Clear() is now only called from the ctor, so just inline the code into
that function.
The LOCK(cs) can be removed, since there can be no data races in the ctor.
Also move the function definition out of the header and into the cpp file.
Currently addrman consistency checks are a compile time option, and are not
enabled in our CI. It's unlikely anyone is running these consistency checks.
Make them a runtime option instead, where users can enable addrman
consistency checks every n operations (similar to mempool tests). Update
the addrman unit tests to do internal consistency checks every 100
operations (checking on every operations causes the test runtime to
increase by several seconds).
Also assert on a failed addrman consistency check to terminate program
execution.
65332b1178 [addrman] Remove RemoveInvalid() (John Newbery)
Pull request description:
PRs #22179 and #22112 (EDIT: later reverted in #22497) added hotfix code to addrman to remove invalid addresses and mutate the ports of I2P entries after entering into addrman. Those hotfixes included at least two addrman data corruption bugs:
- #22467 (Assertion `nRndPos1 < vRandom.size() && nRndPos2 < vRandom.size()' failed)
- #22470 (Changing I2P ports in addrman may wronly skip some entries from "new" buckets)
Hotfixing addrman is inherently dangerous. There are many members that have implicit assumptions on each others' state, and mutating those directly can lead to violating addrman's internal invariants.
Instead of trying to hotfix addrman, just don't insert any invalid addresses. For now, those are addresses which fail `CNetAddr::IsValid()`.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
utACK 65332b1178. I tried to reason through scenarios that could introduce inconsistencies with this code, but can't find any.
fanquake:
ACK 65332b1178 - Skipping the addition of invalid addresses (this code was initially added for Tor addrs) rather than adding all the invalids then removing them all when finishing unserializing seems like an improvement. Especially if it can be achieved with less code.
Tree-SHA512: 023113764cb475572f15da7bf9824b62b79e10a7e359af2eee59017df354348d2aeed88de0fd4ad7a9f89a0dad10827f99d70af6f1cb20abb0eca2714689c8d7
Instead of deserializing addresses, placing them in the buckets, and
then removing them if they're invalid, check first and don't place in
the buckets if they're invalid.
This is a temporary change to convert I2P addresses that have propagated
with port 8333 to ones with port 0.
It would cause a problem some day if indeed some bitcoin software is
listening on port 8333 only and rejects connections to port 0 and we are
still using SAM 3.1 which only supports port 0. In this case we would
replace 8333 with 0 and try to connect to such nodes.
This commit should be included in 22.0 and be reverted before 23.0 is
released.
00b875ba94 addrman: remove invalid addresses when unserializing (Vasil Dimov)
bdb62096f0 fuzz: reduce possible networks check (Vasil Dimov)
a164cd3ba6 net: simplify CNetAddr::IsRoutable() (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
* Simplify some code, now that we know `CNetAddr::IsRFC4193()` and `CNetAddr::IsTor()` cannot be `true` at the same time.
* Drop Tor v2 addresses when loading addrman from `peers.dat` - they would have been loaded as dummy-all-zeros IPv6 addresses and linger in addrman, wasting space.
ACKs for top commit:
sipa:
ACK 00b875ba94. Reviewed the code, and tested with -DDEBUG_ADDRMAN (unit tests + mainnet run with peers.dat that contained v2 onions).
laanwj:
Code review and lightly tested ACK 00b875ba94
jonatack:
ACK 00b875ba94 reviewed, debug-built with -DEBUG_ADDRMAN rebased to current master, restarted node on mainnet/signet/testnet and verified that on each chain -addrinfo shows no change in address counts (as expected). Added some sanity check asserts, rebuilt/re-ran test. Checked that the new test fails on master with "test/addrman_tests.cpp(824): error: in "addrman_tests/remove_invalid": check addrman.size() == 2 has failed [4 != 2]"
jarolrod:
ACK 00b875ba94
Tree-SHA512: 6ed8e6745134b1b94fffaba28482de909ea39483b46b7f57bda61cdbae7a51251d15cb674de3631772fbeabe153d77a19269f96e62a89102a2d5c01e48f0ba06
a92485b2c2 addrman: use unordered_map instead of map (Vasil Dimov)
Pull request description:
`CAddrMan` uses `std::map` internally even though it does not require
that the map's elements are sorted. `std::map`'s access time is
`O(log(map size))`. `std::unordered_map` is more suitable as it has a
`O(1)` access time.
