!c->ActivateBestChain(state, nullptr)) {
|
|
genesis_activation_failure = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (genesis_activation_failure) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() && !fReindex && pblock) {
|
|
// must update the tip for pruning to work while importing with -loadblock.
|
|
// this is a tradeoff to conserve disk space at the expense of time
|
|
// spent updating the tip to be able to prune.
|
|
// otherwise, ActivateBestChain won't be called by the import process
|
|
// until after all of the block files are loaded. ActivateBestChain can be
|
|
// called by concurrent network message processing. but, that is not
|
|
// reliable for the purpose of pruning while importing.
|
|
bool activation_failure = false;
|
|
for (auto c : GetAll()) {
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
if (!c->ActivateBestChain(state, pblock)) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX, "failed to activate chain (%s)\n", state.ToString());
|
|
activation_failure = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (activation_failure) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
NotifyHeaderTip(*this);
|
|
|
|
if (!blocks_with_unknown_parent) continue;
|
|
|
|
// Recursively process earlier encountered successors of this block
|
|
std::deque<uint256> queue;
|
|
queue.push_back(hash);
|
|
while (!queue.empty()) {
|
|
uint256 head = queue.front();
|
|
queue.pop_front();
|
|
auto range = blocks_with_unknown_parent->equal_range(head);
|
|
while (range.first != range.second) {
|
|
std::multimap<uint256, FlatFilePos>::iterator it = range.first;
|
|
std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockrecursive = std::make_shared<CBlock>();
|
|
if (m_blockman.ReadBlockFromDisk(*pblockrecursive, it->second)) {
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: Processing out of order child %s of %s\n", __func__, pblockrecursive->GetHash().ToString(),
|
|
head.ToString());
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
BlockValidationState dummy;
|
|
if (AcceptBlock(pblockrecursive, dummy, nullptr, true, &it->second, nullptr, true)) {
|
|
nLoaded++;
|
|
queue.push_back(pblockrecursive->GetHash());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
range.first++;
|
|
blocks_with_unknown_parent->erase(it);
|
|
NotifyHeaderTip(*this);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const std::exception& e) {
|
|
// historical bugs added extra data to the block files that does not deserialize cleanly.
|
|
// commonly this data is between readable blocks, but it does not really matter. such data is not fatal to the import process.
|
|
// the code that reads the block files deals with invalid data by simply ignoring it.
|
|
// it continues to search for the next {4 byte magic message start bytes + 4 byte length + block} that does deserialize cleanly
|
|
// and passes all of the other block validation checks dealing with POW and the merkle root, etc...
|
|
// we merely note with this informational log message when unexpected data is encountered.
|
|
// we could also be experiencing a storage system read error, or a read of a previous bad write. these are possible, but
|
|
// less likely scenarios. we don't have enough information to tell a difference here.
|
|
// the reindex process is not the place to attempt to clean and/or compact the block files. if so desired, a studious node operator
|
|
// may use knowledge of the fact that the block files are not entirely pristine in order to prepare a set of pristine, and
|
|
// perhaps ordered, block files for later reindexing.
|
|
LogPrint(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: unexpected data at file offset 0x%x - %s. continuing\n", __func__, (nRewind - 1), e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const std::runtime_error& e) {
|
|
GetNotifications().fatalError(std::string("System error: ") + e.what());
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrintf("Loaded %i blocks from external file in %dms\n", nLoaded, Ticks<std::chrono::milliseconds>(SteadyClock::now() - start));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::CheckBlockIndex()
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ShouldCheckBlockIndex()) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// During a reindex, we read the genesis block and call CheckBlockIndex before ActivateBestChain,
|
|
// so we have the genesis block in m_blockman.m_block_index but no active chain. (A few of the
|
|
// tests when iterating the block tree require that m_chain has been initialized.)
|
|
if (ActiveChain().Height() < 0) {
|
|
assert(m_blockman.m_block_index.size() <= 1);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Build forward-pointing map of the entire block tree.
|
|
std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*> forward;
|
|
for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) {
|
|
forward.emplace(block_index.pprev, &block_index);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(forward.size() == m_blockman.m_block_index.size());
|
|
|
|
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator,std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator> rangeGenesis = forward.equal_range(nullptr);
|
|
CBlockIndex *pindex = rangeGenesis.first->second;
|
|
rangeGenesis.first++;
|
|
assert(rangeGenesis.first == rangeGenesis.second); // There is only one index entry with parent nullptr.
|
|
|
|
// Iterate over the entire block tree, using depth-first search.
|
|
// Along the way, remember whether there are blocks on the path from genesis
|
|
// block being explored which are the first to have certain properties.
|
|
size_t nNodes = 0;
|
|
int nHeight = 0;
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which is invalid.
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstMissing = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_HAVE_DATA.
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex for which nTx == 0.
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TREE (regardless of being valid or not).
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS (regardless of being valid or not).
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN (regardless of being valid or not).
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS (regardless of being valid or not).
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexFirstAssumeValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which has BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID
|
|
while (pindex != nullptr) {
|
|
nNodes++;
|
|
// Make sure nChainTx sum is correctly computed.
|
|
unsigned int prev_chain_tx = pindex->pprev ? pindex->pprev->nChainTx : 0;
|
|
assert((pindex->nChainTx == pindex->nTx + prev_chain_tx)
|
|
// For testing, allow transaction counts to be completely unset.
|
|
|| (pindex->nChainTx == 0 && pindex->nTx == 0)
|
|
// For testing, allow this nChainTx to be unset if previous is also unset.
|
|
|| (pindex->nChainTx == 0 && prev_chain_tx == 0 && pindex->pprev));
|
|
|
|
if (pindexFirstAssumeValid == nullptr && pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID) pindexFirstAssumeValid = pindex;
|
|
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr && pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) pindexFirstInvalid = pindex;
|
|
if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr && !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) {
|
|
pindexFirstMissing = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr && pindex->nTx == 0) pindexFirstNeverProcessed = pindex;
|
|
if (pindex->pprev != nullptr && pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_TREE) pindexFirstNotTreeValid = pindex;
|
|
|
|
if (pindex->pprev != nullptr && !pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
|
|
// Skip validity flag checks for BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID index entries, since these
|
|
// *_VALID_MASK flags will not be present for index entries we are temporarily assuming
|
|
// valid.
|
|
if (pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr &&
|
|
(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) {
|
|
pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr &&
|
|
(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN) {
|
|
pindexFirstNotChainValid = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr &&
|
|
(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) {
|
|
pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = pindex;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Begin: actual consistency checks.
|
|
if (pindex->pprev == nullptr) {
|
|
// Genesis block checks.
|
|
assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() == GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock); // Genesis block's hash must match.
|
|
for (auto c : GetAll()) {
|
|
if (c->m_chain.Genesis() != nullptr) {
|
|
assert(pindex == c->m_chain.Genesis()); // The chain's genesis block must be this block.
