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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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# include <net_processing.h>
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# include <addrman.h>
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# include <banman.h>
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# include <blockencodings.h>
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# include <blockfilter.h>
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# include <chainparams.h>
# include <consensus/validation.h>
# include <hash.h>
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# include <index/blockfilterindex.h>
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# include <merkleblock.h>
# include <netbase.h>
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# include <netmessagemaker.h>
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# include <policy/fees.h>
# include <policy/policy.h>
# include <primitives/block.h>
# include <primitives/transaction.h>
# include <random.h>
# include <reverse_iterator.h>
# include <scheduler.h>
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# include <streams.h>
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# include <tinyformat.h>
# include <txmempool.h>
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# include <util/check.h> // For NDEBUG compile time check
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# include <util/strencodings.h>
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# include <util/system.h>
# include <validation.h>
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# include <memory>
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# include <typeinfo>
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/** Expiration time for orphan transactions in seconds */
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static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60 ;
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/** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */
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static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60 ;
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/** How long to cache transactions in mapRelay for normal relay */
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static constexpr std : : chrono : : seconds RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME = std : : chrono : : minutes { 15 } ;
/** How long a transaction has to be in the mempool before it can unconditionally be relayed (even when not in mapRelay). */
static constexpr std : : chrono : : seconds UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY = std : : chrono : : minutes { 2 } ;
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/** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds
* Timeout = base + per_header * ( expected number of headers ) */
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000 ; // 15 minutes
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER = 1000 ; // 1ms/header
/** Protect at least this many outbound peers from disconnection due to slow/
* behind headers chain .
*/
static constexpr int32_t MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT = 4 ;
/** Timeout for (unprotected) outbound peers to sync to our chainwork, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT = 20 * 60 ; // 20 minutes
/** How frequently to check for stale tips, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL = 10 * 60 ; // 10 minutes
/** How frequently to check for extra outbound peers and disconnect, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL = 45 ;
/** Minimum time an outbound-peer-eviction candidate must be connected for, in order to evict, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME = 30 ;
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/** SHA256("main address relay")[0:8] */
static constexpr uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY = 0x3cac0035b5866b90ULL ;
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/// Age after which a stale block will no longer be served if requested as
/// protection against fingerprinting. Set to one month, denominated in seconds.
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static constexpr int STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
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/// Age after which a block is considered historical for purposes of rate
/// limiting block relay. Set to one week, denominated in seconds.
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static constexpr int HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
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/** Time between pings automatically sent out for latency probing and keepalive */
static constexpr std : : chrono : : minutes PING_INTERVAL { 2 } ;
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/** The maximum number of entries in a locator */
static const unsigned int MAX_LOCATOR_SZ = 101 ;
/** The maximum number of entries in an 'inv' protocol message */
static const unsigned int MAX_INV_SZ = 50000 ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
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/** Maximum number of in-flight transaction requests from a peer. It is not a hard limit, but the threshold at which
* point the OVERLOADED_PEER_TX_DELAY kicks in . */
static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT = 100 ;
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/** Maximum number of transactions to consider for requesting, per peer. It provides a reasonable DoS limit to
* per - peer memory usage spent on announcements , while covering peers continuously sending INVs at the maximum
* rate ( by our own policy , see INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND ) for several minutes , while not receiving
* the actual transaction ( from any peer ) in response to requests for them . */
static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS = 5000 ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
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/** How long to delay requesting transactions via txids, if we have wtxid-relaying peers */
static constexpr auto TXID_RELAY_DELAY = std : : chrono : : seconds { 2 } ;
/** How long to delay requesting transactions from non-preferred peers */
static constexpr auto NONPREF_PEER_TX_DELAY = std : : chrono : : seconds { 2 } ;
/** How long to delay requesting transactions from overloaded peers (see MAX_PEER_TX_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT). */
static constexpr auto OVERLOADED_PEER_TX_DELAY = std : : chrono : : seconds { 2 } ;
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/** How long to wait (in microseconds) before downloading a transaction from an additional peer */
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static constexpr std : : chrono : : microseconds GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL { std : : chrono : : seconds { 60 } } ;
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/** Limit to avoid sending big packets. Not used in processing incoming GETDATA for compatibility */
static const unsigned int MAX_GETDATA_SZ = 1000 ;
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/** Number of blocks that can be requested at any given time from a single peer. */
static const int MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER = 16 ;
/** Timeout in seconds during which a peer must stall block download progress before being disconnected. */
static const unsigned int BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT = 2 ;
/** Number of headers sent in one getheaders result. We rely on the assumption that if a peer sends
* less than this number , we reached its tip . Changing this value is a protocol upgrade . */
static const unsigned int MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS = 2000 ;
/** Maximum depth of blocks we're willing to serve as compact blocks to peers
* when requested . For older blocks , a regular BLOCK response will be sent . */
static const int MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH = 5 ;
/** Maximum depth of blocks we're willing to respond to GETBLOCKTXN requests for. */
static const int MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH = 10 ;
/** Size of the "block download window": how far ahead of our current height do we fetch?
