Move `CloseSocket()` (and `NetworkErrorString()` which it uses) from
`netbase.{h,cpp}` to newly added `src/util/sock.{h,cpp}`.
This is necessary in order to use `CloseSocket()` from a newly
introduced Sock class (which will live in `src/util/sock.{h,cpp}`).
`sock.{h,cpp}` cannot depend on netbase because netbase will depend
on it.
Move `MillisToTimeval()` from `netbase.{h,cpp}` to
`src/util/system.{h,cpp}`.
This is necessary in order to use `MillisToTimeval()` from a newly
introduced `src/util/sock.{h,cpp}` which cannot depend on netbase
because netbase will depend on it.
3830b6e net: use CreateSocket for binds (Cory Fields)
df3bcf8 net: pass socket closing responsibility up to caller for outgoing connections (Cory Fields)
9e3b2f5 net: Move IsSelectableSocket check into socket creation (Cory Fields)
1729c29 net: split socket creation out of connection (Cory Fields)
Pull request description:
Requirement for #11227.
We'll need to create sockets and perform the actual connect in separate steps, so break them up.
#11227 adds an RAII wrapper around connection attempts, as a belt-and-suspenders in case a CloseSocket is missed.
Tree-SHA512: de675bb718cc56d68893c303b8057ca062c7431eaa17ae7c4829caed119fa3f15b404d8f52aca22a6bca6e73a26fb79e898b335d090ab015bf6456cf417fc694
ConnectSocketByName handled resolves as necessary, obscuring the connection
process. With them separated, each can be handled asynchronously.
Also, since proxies must be considered now anyway, go ahead and eliminate the
ConnectSocket wrapper and use ConnectSocketDirectly... directly.
Starting with Tor version 0.2.7.1 it is possible, through Tor's control socket
API, to create and destroy 'ephemeral' hidden services programmatically.
https://stem.torproject.org/api/control.html#stem.control.Controller.create_ephemeral_hidden_service
This means that if Tor is running (and proper authorization is available),
bitcoin automatically creates a hidden service to listen on, without user
manual configuration. This will positively affect the number of available
.onion nodes.
- When the node is started, connect to Tor through control socket
- Send `ADD_ONION` command
- First time:
- Make it create a hidden service key
- Save the key in the data directory for later usage
- Make it redirect port 8333 to the local port 8333 (or whatever port we're listening on).
- Keep control socket connection open for as long node is running. The hidden service will
(by default) automatically go away when the connection is closed.
According to Tor's extensions to the SOCKS protocol
(https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/socks-extensions.txt)
it is possible to perform stream isolation by providing authentication
to the proxy. Each set of credentials will create a new circuit,
which makes it harder to correlate connections.
This patch adds an option, `-proxyrandomize` (on by default) that randomizes
credentials for every outgoing connection, thus creating a new circuit.
2015-03-16 15:29:59 SOCKS5 Sending proxy authentication 3842137544:3256031132
We've chosen to htons/ntohs explicitly on reading and writing
(I do not know why). But as READWRITE already does an endian swap
on big endian, this means the port number gets switched around,
which was what we were trying to avoid in the first place. So
to make this compatible, serialize it as FLATDATA.
This avoids connecting to them again too soon in ThreadOpenConnections.
Make an exception for connection failures to the proxy as these
shouldn't affect the status of specific nodes.
Thanks to Pieter Wuille for most of the work on this commit.
I did not fixup the overhaul commit, because a rebase conflicted
with "remove fields of ser_streamplaceholder".
I prefer not to risk making a mistake while resolving it.