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()) assert(pindex->nSequenceId <= 0); // nSequenceId can't be set positive for blocks that aren't linked (negative is used for preciousblock)
|
|
// VALID_TRANSACTIONS is equivalent to nTx > 0 for all nodes (whether or not pruning has occurred).
|
|
// HAVE_DATA is only equivalent to nTx > 0 (or VALID_TRANSACTIONS) if no pruning has occurred.
|
|
// Unless these indexes are assumed valid and pending block download on a
|
|
// background chainstate.
|
|
if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned && !pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
|
|
// If we've never pruned, then HAVE_DATA should be equivalent to nTx > 0
|
|
assert(!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) == (pindex->nTx == 0));
|
|
if (pindexFirstAssumeValid == nullptr) {
|
|
// If we've got some assume valid blocks, then we might have
|
|
// missing blocks (not HAVE_DATA) but still treat them as
|
|
// having been processed (with a fake nTx value). Otherwise, we
|
|
// can assert that these are the same.
|
|
assert(pindexFirstMissing == pindexFirstNeverProcessed);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
// If we have pruned, then we can only say that HAVE_DATA implies nTx > 0
|
|
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) assert(pindex->nTx > 0);
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_UNDO) assert(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA);
|
|
if (pindex->IsAssumedValid()) {
|
|
// Assumed-valid blocks should have some nTx value.
|
|
assert(pindex->nTx > 0);
|
|
// Assumed-valid blocks should connect to the main chain.
|
|
assert((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TREE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Otherwise there should only be an nTx value if we have
|
|
// actually seen a block's transactions.
|
|
assert(((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) == (pindex->nTx > 0)); // This is pruning-independent.
|
|
}
|
|
// All parents having had data (at some point) is equivalent to all parents being VALID_TRANSACTIONS, which is equivalent to HaveNumChainTxs().
|
|
assert((pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr) == pindex->HaveNumChainTxs());
|
|
assert((pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr) == pindex->HaveNumChainTxs());
|
|
assert(pindex->nHeight == nHeight); // nHeight must be consistent.
|
|
assert(pindex->pprev == nullptr || pindex->nChainWork >= pindex->pprev->nChainWork); // For every block except the genesis block, the chainwork must be larger than the parent's.
|
|
assert(nHeight < 2 || (pindex->pskip && (pindex->pskip->nHeight < nHeight))); // The pskip pointer must point back for all but the first 2 blocks.
|
|
assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr); // All m_blockman.m_block_index entries must at least be TREE valid
|
|
if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TREE) assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr); // TREE valid implies all parents are TREE valid
|
|
if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN) assert(pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr); // CHAIN valid implies all parents are CHAIN valid
|
|
if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) assert(pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr); // SCRIPTS valid implies all parents are SCRIPTS valid
|
|
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
|
|
// Checks for not-invalid blocks.
|
|
assert((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_MASK) == 0); // The failed mask cannot be set for blocks without invalid parents.
|
|
}
|
|
// Chainstate-specific checks on setBlockIndexCandidates
|
|
for (auto c : GetAll()) {
|
|
if (c->m_chain.Tip() == nullptr) continue;
|
|
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, c->m_chain.Tip()) && pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr) {
|
|
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
|
|
const bool is_active = c == &ActiveChainstate();
|
|
// If this block sorts at least as good as the current tip and
|
|
// is valid and we have all data for its parents, it must be in
|
|
// setBlockIndexCandidates. m_chain.Tip() must also be there
|
|
// even if some data has been pruned.
|
|
//
|
|
if ((pindexFirstMissing == nullptr || pindex == c->m_chain.Tip())) {
|
|
// The active chainstate should always have this block
|
|
// as a candidate, but a background chainstate should
|
|
// only have it if it is an ancestor of the snapshot base.
|
|
if (is_active || GetSnapshotBaseBlock()->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) {
|
|
assert(c->setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// If some parent is missing, then it could be that this block was in
|
|
// setBlockIndexCandidates but had to be removed because of the missing data.
|
|
// In this case it must be in m_blocks_unlinked -- see test below.
|
|
}
|
|
} else { // If this block sorts worse than the current tip or some ancestor's block has never been seen, it cannot be in setBlockIndexCandidates.
|
|
assert(c->setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex) == 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Check whether this block is in m_blocks_unlinked.
|
|
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator,std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator> rangeUnlinked = m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex->pprev);
|
|
bool foundInUnlinked = false;
|
|
while (rangeUnlinked.first != rangeUnlinked.second) {
|
|
assert(rangeUnlinked.first->first == pindex->pprev);
|
|
if (rangeUnlinked.first->second == pindex) {
|
|
foundInUnlinked = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
rangeUnlinked.first++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (pindex->pprev && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && pindexFirstNeverProcessed != nullptr && pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
|
|
// If this block has block data available, some parent was never received, and has no invalid parents, it must be in m_blocks_unlinked.
|
|
assert(foundInUnlinked);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) assert(!foundInUnlinked); // Can't be in m_blocks_unlinked if we don't HAVE_DATA
|
|
if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr) assert(!foundInUnlinked); // We aren't missing data for any parent -- cannot be in m_blocks_unlinked.
|
|
if (pindex->pprev && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr && pindexFirstMissing != nullptr) {
|
|
// We HAVE_DATA for this block, have received data for all parents at some point, but we're currently missing data for some parent.
|
|
assert(m_blockman.m_have_pruned || pindexFirstAssumeValid != nullptr); // We must have pruned, or else we're using a snapshot (causing us to have faked the received data for some parent(s)).
|
|
// This block may have entered m_blocks_unlinked if:
|
|
// - it has a descendant that at some point had more work than the
|
|
// tip, and
|
|
// - we tried switching to that descendant but were missing
|
|
// data for some intermediate block between m_chain and the
|
|
// tip.
|
|
// So if this block is itself better than any m_chain.Tip() and it wasn't in
|
|
// setBlockIndexCandidates, then it must be in m_blocks_unlinked.