* Larger windows tolerate larger download speed differences between peer , but increase the potential
* degree of disordering of blocks on disk ( which make reindexing and pruning harder ) . We ' ll probably
* want to make this a per - peer adaptive value at some point . */
static const unsigned int BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW = 1024 ;
/** Block download timeout base, expressed in millionths of the block interval (i.e. 10 min) */
static const int64_t BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 1000000 ;
/** Additional block download timeout per parallel downloading peer (i.e. 5 min) */
static const int64_t BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER = 500000 ;
/** Maximum number of headers to announce when relaying blocks with headers message.*/
static const unsigned int MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE = 8 ;
/** Maximum number of unconnecting headers announcements before DoS score */
static const int MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS = 10 ;
/** Minimum blocks required to signal NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED */
static const unsigned int NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS = 288 ;
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/** Average delay between local address broadcasts */
static constexpr std : : chrono : : hours AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL { 24 } ;
/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts */
static constexpr std : : chrono : : seconds AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL { 30 } ;
/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds.
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* Blocks and peers with noban permission bypass this , outbound peers get half this delay . */
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static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5 ;
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/** Maximum rate of inventory items to send per second.
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* Limits the impact of low - fee transaction floods . */
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static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND = 7 ;
/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission. */
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ;
/** The number of most recently announced transactions a peer can request. */
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY = 3500 ;
/** Verify that INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY is enough to cache everything typically
* relayed before unconditional relay from the mempool kicks in . This is only a
* lower bound , and it should be larger to account for higher inv rate to outbound
* peers , and random variations in the broadcast mechanism . */
static_assert ( INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY > = INVENTORY_BROADCAST_PER_SECOND * UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY / std : : chrono : : seconds { 1 } , " INVENTORY_RELAY_MAX too low " ) ;
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/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */
static constexpr unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60 ;
/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */
static constexpr unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60 ;
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/** Maximum number of compact filters that may be requested with one getcfilters. See BIP 157. */
static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFILTERS_SIZE = 1000 ;
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/** Maximum number of cf hashes that may be requested with one getcfheaders. See BIP 157. */
static constexpr uint32_t MAX_GETCFHEADERS_SIZE = 2000 ;
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/** the maximum percentage of addresses from our addrman to return in response to a getaddr message. */
static constexpr size_t MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND = 23 ;
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struct COrphanTx {
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// When modifying, adapt the copy of this definition in tests/DoS_tests.
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CTransactionRef tx ;
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NodeId fromPeer ;
int64_t nTimeExpire ;
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size_t list_pos ;
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} ;
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/** Guards orphan transactions and extra txs for compact blocks */
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RecursiveMutex g_cs_orphans ;
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/** Map from txid to orphan transaction record. Limited by
* - maxorphantx / DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS */
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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/** Index from wtxid into the mapOrphanTransactions to lookup orphan
* transactions using their witness ids . */
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator > g_orphans_by_wtxid GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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void EraseOrphansFor ( NodeId peer ) ;
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// Internal stuff
namespace {
/** Number of nodes with fSyncStarted. */
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int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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/**
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* Sources of received blocks , saved to be able punish them when processing
* happens afterwards .
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* Set mapBlockSource [ hash ] . second to false if the node should not be
* punished if the block is invalid .
*/
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , bool > > mapBlockSource GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/**
* Filter for transactions that were recently rejected by
* AcceptToMemoryPool . These are not rerequested until the chain tip
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* changes , at which point the entire filter is reset .
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*
* Without this filter we ' d be re - requesting txs from each of our peers ,
* increasing bandwidth consumption considerably . For instance , with 100
* peers , half of which relay a tx we don ' t accept , that might be a 50 x
* bandwidth increase . A flooding attacker attempting to roll - over the
* filter using minimum - sized , 60 byte , transactions might manage to send
* 1000 / sec if we have fast peers , so we pick 120 , 000 to give our peers a
* two minute window to send invs to us .