This patch lowers the execution times of `CAddrMan`'s methods as follows
(as per `src/bench/addrman.cpp`):
```
AddrMan::Add(): -3.5%
AddrMan::GetAddr(): -76%
AddrMan::Good(): -0.38%
AddrMan::Select(): -45%
```
ACKs for top commit:
jonatack:
ACK a92485b2c2
achow101:
ACK a92485b2c2
hebasto:
re-ACK a92485b2c2, only suggested changes and rebased since my [previous](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18722#pullrequestreview-666663681) review.
Tree-SHA512: d82959a00e6bd68a6c4c5a265dd08849e6602ac3231293b7a3a3b7bf82ab1d3ba77f8ca682919c15c5d601b13e468b8836fcf19595248116635f7a50d02ed603
The Tor v2 addresses, left over from when Tor v2 was supported will be
unserialized as a dummy, invalid `::` (all zeros) IPv6 address. Remove
them so that they do not take up space in addrman.
`CAddrMan` uses `std::map` internally even though it does not require
that the map's elements are sorted. `std::map`'s access time is
`O(log(map size))`. `std::unordered_map` is more suitable as it has a
`O(1)` access time.
This patch lowers the execution times of `CAddrMan`'s methods as follows
(as per `src/bench/addrman.cpp`):
```
AddrMan::Add(): -3.5%
AddrMan::GetAddr(): -76%
AddrMan::Good(): -0.38%
AddrMan::Select(): -45%
```
CAddrMan.GetAddr() would previously limit the number and percentage of
addresses returned (to ADDRMAN_GETADDR_MAX (1000) and
ADDRMAN_GETADDR_MAX_PCT (23) respectively). Instead, make it the callers
responsibility to specify the maximum addresses and percentage they want
returned.
For net_processing, the maximums are MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND (1000) and
MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND (23). For rpc/net, the maximum is specified by the
client.
748977690e Add asmap_direct fuzzer that tests Interpreter directly (Pieter Wuille)
7cf97fda15 Make asmap Interpreter errors fatal and fuzz test it (Pieter Wuille)
c81aefc537 Add additional effiency checks to sanity checker (Pieter Wuille)
fffd8dca2d Add asmap sanity checker (Pieter Wuille)
5feefbe6e7 Improve asmap Interpret checks and document failures (Pieter Wuille)
2b3dbfa5a6 Deal with decoding failures explicitly in asmap Interpret (Pieter Wuille)
1479007a33 Introduce Instruction enum in asmap (Pieter Wuille)
Pull request description:
This improves/documents the failure cases inside the asmap interpreter. None of the changes are bug fixes (they only change behavior for corrupted asmap files), but they may make things easier to follow.
In a second step, a sanity checker is added that effectively executes every potential code path through the asmap file, checking the same failure cases as the interpreter, and more. It takes around 30 ms to run for me for a 1.2 MB asmap file.
I've verified that this accepts asmap files constructed by https://github.com/sipa/asmap/blob/master/buildmap.py with a large dataset, and no longer accepts it with 1 bit changed in it.
ACKs for top commit:
practicalswift:
ACK 748977690e modulo feedback below.
jonatack:
ACK 748977690e code review, regular build/tests/ran bitcoin with -asmap, fuzz build/ran both fuzzers overnight.
fjahr:
ACK 748977690e
Tree-SHA512: d876df3859735795c857c83e7155ba6851ce839bdfa10c18ce2698022cc493ce024b5578c1828e2a94bcdf2552c2f46c392a251ed086691b41959e62a6970821
- move asmap #includes to sorted positions in addrman and init (move-only)
- remove redundant quotes in asmap InitError, update test
- remove full stops from asmap logging to be consistent with debug logging,
update tests
3c1bc40205 Add extra logging of asmap use and bucketing (Gleb Naumenko)
e4658aa8ea Return mapped AS in RPC call getpeerinfo (Gleb Naumenko)
ec45646de9 Integrate ASN bucketing in Addrman and add tests (Gleb Naumenko)
8feb4e4b66 Add asmap utility which queries a mapping (Gleb Naumenko)
Pull request description:
This PR attempts to solve the problem explained in #16599.
A particular attack which encouraged us to work on this issue is explained here [[Erebus Attack against Bitcoin Peer-to-Peer Network](https://erebus-attack.comp.nus.edu.sg/)] (by @muoitranduc)
Instead of relying on /16 prefix to diversify the connections every node creates, we would instead rely on the (ip -> ASN) mapping, if this mapping is provided.