|
|
for (auto c : GetAll()) {
|
|
const bool is_active = c == &ActiveChainstate();
|
|
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, c->m_chain.Tip()) && c->setBlockIndexCandidates.count(pindex) == 0) {
|
|
if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) {
|
|
if (is_active || GetSnapshotBaseBlock()->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) {
|
|
assert(foundInUnlinked);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() == pindex->GetBlockHeader().GetHash()); // Perhaps too slow
|
|
// End: actual consistency checks.
|
|
|
|
// Try descending into the first subnode.
|
|
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator,std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator> range = forward.equal_range(pindex);
|
|
if (range.first != range.second) {
|
|
// A subnode was found.
|
|
pindex = range.first->second;
|
|
nHeight++;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// This is a leaf node.
|
|
// Move upwards until we reach a node of which we have not yet visited the last child.
|
|
while (pindex) {
|
|
// We are going to either move to a parent or a sibling of pindex.
|
|
// If pindex was the first with a certain property, unset the corresponding variable.
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstInvalid) pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstMissing) pindexFirstMissing = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstNeverProcessed) pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTreeValid) pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid) pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotChainValid) pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstNotScriptsValid) pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr;
|
|
if (pindex == pindexFirstAssumeValid) pindexFirstAssumeValid = nullptr;
|
|
// Find our parent.
|
|
CBlockIndex* pindexPar = pindex->pprev;
|
|
// Find which child we just visited.
|
|
std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator,std::multimap<CBlockIndex*,CBlockIndex*>::iterator> rangePar = forward.equal_range(pindexPar);
|
|
while (rangePar.first->second != pindex) {
|
|
assert(rangePar.first != rangePar.second); // Our parent must have at least the node we're coming from as child.
|
|
rangePar.first++;
|
|
}
|
|
// Proceed to the next one.
|
|
rangePar.first++;
|
|
if (rangePar.first != rangePar.second) {
|
|
// Move to the sibling.
|
|
pindex = rangePar.first->second;
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Move up further.
|
|
pindex = pindexPar;
|
|
nHeight--;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Check that we actually traversed the entire map.
|
|
assert(nNodes == forward.size());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::string Chainstate::ToString()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
CBlockIndex* tip = m_chain.Tip();
|
|
return strprintf("Chainstate [%s] @ height %d (%s)",
|
|
m_from_snapshot_blockhash ? "snapshot" : "ibd",
|
|
tip ? tip->nHeight : -1, tip ? tip->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "null");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool Chainstate::ResizeCoinsCaches(size_t coinstip_size, size_t coinsdb_size)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
if (coinstip_size == m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes &&
|
|
coinsdb_size == m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes) {
|
|
// Cache sizes are unchanged, no need to continue.
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
size_t old_coinstip_size = m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes;
|
|
m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = coinstip_size;
|
|
m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes = coinsdb_size;
|
|
CoinsDB().ResizeCache(coinsdb_size);
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[%s] resized coinsdb cache to %.1f MiB\n",
|
|
this->ToString(), coinsdb_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024));
|
|
LogPrintf("[%s] resized coinstip cache to %.1f MiB\n",
|
|
this->ToString(), coinstip_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024));
|
|
|
|
BlockValidationState state;
|
|
bool ret;
|
|
|
|
if (coinstip_size > old_coinstip_size) {
|
|
// Likely no need to flush if cache sizes have grown.
|
|
ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Otherwise, flush state to disk and deallocate the in-memory coins map.
|
|
ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::ALWAYS);
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//! Guess how far we are in the verification process at the given block index
|
|
//! require cs_main if pindex has not been validated yet (because nChainTx might be unset)
|
|
double GuessVerificationProgress(const ChainTxData& data, const CBlockIndex *pindex) {
|
|
if (pindex == nullptr)
|
|
return 0.0;
|
|
|
|
int64_t nNow = time(nullptr);
|
|
|
|
double fTxTotal;
|
|
|
|
if (pindex->nChainTx <= data.nTxCount) {
|
|
fTxTotal = data.nTxCount + (nNow - data.nTime) * data.dTxRate;
|
|
} else {
|
|
fTxTotal = pindex->nChainTx + (nNow - pindex->GetBlockTime()) * data.dTxRate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return std::min<double>(pindex->nChainTx / fTxTotal, 1.0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::optional<uint256> ChainstateManager::SnapshotBlockhash() const
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
if (m_active_chainstate && m_active_chainstate->m_from_snapshot_blockhash) {
|
|
// If a snapshot chainstate exists, it will always be our active.
|
|
return m_active_chainstate->m_from_snapshot_blockhash;
|
|
}
|
|
return std::nullopt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::vector<Chainstate*> ChainstateManager::GetAll()
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
std::vector<Chainstate*> out;
|
|
|
|
for (Chainstate* cs : {m_ibd_chainstate.get(), m_snapshot_chainstate.get()}) {
|
|
if (this->IsUsable(cs)) out.push_back(cs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate& ChainstateManager::InitializeChainstate(CTxMemPool* mempool)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
assert(!m_ibd_chainstate);
|
|
assert(!m_active_chainstate);
|
|
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate = std::make_unique<Chainstate>(mempool, m_blockman, *this);
|
|
m_active_chainstate = m_ibd_chainstate.get();
|
|
return *m_active_chainstate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
[[nodiscard]] static bool DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(const fs::path db_path, bool is_snapshot)
|
|
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
|
|
if (is_snapshot) {
|
|
fs::path base_blockhash_path = db_path / node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
bool existed = fs::remove(base_blockhash_path);
|
|
if (!existed) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot chainstate dir being removed lacks %s file\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME));
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] failed to remove file %s: %s\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(base_blockhash_path), fsbridge::get_filesystem_error_message(e));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::string path_str = fs::PathToString(db_path);
|
|
LogPrintf("Removing leveldb dir at %s\n", path_str);
|
|
|
|
// We have to destruct before this call leveldb::DB in order to release the db
|
|
// lock, otherwise `DestroyDB` will fail. See `leveldb::~DBImpl()`.
|
|
const bool destroyed = DestroyDB(path_str);
|
|
|
|
if (!destroyed) {
|
|
LogPrintf("error: leveldb DestroyDB call failed on %s\n", path_str);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Datadir should be removed from filesystem; otherwise initialization may detect
|
|
// it on subsequent statups and get confused.
|
|
//
|
|
// If the base_blockhash_path removal above fails in the case of snapshot
|
|
// chainstates, this will return false since leveldb won't remove a non-empty
|
|
// directory.