*
* Decreasing the false positive rate is fairly cheap , so we pick one in a
* million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this
* filter .
*
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* We typically only add wtxids to this filter . For non - segwit
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* transactions , the txid = = wtxid , so this only prevents us from
* re - downloading non - segwit transactions when communicating with
* non - wtxidrelay peers - - which is important for avoiding malleation
* attacks that could otherwise interfere with transaction relay from
* non - wtxidrelay peers . For communicating with wtxidrelay peers , having
* the reject filter store wtxids is exactly what we want to avoid
* redownload of a rejected transaction .
*
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* In cases where we can tell that a segwit transaction will fail
* validation no matter the witness , we may add the txid of such
* transaction to the filter as well . This can be helpful when
* communicating with txid - relay peers or if we were to otherwise fetch a
* transaction via txid ( eg in our orphan handling ) .
*
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* Memory used : 1.3 MB
*/
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std : : unique_ptr < CRollingBloomFilter > recentRejects GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/*
* Filter for transactions that have been recently confirmed .
* We use this to avoid requesting transactions that have already been
* confirnmed .
*/
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Mutex g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions ;
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std : : unique_ptr < CRollingBloomFilter > g_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions ) ;
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/** Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded. */
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struct QueuedBlock {
uint256 hash ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex ; //!< Optional.
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bool fValidatedHeaders ; //!< Whether this block has validated headers at the time of request.
std : : unique_ptr < PartiallyDownloadedBlock > partialBlock ; //!< Optional, used for CMPCTBLOCK downloads
} ;
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > mapBlocksInFlight GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Stack of nodes which we have set to announce using compact blocks */
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std : : list < NodeId > lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Number of preferable block download peers. */
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int nPreferredDownload GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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/** Number of peers from which we're downloading blocks. */
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int nPeersWithValidatedDownloads GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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/** Number of peers with wtxid relay. */
int g_wtxid_relay_peers GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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/** Number of outbound peers with m_chain_sync.m_protect. */
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int g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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/** When our tip was last updated. */
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std : : atomic < int64_t > g_last_tip_update ( 0 ) ;
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/** Relay map (txid or wtxid -> CTransactionRef) */
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typedef std : : map < uint256 , CTransactionRef > MapRelay ;
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MapRelay mapRelay GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
/** Expiration-time ordered list of (expire time, relay map entry) pairs. */
std : : deque < std : : pair < int64_t , MapRelay : : iterator > > vRelayExpiration GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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struct IteratorComparator
{
template < typename I >
bool operator ( ) ( const I & a , const I & b ) const
{
return & ( * a ) < & ( * b ) ;
}
} ;
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/** Index from the parents' COutPoint into the mapOrphanTransactions. Used
* to remove orphan transactions from the mapOrphanTransactions */
std : : map < COutPoint , std : : set < std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator , IteratorComparator > > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
/** Orphan transactions in vector for quick random eviction */
std : : vector < std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator > g_orphan_list GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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/** Orphan/conflicted/etc transactions that are kept for compact block reconstruction.
* The last - blockreconstructionextratxn / DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN of
* these are kept in a ring buffer */
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static std : : vector < std : : pair < uint256 , CTransactionRef > > vExtraTxnForCompact GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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/** Offset into vExtraTxnForCompact to insert the next tx */
static size_t vExtraTxnForCompactIt GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) = 0 ;
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} // namespace
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namespace {
/**
* Maintain validation - specific state about nodes , protected by cs_main , instead
* by CNode ' s own locks . This simplifies asynchronous operation , where
* processing of incoming data is done after the ProcessMessage call returns ,
* and we ' re no longer holding the node ' s locks .
