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Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#27780: fuzz: Avoid timeout in utxo_total_supply

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fafb4da121 fuzz: Avoid timeout in utxo_total_supply (MarcoFalke)

Pull request description:

  Looks like for high block counts it may be better to mock the chain, otherwise a high limit will lead to fuzz input bloat and timeouts, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/17860#issuecomment-1538252773.

  It can be checked that the fuzz target can still find the CVE, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/17860#pullrequestreview-1410594057 with a diff of:

  ```diff
  diff --git a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
  index f949655909..6f4cfb5f51 100644
  --- a/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
  +++ b/src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
  @@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state)
       // the underlying coins database.
       std::set<COutPoint> vInOutPoints;
       for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) {
  -        if (!vInOutPoints.insert(txin.prevout).second)
  -            return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-inputs-duplicate");
       }

       if (tx.IsCoinBase())
  ```

  Also, fix a nit, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/17860#discussion_r1186451948

ACKs for top commit:
  dergoegge:
    ACK fafb4da121

Tree-SHA512: a28fe9cd6ebb4c9bed5a5b35be76c1c436a87586c8fc3b3c4c8559a4a77ac08098324370da421d794c99579882c0872b6b29415de47ade6a05a08504a3d494c4
This commit is contained in:
fanquake 2023-05-31 11:12:06 +01:00
commit 2a786ea349
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GPG key ID: 2EEB9F5CC09526C1
1 changed files with 8 additions and 6 deletions
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14
src/test/fuzz/utxo_total_supply.cpp
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@ -119,7 +119,9 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(utxo_total_supply)
current_block = PrepareNextBlock();
StoreLastTxo();
LIMITED_WHILE(fuzzed_data_provider.remaining_bytes(), 100'000)
// Limit to avoid timeout, but enough to cover duplicate_coinbase_height
// and CVE-2018-17144.
LIMITED_WHILE(fuzzed_data_provider.remaining_bytes(), 2'000)
{
CallOneOf(
fuzzed_data_provider,
@ -142,14 +144,14 @@ FUZZ_TARGET(utxo_total_supply)
node::RegenerateCommitments(*current_block, chainman);
const bool was_valid = !MineBlock(node, current_block).IsNull();
if (duplicate_coinbase_height == ActiveHeight()) {
// we mined the duplicate coinbase
assert(current_block->vtx.at(0)->vin.at(0).scriptSig == duplicate_coinbase_script);
}
const auto prev_utxo_stats = utxo_stats;
if (was_valid) {
circulation += GetBlockSubsidy(ActiveHeight(), Params().GetConsensus());
if (duplicate_coinbase_height == ActiveHeight()) {
// we mined the duplicate coinbase
assert(current_block->vtx.at(0)->vin.at(0).scriptSig == duplicate_coinbase_script);
}
}
UpdateUtxoStats();