|
|
return destroyed && !fs::exists(db_path);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::ActivateSnapshot(
|
|
AutoFile& coins_file,
|
|
const SnapshotMetadata& metadata,
|
|
bool in_memory)
|
|
{
|
|
uint256 base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash;
|
|
|
|
if (this->SnapshotBlockhash()) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] can't activate a snapshot-based chainstate more than once\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
if (Assert(m_active_chainstate->GetMempool())->size() > 0) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] can't activate a snapshot when mempool not empty\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int64_t current_coinsdb_cache_size{0};
|
|
int64_t current_coinstip_cache_size{0};
|
|
|
|
// Cache percentages to allocate to each chainstate.
|
|
//
|
|
// These particular percentages don't matter so much since they will only be
|
|
// relevant during snapshot activation; caches are rebalanced at the conclusion of
|
|
// this function. We want to give (essentially) all available cache capacity to the
|
|
// snapshot to aid the bulk load later in this function.
|
|
static constexpr double IBD_CACHE_PERC = 0.01;
|
|
static constexpr double SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC = 0.99;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
// Resize the coins caches to ensure we're not exceeding memory limits.
|
|
//
|
|
// Allocate the majority of the cache to the incoming snapshot chainstate, since
|
|
// (optimistically) getting to its tip will be the top priority. We'll need to call
|
|
// `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` once we're done with this function to ensure
|
|
// the right allocation (including the possibility that no snapshot was activated
|
|
// and that we should restore the active chainstate caches to their original size).
|
|
//
|
|
current_coinsdb_cache_size = this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes;
|
|
current_coinstip_cache_size = this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes;
|
|
|
|
// Temporarily resize the active coins cache to make room for the newly-created
|
|
// snapshot chain.
|
|
this->ActiveChainstate().ResizeCoinsCaches(
|
|
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinstip_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC),
|
|
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto snapshot_chainstate = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main,
|
|
return std::make_unique<Chainstate>(
|
|
/*mempool=*/nullptr, m_blockman, *this, base_blockhash));
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsDB(
|
|
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size * SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC),
|
|
in_memory, false, "chainstate");
|
|
snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsCache(
|
|
static_cast<size_t>(current_coinstip_cache_size * SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
auto cleanup_bad_snapshot = [&](const char* reason) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] activation failed - %s\n", reason);
|
|
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
|
|
|
|
// PopulateAndValidateSnapshot can return (in error) before the leveldb datadir
|
|
// has been created, so only attempt removal if we got that far.
|
|
if (auto snapshot_datadir = node::FindSnapshotChainstateDir(m_options.datadir)) {
|
|
// We have to destruct leveldb::DB in order to release the db lock, otherwise
|
|
// DestroyDB() (in DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk()) will fail. See `leveldb::~DBImpl()`.
|
|
// Destructing the chainstate (and so resetting the coinsviews object) does this.
|
|
snapshot_chainstate.reset();
|
|
bool removed = DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(*snapshot_datadir, /*is_snapshot=*/true);
|
|
if (!removed) {
|
|
GetNotifications().fatalError(strprintf("Failed to remove snapshot chainstate dir (%s). "
|
|
"Manually remove it before restarting.\n", fs::PathToString(*snapshot_datadir)));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return false;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (!this->PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(*snapshot_chainstate, coins_file, metadata)) {
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
return cleanup_bad_snapshot("population failed");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main); // cs_main required for rest of snapshot activation.
|
|
|
|
// Do a final check to ensure that the snapshot chainstate is actually a more
|
|
// work chain than the active chainstate; a user could have loaded a snapshot
|
|
// very late in the IBD process, and we wouldn't want to load a useless chainstate.
|
|
if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(ActiveTip(), snapshot_chainstate->m_chain.Tip())) {
|
|
return cleanup_bad_snapshot("work does not exceed active chainstate");
|
|
}
|
|
// If not in-memory, persist the base blockhash for use during subsequent
|
|
// initialization.
|
|
if (!in_memory) {
|
|
if (!node::WriteSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*snapshot_chainstate)) {
|
|
return cleanup_bad_snapshot("could not write base blockhash");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate.swap(snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
const bool chaintip_loaded = m_snapshot_chainstate->LoadChainTip();
|
|
assert(chaintip_loaded);
|
|
|
|
// Transfer possession of the mempool to the snapshot chainstate.
|
|
// Mempool is empty at this point because we're still in IBD.
|
|
Assert(m_active_chainstate->m_mempool->size() == 0);
|
|
Assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate->m_mempool);
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->m_mempool = m_active_chainstate->m_mempool;
|
|
m_active_chainstate->m_mempool = nullptr;
|
|
m_active_chainstate = m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
|
|
m_blockman.m_snapshot_height = this->GetSnapshotBaseHeight();
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] successfully activated snapshot %s\n", base_blockhash.ToString());
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] (%.2f MB)\n",
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000));
|
|
|
|
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void FlushSnapshotToDisk(CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache, bool snapshot_loaded)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY_MSG_ONCE(
|
|
strprintf("%s (%.2f MB)",
|
|
snapshot_loaded ? "saving snapshot chainstate" : "flushing coins cache",
|
|
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)),
|
|
BCLog::LogFlags::ALL);
|
|
|
|
coins_cache.Flush();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct StopHashingException : public std::exception
|
|
{
|
|
const char* what() const noexcept override
|
|
{
|
|
return "ComputeUTXOStats interrupted.";
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(const util::SignalInterrupt& interrupt)
|
|
{
|
|
if (interrupt) throw StopHashingException();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(
|
|
Chainstate& snapshot_chainstate,
|
|
AutoFile& coins_file,
|
|
const SnapshotMetadata& metadata)
|
|
{
|
|
// It's okay to release cs_main before we're done using `coins_cache` because we know
|
|
// that nothing else will be referencing the newly created snapshot_chainstate yet.
|
|
CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = *WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsTip());
|
|
|
|
uint256 base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash;
|
|
|
|
CBlockIndex* snapshot_start_block = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(base_blockhash));
|
|
|
|
if (!snapshot_start_block) {
|
|
// Needed for ComputeUTXOStats to determine the
|
|
// height and to avoid a crash when base_blockhash.IsNull()
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] Did not find snapshot start blockheader %s\n",
|
|
base_blockhash.ToString());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int base_height = snapshot_start_block->nHeight;
|
|
const auto& maybe_au_data = GetParams().AssumeutxoForHeight(base_height);
|
|
|
|
if (!maybe_au_data) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] assumeutxo height in snapshot metadata not recognized "
|
|
"(%d) - refusing to load snapshot\n", base_height);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const AssumeutxoData& au_data = *maybe_au_data;
|
|
|
|
// This work comparison is a duplicate check with the one performed later in
|
|
// ActivateSnapshot(), but is done so that we avoid doing the long work of staging
|
|
// a snapshot that isn't actually usable.