*/
struct CNodeState {
//! The peer's address
const CService address ;
//! Whether we have a fully established connection.
bool fCurrentlyConnected ;
//! The best known block we know this peer has announced.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexBestKnownBlock ;
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//! The hash of the last unknown block this peer has announced.
uint256 hashLastUnknownBlock ;
//! The last full block we both have.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexLastCommonBlock ;
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//! The best header we have sent our peer.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexBestHeaderSent ;
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//! Length of current-streak of unconnecting headers announcements
int nUnconnectingHeaders ;
//! Whether we've started headers synchronization with this peer.
bool fSyncStarted ;
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//! When to potentially disconnect peer for stalling headers download
int64_t nHeadersSyncTimeout ;
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//! Since when we're stalling block download progress (in microseconds), or 0.
int64_t nStallingSince ;
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std : : list < QueuedBlock > vBlocksInFlight ;
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//! When the first entry in vBlocksInFlight started downloading. Don't care when vBlocksInFlight is empty.
int64_t nDownloadingSince ;
int nBlocksInFlight ;
int nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders ;
//! Whether we consider this a preferred download peer.
bool fPreferredDownload ;
//! Whether this peer wants invs or headers (when possible) for block announcements.
bool fPreferHeaders ;
//! Whether this peer wants invs or cmpctblocks (when possible) for block announcements.
bool fPreferHeaderAndIDs ;
/**
* Whether this peer will send us cmpctblocks if we request them .
* This is not used to gate request logic , as we really only care about fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ,
* but is used as a flag to " lock in " the version of compact blocks ( fWantsCmpctWitness ) we send .
*/
bool fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ;
//! Whether this peer can give us witnesses
bool fHaveWitness ;
//! Whether this peer wants witnesses in cmpctblocks/blocktxns
bool fWantsCmpctWitness ;
/**
* If we ' ve announced NODE_WITNESS to this peer : whether the peer sends witnesses in cmpctblocks / blocktxns ,
* otherwise : whether this peer sends non - witnesses in cmpctblocks / blocktxns .
*/
bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ;
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/** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT and EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL logic.
*
* Both are only in effect for outbound , non - manual , non - protected connections .
* Any peer protected ( m_protect = true ) is not chosen for eviction . A peer is
* marked as protected if all of these are true :
* - its connection type is IsBlockOnlyConn ( ) = = false
* - it gave us a valid connecting header
* - we haven ' t reached MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT yet
* - it has a better chain than we have
*
* CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT : if a peer ' s best known block has less work than our tip ,
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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* set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future :
* - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip
* when the timeout was set , then either reset the timeout or clear it
* ( after comparing against our current tip ' s work )
* - If at timeout their best known block still has less work than our
* tip did when the timeout was set , then send a getheaders message ,
* and set a shorter timeout , HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future .
* If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is
* reached , disconnect .
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*
* EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL : after each interval , if we have too many outbound peers ,
* drop the outbound one that least recently announced us a new block .
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
*/
struct ChainSyncTimeoutState {
//! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced
int64_t m_timeout ;
//! A header with the work we require on our peer's chain
const CBlockIndex * m_work_header ;
//! After timeout is reached, set to true after sending getheaders
bool m_sent_getheaders ;
//! Whether this peer is protected from disconnection due to a bad/slow chain
bool m_protect ;
} ;
ChainSyncTimeoutState m_chain_sync ;
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//! Time of last new block announcement
int64_t m_last_block_announcement ;
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//! Whether this peer is an inbound connection
bool m_is_inbound ;
//! Whether this peer is a manual connection
bool m_is_manual_connection ;
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//! A rolling bloom filter of all announced tx CInvs to this peer.
CRollingBloomFilter m_recently_announced_invs = CRollingBloomFilter { INVENTORY_MAX_RECENT_RELAY , 0.000001 } ;
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//! Whether this peer relays txs via wtxid
bool m_wtxid_relay { false } ;
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CNodeState ( CAddress addrIn , bool is_inbound , bool is_manual )
: address ( addrIn ) , m_is_inbound ( is_inbound ) , m_is_manual_connection ( is_manual )
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{
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fCurrentlyConnected = false ;
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pindexBestKnownBlock = nullptr ;
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hashLastUnknownBlock . SetNull ( ) ;
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pindexLastCommonBlock = nullptr ;
pindexBestHeaderSent = nullptr ;
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nUnconnectingHeaders = 0 ;
fSyncStarted = false ;
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nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0 ;
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nStallingSince = 0 ;
nDownloadingSince = 0 ;
nBlocksInFlight = 0 ;
nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = 0 ;
fPreferredDownload = false ;
fPreferHeaders = false ;
fPreferHeaderAndIDs = false ;
fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = false ;
fHaveWitness = false ;
fWantsCmpctWitness = false ;
fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = false ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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m_chain_sync = { 0 , nullptr , false , false } ;
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m_last_block_announcement = 0 ;
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m_recently_announced_invs . reset ( ) ;
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}
} ;
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/** Map maintaining per-node state. */
static std : : map < NodeId , CNodeState > mapNodeState GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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static CNodeState * State ( NodeId pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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std : : map < NodeId , CNodeState > : : iterator it = mapNodeState . find ( pnode ) ;
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if ( it = = mapNodeState . end ( ) )
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return nullptr ;
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return & it - > second ;
}
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/**
* Data structure for an individual peer . This struct is not protected by
* cs_main since it does not contain validation - critical data .