A .map file can be created by every user independently based on a router dump, or provided along with the Bitcoin release. Currently we use the python scripts written by @sipa to create a .map file, which is no larger than 2MB (awesome!).
Here I suggest adding a field to peers.dat which would represent a hash of asmap file used while serializing addrman (or 0 for /16 prefix legacy approach).
In this case, every time the file is updated (or grouping method changed), all buckets will be re-computed.
I believe that alternative selective re-bucketing for only updated ranges would require substantial changes.
TODO:
- ~~more unit tests~~
- ~~find a way to test the code without including >1 MB mapping file in the repo.~~
- find a way to check that mapping file is not corrupted (checksum?)
- comments and separate tests for asmap.cpp
- make python code for .map generation public
- figure out asmap distribution (?)
~Interesting corner case: I’m using std::hash to compute a fingerprint of asmap, and std::hash returns size_t. I guess if a user updates the OS to 64-bit, then the hash of asap will change? Does it even matter?~
ACKs for top commit:
laanwj:
re-ACK 3c1bc40205
jamesob:
ACK 3c1bc40205 ([`jamesob/ackr/16702.3.naumenkogs.p2p_supplying_and_using`](https://github.com/jamesob/bitcoin/tree/ackr/16702.3.naumenkogs.p2p_supplying_and_using))
jonatack:
ACK 3c1bc40205
Tree-SHA512: e2dc6171188d5cdc2ab2c022fa49ed73a14a0acb8ae4c5ffa970172a0365942a249ad3d57e5fb134bc156a3492662c983f74bd21e78d316629dcadf71576800c
Instead of using /16 netgroups to bucket nodes in Addrman for connection
diversification, ASN, which better represents an actor in terms
of network-layer infrastructure, is used.
For testing, asmap.raw is used. It represents a minimal
asmap needed for testing purposes.
After 40 minutes, time out a test-before-evict entry and just evict without
testing. Otherwise, if we were unable to test an entry for some reason, we
might break using feelers altogether.
Changes addrman to use the test-before-evict discipline in which an
address is to be evicted from the tried table is first tested and if
it is still online it is not evicted.
Adds tests to provide test coverage for this change.
This change was suggested as Countermeasure 3 in
Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network, Ethan Heilman,
Alison Kendler, Aviv Zohar, Sharon Goldberg. ePrint Archive Report
2015/263. March 2015.
6eddd43 Fix warnings when building with DEBUG_ADDRMAN (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Fix warnings when building with `DEBUG_ADDRMAN`.
Warnings prior to this commit:
```
addrman.cpp:390:24: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (vRandom.size() != nTried + nNew)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:411:52: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') [-Wsign-compare]
if (info.nRandomPos < 0 || info.nRandomPos >= vRandom.size() || vRandom[info.nRandomPos] != n)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:419:25: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (setTried.size() != nTried)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:421:23: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (mapNew.size() != nNew)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~
4 warnings generated.
```
Tree-SHA512: 0316faecfe95066d2c9a0b6b3960086e43824f21a67086a895ea45fbce1327f8d6df5945fe923c2dbe4efce430bc1384d515d317c3930d97d24965e507cf734d
680bc2cbb Use range-based for loops (C++11) when looping over map elements (practicalswift)
Pull request description:
Before this commit:
```c++
for (std::map<T1, T2>::iterator x = y.begin(); x != y.end(); ++x) {
T1 z = (*x).first;
…
}
```
After this commit:
```c++
for (auto& x : y) {
T1 z = x.first;
…
}
```
Tree-SHA512: 954b136b7f5e6df09f39248a6b530fd9baa9ab59d7c2c7eb369fd4afbb591b7a52c92ee25f87f1745f47b41d6828b7abfd395b43daf84a55b4e6a3d45015e3a0
Warnings prior to this commit:
```
addrman.cpp:390:24: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (vRandom.size() != nTried + nNew)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:411:52: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'int' and 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') [-Wsign-compare]
if (info.nRandomPos < 0 || info.nRandomPos >= vRandom.size() || vRandom[info.nRandomPos] != n)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:419:25: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (setTried.size() != nTried)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~
addrman.cpp:421:23: warning: comparison of integers of different signs: 'size_type' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'int' [-Wsign-compare]
if (mapNew.size() != nNew)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~
4 warnings generated.
```