|
|
if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return !CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(ActiveTip(), snapshot_start_block))) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] activation failed - work does not exceed active chainstate\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
COutPoint outpoint;
|
|
Coin coin;
|
|
const uint64_t coins_count = metadata.m_coins_count;
|
|
uint64_t coins_left = metadata.m_coins_count;
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] loading coins from snapshot %s\n", base_blockhash.ToString());
|
|
int64_t coins_processed{0};
|
|
|
|
while (coins_left > 0) {
|
|
try {
|
|
coins_file >> outpoint;
|
|
coins_file >> coin;
|
|
} catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot format or truncated snapshot after deserializing %d coins\n",
|
|
coins_count - coins_left);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (coin.nHeight > base_height ||
|
|
outpoint.n >= std::numeric_limits<decltype(outpoint.n)>::max() // Avoid integer wrap-around in coinstats.cpp:ApplyHash
|
|
) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot data after deserializing %d coins\n",
|
|
coins_count - coins_left);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot data after deserializing %d coins - bad tx out value\n",
|
|
coins_count - coins_left);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
coins_cache.EmplaceCoinInternalDANGER(std::move(outpoint), std::move(coin));
|
|
|
|
--coins_left;
|
|
++coins_processed;
|
|
|
|
if (coins_processed % 1000000 == 0) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] %d coins loaded (%.2f%%, %.2f MB)\n",
|
|
coins_processed,
|
|
static_cast<float>(coins_processed) * 100 / static_cast<float>(coins_count),
|
|
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Batch write and flush (if we need to) every so often.
|
|
//
|
|
// If our average Coin size is roughly 41 bytes, checking every 120,000 coins
|
|
// means <5MB of memory imprecision.
|
|
if (coins_processed % 120000 == 0) {
|
|
if (m_interrupt) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const auto snapshot_cache_state = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main,
|
|
return snapshot_chainstate.GetCoinsCacheSizeState());
|
|
|
|
if (snapshot_cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL) {
|
|
// This is a hack - we don't know what the actual best block is, but that
|
|
// doesn't matter for the purposes of flushing the cache here. We'll set this
|
|
// to its correct value (`base_blockhash`) below after the coins are loaded.
|
|
coins_cache.SetBestBlock(GetRandHash());
|
|
|
|
// No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being used yet.
|
|
FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/false);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Important that we set this. This and the coins_cache accesses above are
|
|
// sort of a layer violation, but either we reach into the innards of
|
|
// CCoinsViewCache here or we have to invert some of the Chainstate to
|
|
// embed them in a snapshot-activation-specific CCoinsViewCache bulk load
|
|
// method.
|
|
coins_cache.SetBestBlock(base_blockhash);
|
|
|
|
bool out_of_coins{false};
|
|
try {
|
|
coins_file >> outpoint;
|
|
} catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) {
|
|
// We expect an exception since we should be out of coins.
|
|
out_of_coins = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!out_of_coins) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot - coins left over after deserializing %d coins\n",
|
|
coins_count);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] loaded %d (%.2f MB) coins from snapshot %s\n",
|
|
coins_count,
|
|
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000),
|
|
base_blockhash.ToString());
|
|
|
|
// No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being used yet.
|
|
FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/true);
|
|
|
|
assert(coins_cache.GetBestBlock() == base_blockhash);
|
|
|
|
// As above, okay to immediately release cs_main here since no other context knows
|
|
// about the snapshot_chainstate.
|
|
CCoinsViewDB* snapshot_coinsdb = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsDB());
|
|
|
|
std::optional<CCoinsStats> maybe_stats;
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
maybe_stats = ComputeUTXOStats(
|
|
CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED, snapshot_coinsdb, m_blockman, [&interrupt = m_interrupt] { SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(interrupt); });
|
|
} catch (StopHashingException const&) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!maybe_stats.has_value()) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] failed to generate coins stats\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Assert that the deserialized chainstate contents match the expected assumeutxo value.
|
|
if (AssumeutxoHash{maybe_stats->hashSerialized} != au_data.hash_serialized) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] bad snapshot content hash: expected %s, got %s\n",
|
|
au_data.hash_serialized.ToString(), maybe_stats->hashSerialized.ToString());
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.SetTip(*snapshot_start_block);
|
|
|
|
// The remainder of this function requires modifying data protected by cs_main.
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
|
|
// Fake various pieces of CBlockIndex state:
|
|
CBlockIndex* index = nullptr;
|
|
|
|
// Don't make any modifications to the genesis block.
|
|
// This is especially important because we don't want to erroneously
|
|
// apply BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID to genesis, which would happen if we didn't skip
|
|
// it here (since it apparently isn't BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS).
|
|
constexpr int AFTER_GENESIS_START{1};
|
|
|
|
for (int i = AFTER_GENESIS_START; i <= snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.Height(); ++i) {
|
|
index = snapshot_chainstate.m_chain[i];
|
|
|
|
// Fake nTx so that LoadBlockIndex() loads assumed-valid CBlockIndex
|
|
// entries (among other things)
|
|
if (!index->nTx) {
|
|
index->nTx = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
// Fake nChainTx so that GuessVerificationProgress reports accurately
|
|
index->nChainTx = index->pprev->nChainTx + index->nTx;
|
|
|
|
// Mark unvalidated block index entries beneath the snapshot base block as assumed-valid.
|
|
if (!index->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS)) {
|
|
// This flag will be removed once the block is fully validated by a
|
|
// background chainstate.
|
|
index->nStatus |= BLOCK_ASSUMED_VALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fake BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS so that Chainstate::NeedsRedownload()
|
|
// won't ask to rewind the entire assumed-valid chain on startup.