*
* Memory is owned by shared pointers and this object is destructed when
* the refcount drops to zero .
*
* TODO : move most members from CNodeState to this structure .
* TODO : move remaining application - layer data members from CNode to this structure .
*/
struct Peer {
/** Same id as the CNode object for this peer */
const NodeId m_id { 0 } ;
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/** Protects misbehavior data members */
Mutex m_misbehavior_mutex ;
/** Accumulated misbehavior score for this peer */
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int m_misbehavior_score GUARDED_BY ( m_misbehavior_mutex ) { 0 } ;
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/** Whether this peer should be disconnected and marked as discouraged (unless it has the noban permission). */
bool m_should_discourage GUARDED_BY ( m_misbehavior_mutex ) { false } ;
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/** Set of txids to reconsider once their parent transactions have been accepted **/
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std : : set < uint256 > m_orphan_work_set GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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/** Protects m_getdata_requests **/
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Mutex m_getdata_requests_mutex ;
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/** Work queue of items requested by this peer **/
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std : : deque < CInv > m_getdata_requests GUARDED_BY ( m_getdata_requests_mutex ) ;
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Peer ( NodeId id ) : m_id ( id ) { }
} ;
using PeerRef = std : : shared_ptr < Peer > ;
/**
* Map of all Peer objects , keyed by peer id . This map is protected
* by the global g_peer_mutex . Once a shared pointer reference is
* taken , the lock may be released . Individual fields are protected by
* their own locks .
*/
Mutex g_peer_mutex ;
static std : : map < NodeId , PeerRef > g_peer_map GUARDED_BY ( g_peer_mutex ) ;
/** Get a shared pointer to the Peer object.
* May return nullptr if the Peer object can ' t be found . */
static PeerRef GetPeerRef ( NodeId id )
{
LOCK ( g_peer_mutex ) ;
auto it = g_peer_map . find ( id ) ;
return it ! = g_peer_map . end ( ) ? it - > second : nullptr ;
}
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static void UpdatePreferredDownload ( const CNode & node , CNodeState * state ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
nPreferredDownload - = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
// Whether this node should be marked as a preferred download node.
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state - > fPreferredDownload = ( ! node . IsInboundConn ( ) | | node . HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) ) & & ! node . IsAddrFetchConn ( ) & & ! node . fClient ;
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nPreferredDownload + = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
}
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static void PushNodeVersion ( CNode & pnode , CConnman & connman , int64_t nTime )
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{
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// Note that pnode->GetLocalServices() is a reflection of the local
// services we were offering when the CNode object was created for this
// peer.
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ServiceFlags nLocalNodeServices = pnode . GetLocalServices ( ) ;
uint64_t nonce = pnode . GetLocalNonce ( ) ;
int nNodeStartingHeight = pnode . GetMyStartingHeight ( ) ;
NodeId nodeid = pnode . GetId ( ) ;
CAddress addr = pnode . addr ;
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CAddress addrYou = ( addr . IsRoutable ( ) & & ! IsProxy ( addr ) ? addr : CAddress ( CService ( ) , addr . nServices ) ) ;
CAddress addrMe = CAddress ( CService ( ) , nLocalNodeServices ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & pnode , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : VERSION , PROTOCOL_VERSION , ( uint64_t ) nLocalNodeServices , nTime , addrYou , addrMe ,
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nonce , strSubVersion , nNodeStartingHeight , : : g_relay_txes & & pnode . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) ) ;
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if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, them=%s, peer=%d \n " , PROTOCOL_VERSION , nNodeStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , addrYou . ToString ( ) , nodeid ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d \n " , PROTOCOL_VERSION , nNodeStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , nodeid ) ;
}
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}
// Returns a bool indicating whether we requested this block.