|
|
if (DeploymentActiveAt(*index, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) {
|
|
index->nStatus |= BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(index);
|
|
// Changes to the block index will be flushed to disk after this call
|
|
// returns in `ActivateSnapshot()`, when `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` is
|
|
// called, since we've added a snapshot chainstate and therefore will
|
|
// have to downsize the IBD chainstate, which will result in a call to
|
|
// `FlushStateToDisk(ALWAYS)`.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(index);
|
|
index->nChainTx = au_data.nChainTx;
|
|
snapshot_chainstate.setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(snapshot_start_block);
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] validated snapshot (%.2f MB)\n",
|
|
coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Currently, this function holds cs_main for its duration, which could be for
|
|
// multiple minutes due to the ComputeUTXOStats call. This hold is necessary
|
|
// because we need to avoid advancing the background validation chainstate
|
|
// farther than the snapshot base block - and this function is also invoked
|
|
// from within ConnectTip, i.e. from within ActivateBestChain, so cs_main is
|
|
// held anyway.
|
|
//
|
|
// Eventually (TODO), we could somehow separate this function's runtime from
|
|
// maintenance of the active chain, but that will either require
|
|
//
|
|
// (i) setting `m_disabled` immediately and ensuring all chainstate accesses go
|
|
// through IsUsable() checks, or
|
|
//
|
|
// (ii) giving each chainstate its own lock instead of using cs_main for everything.
|
|
SnapshotCompletionResult ChainstateManager::MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(cs_main);
|
|
if (m_ibd_chainstate.get() == &this->ActiveChainstate() ||
|
|
!this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()) ||
|
|
!this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get()) ||
|
|
!m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Tip()) {
|
|
// Nothing to do - this function only applies to the background
|
|
// validation chainstate.
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SKIPPED;
|
|
}
|
|
const int snapshot_tip_height = this->ActiveHeight();
|
|
const int snapshot_base_height = *Assert(this->GetSnapshotBaseHeight());
|
|
const CBlockIndex& index_new = *Assert(m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Tip());
|
|
|
|
if (index_new.nHeight < snapshot_base_height) {
|
|
// Background IBD not complete yet.
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SKIPPED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(SnapshotBlockhash());
|
|
uint256 snapshot_blockhash = *Assert(SnapshotBlockhash());
|
|
|
|
auto handle_invalid_snapshot = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) {
|
|
bilingual_str user_error = strprintf(_(
|
|
"%s failed to validate the -assumeutxo snapshot state. "
|
|
"This indicates a hardware problem, or a bug in the software, or a "
|
|
"bad software modification that allowed an invalid snapshot to be "
|
|
"loaded. As a result of this, the node will shut down and stop using any "
|
|
"state that was built on the snapshot, resetting the chain height "
|
|
"from %d to %d. On the next "
|
|
"restart, the node will resume syncing from %d "
|
|
"without using any snapshot data. "
|
|
"Please report this incident to %s, including how you obtained the snapshot. "
|
|
"The invalid snapshot chainstate will be left on disk in case it is "
|
|
"helpful in diagnosing the issue that caused this error."),
|
|
PACKAGE_NAME, snapshot_tip_height, snapshot_base_height, snapshot_base_height, PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] !!! %s\n", user_error.original);
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleting snapshot, reverting to validated chain, and stopping node\n");
|
|
|
|
m_active_chainstate = m_ibd_chainstate.get();
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->m_disabled = true;
|
|
assert(!this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()));
|
|
assert(this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get()));
|
|
|
|
auto rename_result = m_snapshot_chainstate->InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk();
|
|
if (!rename_result) {
|
|
user_error = strprintf(Untranslated("%s\n%s"), user_error, util::ErrorString(rename_result));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
GetNotifications().fatalError(user_error.original, user_error);
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (index_new.GetBlockHash() != snapshot_blockhash) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] supposed base block %s does not match the "
|
|
"snapshot base block %s (height %d). Snapshot is not valid.\n",
|
|
index_new.ToString(), snapshot_blockhash.ToString(), snapshot_base_height);
|
|
handle_invalid_snapshot();
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::BASE_BLOCKHASH_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
assert(index_new.nHeight == snapshot_base_height);
|
|
|
|
int curr_height = m_ibd_chainstate->m_chain.Height();
|
|
|
|
assert(snapshot_base_height == curr_height);
|
|
assert(snapshot_base_height == index_new.nHeight);
|
|
assert(this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get()));
|
|
assert(this->GetAll().size() == 2);
|
|
|
|
CCoinsViewDB& ibd_coins_db = m_ibd_chainstate->CoinsDB();
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate->ForceFlushStateToDisk();
|
|
|
|
const auto& maybe_au_data = m_options.chainparams.AssumeutxoForHeight(curr_height);
|
|
if (!maybe_au_data) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] assumeutxo data not found for height "
|
|
"(%d) - refusing to validate snapshot\n", curr_height);
|
|
handle_invalid_snapshot();
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::MISSING_CHAINPARAMS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const AssumeutxoData& au_data = *maybe_au_data;
|
|
std::optional<CCoinsStats> maybe_ibd_stats;
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] computing UTXO stats for background chainstate to validate "
|
|
"snapshot - this could take a few minutes\n");
|
|
try {
|
|
maybe_ibd_stats = ComputeUTXOStats(
|
|
CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED,
|
|
&ibd_coins_db,
|
|
m_blockman,
|
|
[&interrupt = m_interrupt] { SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(interrupt); });
|
|
} catch (StopHashingException const&) {
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// XXX note that this function is slow and will hold cs_main for potentially minutes.
|
|
if (!maybe_ibd_stats) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] failed to generate stats for validation coins db\n");
|
|
// While this isn't a problem with the snapshot per se, this condition
|
|
// prevents us from validating the snapshot, so we should shut down and let the
|
|
// user handle the issue manually.
|
|
handle_invalid_snapshot();
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
const auto& ibd_stats = *maybe_ibd_stats;
|
|
|
|
// Compare the background validation chainstate's UTXO set hash against the hard-coded
|
|
// assumeutxo hash we expect.
|
|
//
|
|
// TODO: For belt-and-suspenders, we could cache the UTXO set
|
|
// hash for the snapshot when it's loaded in its chainstate's leveldb. We could then
|
|
// reference that here for an additional check.
|
|
if (AssumeutxoHash{ibd_stats.hashSerialized} != au_data.hash_serialized) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] hash mismatch: actual=%s, expected=%s\n",
|
|
ibd_stats.hashSerialized.ToString(),
|
|
au_data.hash_serialized.ToString());
|
|
handle_invalid_snapshot();
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::HASH_MISMATCH;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot beginning at %s has been fully validated\n",
|
|
snapshot_blockhash.ToString());
|
|
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate->m_disabled = true;
|
|
this->MaybeRebalanceCaches();
|
|
|
|
return SnapshotCompletionResult::SUCCESS;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate& ChainstateManager::ActiveChainstate() const
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
assert(m_active_chainstate);
|
|
return *m_active_chainstate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::IsSnapshotActive() const
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
return m_snapshot_chainstate && m_active_chainstate == m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::MaybeRebalanceCaches()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
bool ibd_usable = this->IsUsable(m_ibd_chainstate.get());
|
|
bool snapshot_usable = this->IsUsable(m_snapshot_chainstate.get());
|
|
assert(ibd_usable || snapshot_usable);
|
|
|
|
if (ibd_usable && !snapshot_usable) {
|
|
// Allocate everything to the IBD chainstate. This will always happen
|
|
// when we are not using a snapshot.
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache, m_total_coinsdb_cache);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (snapshot_usable && !ibd_usable) {
|
|
// If background validation has completed and snapshot is our active chain...
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] allocating all cache to the snapshot chainstate\n");
|
|
// Allocate everything to the snapshot chainstate.
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache, m_total_coinsdb_cache);
|
|
}
|
|
else if (ibd_usable && snapshot_usable) {
|
|
// If both chainstates exist, determine who needs more cache based on IBD status.
|
|
//
|
|
// Note: shrink caches first so that we don't inadvertently overwhelm available memory.
|
|
if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) {
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
|
|
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05);
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
|
|
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95);
|
|
} else {
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
|
|
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05);
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate->ResizeCoinsCaches(
|
|
m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void ChainstateManager::ResetChainstates()
|
|
{
|
|
m_ibd_chainstate.reset();
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate.reset();
|
|
m_active_chainstate = nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Apply default chain params to nullopt members.
|
|
* This helps to avoid coding errors around the accidental use of the compare
|
|
* operators that accept nullopt, thus ignoring the intended default value.
|
|
*/
|
|
static ChainstateManager::Options&& Flatten(ChainstateManager::Options&& opts)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!opts.check_block_index.has_value()) opts.check_block_index = opts.chainparams.DefaultConsistencyChecks();
|
|
if (!opts.minimum_chain_work.has_value()) opts.minimum_chain_work = UintToArith256(opts.chainparams.GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork);
|
|
if (!opts.assumed_valid_block.has_value()) opts.assumed_valid_block = opts.chainparams.GetConsensus().defaultAssumeValid;
|
|
Assert(opts.adjusted_time_callback);
|
|
return std::move(opts);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ChainstateManager::ChainstateManager(const util::SignalInterrupt& interrupt, Options options, node::BlockManager::Options blockman_options)
|
|
: m_interrupt{interrupt},
|
|
m_options{Flatten(std::move(options))},
|
|
m_blockman{interrupt, std::move(blockman_options)} {}
|
|
|
|
ChainstateManager::~ChainstateManager()
|
|
{
|
|
LOCK(::cs_main);
|
|
|
|
m_versionbitscache.Clear();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::DetectSnapshotChainstate()
|
|
{
|
|
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
std::optional<fs::path> path = node::FindSnapshotChainstateDir(m_options.datadir);
|
|
if (!path) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
std::optional<uint256> base_blockhash = node::ReadSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*path);
|
|
if (!base_blockhash) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] detected active snapshot chainstate (%s) - loading\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(*path));
|
|
|
|
this->ActivateExistingSnapshot(*base_blockhash);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate& ChainstateManager::ActivateExistingSnapshot(uint256 base_blockhash)
|
|
{
|
|
assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate =
|
|
std::make_unique<Chainstate>(nullptr, m_blockman, *this, base_blockhash);
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] switching active chainstate to %s\n", m_snapshot_chainstate->ToString());
|
|
|
|
// Mempool is empty at this point because we're still in IBD.
|
|
Assert(m_active_chainstate->m_mempool->size() == 0);
|
|
Assert(!m_snapshot_chainstate->m_mempool);
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate->m_mempool = m_active_chainstate->m_mempool;
|
|
m_active_chainstate->m_mempool = nullptr;
|
|
m_active_chainstate = m_snapshot_chainstate.get();
|
|
return *m_snapshot_chainstate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool IsBIP30Repeat(const CBlockIndex& block_index)
|
|
{
|
|
return (block_index.nHeight==91842 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
|
|
(block_index.nHeight==91880 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000743f190a18c5577a3c2d2a1f610ae9601ac046a38084ccb7cd721"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool IsBIP30Unspendable(const CBlockIndex& block_index)
|
|
{
|
|
return (block_index.nHeight==91722 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000271a2dc26e7667f8419f2e15416dc6955e5a6c6cdf3f2574dd08e")) ||
|
|
(block_index.nHeight==91812 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000af0aed4792b1acee3d966af36cf5def14935db8de83d6f9306f2f"));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static fs::path GetSnapshotCoinsDBPath(Chainstate& cs) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main)
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
// Should never be called on a non-snapshot chainstate.
|
|
assert(cs.m_from_snapshot_blockhash);
|
|
auto storage_path_maybe = cs.CoinsDB().StoragePath();
|
|
// Should never be called with a non-existent storage path.
|
|
assert(storage_path_maybe);
|
|
return *storage_path_maybe;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
util::Result<void> Chainstate::InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk()
|
|
{
|
|
fs::path snapshot_datadir = GetSnapshotCoinsDBPath(*this);
|
|
|
|
// Coins views no longer usable.
|
|
m_coins_views.reset();
|
|
|
|
auto invalid_path = snapshot_datadir + "_INVALID";
|
|
std::string dbpath = fs::PathToString(snapshot_datadir);
|
|
std::string target = fs::PathToString(invalid_path);
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] renaming snapshot datadir %s to %s\n", dbpath, target);
|
|
|
|
// The invalid snapshot datadir is simply moved and not deleted because we may
|
|
// want to do forensics later during issue investigation. The user is instructed
|
|
// accordingly in MaybeCompleteSnapshotValidation().
|
|
try {
|
|
fs::rename(snapshot_datadir, invalid_path);
|
|
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
|
|
auto src_str = fs::PathToString(snapshot_datadir);
|
|
auto dest_str = fs::PathToString(invalid_path);
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("%s: error renaming file '%s' -> '%s': %s\n",
|
|
__func__, src_str, dest_str, e.what());
|
|
return util::Error{strprintf(_(
|
|
"Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. "
|
|
"You should resolve this by manually moving or deleting the invalid "
|
|
"snapshot directory %s, otherwise you will encounter the same error again "
|
|
"on the next startup."),
|
|
src_str, dest_str, src_str)};
|
|
}
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::DeleteSnapshotChainstate()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
Assert(m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
Assert(m_ibd_chainstate);
|
|
|
|
fs::path snapshot_datadir = GetSnapshotCoinsDBPath(*m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
if (!DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(snapshot_datadir, /*is_snapshot=*/ true)) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Deletion of %s failed. Please remove it manually to continue reindexing.\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(snapshot_datadir));
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
m_active_chainstate = m_ibd_chainstate.get();
|
|
m_snapshot_chainstate.reset();
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ChainstateRole Chainstate::GetRole() const
|
|
{
|
|
if (m_chainman.GetAll().size() <= 1) {
|
|
return ChainstateRole::NORMAL;
|
|
}
|
|
return (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) ?
|
|
ChainstateRole::BACKGROUND :
|
|
ChainstateRole::ASSUMEDVALID;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const CBlockIndex* ChainstateManager::GetSnapshotBaseBlock() const
|
|
{
|
|
return m_active_chainstate ? m_active_chainstate->SnapshotBase() : nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::optional<int> ChainstateManager::GetSnapshotBaseHeight() const
|
|
{
|
|
const CBlockIndex* base = this->GetSnapshotBaseBlock();
|
|
return base ? std::make_optional(base->nHeight) : std::nullopt;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool ChainstateManager::ValidatedSnapshotCleanup()
|
|
{
|
|
AssertLockHeld(::cs_main);
|
|
auto get_storage_path = [](auto& chainstate) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) -> std::optional<fs::path> {
|
|
if (!(chainstate && chainstate->HasCoinsViews())) {
|
|
return {};
|
|
}
|
|
return chainstate->CoinsDB().StoragePath();
|
|
};
|
|
std::optional<fs::path> ibd_chainstate_path_maybe = get_storage_path(m_ibd_chainstate);
|
|
std::optional<fs::path> snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe = get_storage_path(m_snapshot_chainstate);
|
|
|
|
if (!this->IsSnapshotValidated()) {
|
|
// No need to clean up.
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
// If either path doesn't exist, that means at least one of the chainstates
|
|
// is in-memory, in which case we can't do on-disk cleanup. You'd better be
|
|
// in a unittest!
|
|
if (!ibd_chainstate_path_maybe || !snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe) {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] snapshot chainstate cleanup cannot happen with "
|
|
"in-memory chainstates. You are testing, right?\n");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const auto& snapshot_chainstate_path = *snapshot_chainstate_path_maybe;
|
|
const auto& ibd_chainstate_path = *ibd_chainstate_path_maybe;
|
|
|
|
// Since we're going to be moving around the underlying leveldb filesystem content
|
|
// for each chainstate, make sure that the chainstates (and their constituent
|
|
// CoinsViews members) have been destructed first.
|
|
//
|
|
// The caller of this method will be responsible for reinitializing chainstates
|
|
// if they want to continue operation.
|
|
this->ResetChainstates();
|
|
|
|
// No chainstates should be considered usable.
|
|
assert(this->GetAll().size() == 0);
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleting background chainstate directory (now unnecessary) (%s)\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
|
|
|
|
fs::path tmp_old{ibd_chainstate_path + "_todelete"};
|
|
|
|
auto rename_failed_abort = [this](
|
|
fs::path p_old,
|
|
fs::path p_new,
|
|
const fs::filesystem_error& err) {
|
|
LogPrintf("Error renaming path (%s) -> (%s): %s\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(p_old), fs::PathToString(p_new), err.what());
|
|
GetNotifications().fatalError(strprintf(
|
|
"Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. "
|
|
"Cannot clean up the background chainstate leveldb directory.",
|
|
fs::PathToString(p_old), fs::PathToString(p_new)));
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
fs::rename(ibd_chainstate_path, tmp_old);
|
|
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
|
|
rename_failed_abort(ibd_chainstate_path, tmp_old, e);
|
|
throw;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] moving snapshot chainstate (%s) to "
|
|
"default chainstate directory (%s)\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(snapshot_chainstate_path), fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
fs::rename(snapshot_chainstate_path, ibd_chainstate_path);
|
|
} catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) {
|
|
rename_failed_abort(snapshot_chainstate_path, ibd_chainstate_path, e);
|
|
throw;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(tmp_old, /*is_snapshot=*/false)) {
|
|
// No need to FatalError because once the unneeded bg chainstate data is
|
|
// moved, it will not interfere with subsequent initialization.
|
|
LogPrintf("Deletion of %s failed. Please remove it manually, as the "
|
|
"directory is now unnecessary.\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(tmp_old));
|
|
} else {
|
|
LogPrintf("[snapshot] deleted background chainstate directory (%s)\n",
|
|
fs::PathToString(ibd_chainstate_path));
|
|
}
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Chainstate& ChainstateManager::GetChainstateForIndexing()
|
|
{
|
|
// We can't always return `m_ibd_chainstate` because after background validation
|
|
// has completed, `m_snapshot_chainstate == m_active_chainstate`, but it can be
|
|
// indexed.
|
|
return (this->GetAll().size() > 1) ? *m_ibd_chainstate : *m_active_chainstate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
std::pair<int, int> ChainstateManager::GetPruneRange(const Chainstate& chainstate, int last_height_can_prune)
|
|
{
|
|
if (chainstate.m_chain.Height() <= 0) {
|
|
return {0, 0};
|
|
}
|
|
int prune_start{0};
|
|
|
|
if (this->GetAll().size() > 1 && m_snapshot_chainstate.get() == &chainstate) {
|
|
// Leave the blocks in the background IBD chain alone if we're pruning
|
|
// the snapshot chain.
|
|
prune_start = *Assert(GetSnapshotBaseHeight()) + 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int max_prune = std::max<int>(
|
|
0, chainstate.m_chain.Height() - static_cast<int>(MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP));
|
|
|
|
// last block to prune is the lesser of (caller-specified height, MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP from the tip)
|
|
//
|
|
// While you might be tempted to prune the background chainstate more
|
|
// aggressively (i.e. fewer MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP), this won't work with index
|
|
// building - specifically blockfilterindex requires undo data, and if
|
|
// we don't maintain this trailing window, we hit indexing failures.
|
|
int prune_end = std::min(last_height_can_prune, max_prune);
|
|
|
|
return {prune_start, prune_end};
|
|
}
|