// Also used if a block was /not/ received and timed out or started with another peer
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static bool MarkBlockAsReceived ( const uint256 & hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( itInFlight ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ) {
CNodeState * state = State ( itInFlight - > second . first ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders - = itInFlight - > second . second - > fValidatedHeaders ;
if ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = = 0 & & itInFlight - > second . second - > fValidatedHeaders ) {
// Last validated block on the queue was received.
nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - - ;
}
if ( state - > vBlocksInFlight . begin ( ) = = itInFlight - > second . second ) {
// First block on the queue was received, update the start download time for the next one
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state - > nDownloadingSince = std : : max ( state - > nDownloadingSince , count_microseconds ( GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ) ) ;
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}
state - > vBlocksInFlight . erase ( itInFlight - > second . second ) ;
state - > nBlocksInFlight - - ;
state - > nStallingSince = 0 ;
mapBlocksInFlight . erase ( itInFlight ) ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
// returns false, still setting pit, if the block was already in flight from the same peer
// pit will only be valid as long as the same cs_main lock is being held
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static bool MarkBlockAsInFlight ( CTxMemPool & mempool , NodeId nodeid , const uint256 & hash , const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator * * pit = nullptr ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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// Short-circuit most stuff in case it is from the same node
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( itInFlight ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) & & itInFlight - > second . first = = nodeid ) {
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if ( pit ) {
* pit = & itInFlight - > second . second ;
}
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return false ;
}
// Make sure it's not listed somewhere already.
MarkBlockAsReceived ( hash ) ;
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std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator it = state - > vBlocksInFlight . insert ( state - > vBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ,
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{ hash , pindex , pindex ! = nullptr , std : : unique_ptr < PartiallyDownloadedBlock > ( pit ? new PartiallyDownloadedBlock ( & mempool ) : nullptr ) } ) ;
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state - > nBlocksInFlight + + ;
state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders + = it - > fValidatedHeaders ;
if ( state - > nBlocksInFlight = = 1 ) {
// We're starting a block download (batch) from this peer.
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state - > nDownloadingSince = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) . count ( ) ;
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}
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if ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = = 1 & & pindex ! = nullptr ) {
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nPeersWithValidatedDownloads + + ;
}
itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . insert ( std : : make_pair ( hash , std : : make_pair ( nodeid , it ) ) ) . first ;
if ( pit )
* pit = & itInFlight - > second . second ;
return true ;
}
/** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertised is not yet known. */
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static void ProcessBlockAvailability ( NodeId nodeid ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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if ( ! state - > hashLastUnknownBlock . IsNull ( ) ) {
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( state - > hashLastUnknownBlock ) ;
if ( pindex & & pindex - > nChainWork > 0 ) {
if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | pindex - > nChainWork > = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork ) {
state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex ;
}
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state - > hashLastUnknownBlock . SetNull ( ) ;
}
}
}
/** Update tracking information about which blocks a peer is assumed to have. */
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static void UpdateBlockAvailability ( NodeId nodeid , const uint256 & hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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ProcessBlockAvailability ( nodeid ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hash ) ;
if ( pindex & & pindex - > nChainWork > 0 ) {
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// An actually better block was announced.
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if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | pindex - > nChainWork > = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork ) {
state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex ;
}
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} else {
// An unknown block was announced; just assume that the latest one is the best one.
state - > hashLastUnknownBlock = hash ;
}
}
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/**
* When a peer sends us a valid block , instruct it to announce blocks to us
* using CMPCTBLOCK if possible by adding its nodeid to the end of
* lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs , and keeping that list under a certain size by
* removing the first element if necessary .
*/
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static void MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs ( NodeId nodeid , CConnman & connman ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( nodeid ) ;
if ( ! nodestate | | ! nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
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// Never ask from peers who can't provide witnesses.
return ;
}
if ( nodestate - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ) {
for ( std : : list < NodeId > : : iterator it = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . begin ( ) ; it ! = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . end ( ) ; it + + ) {
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if ( * it = = nodeid ) {
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . erase ( it ) ;
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . push_back ( nodeid ) ;
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return ;
}
}
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connman . ForNode ( nodeid , [ & connman ] ( CNode * pfrom ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( : : cs_main ) {
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ;
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uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) ? 2 : 1 ;
if ( lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . size ( ) > = 3 ) {
// As per BIP152, we only get 3 of our peers to announce
// blocks using compact encodings.
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connman . ForNode ( lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . front ( ) , [ & connman , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ] ( CNode * pnodeStop ) {
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connman . PushMessage ( pnodeStop , CNetMsgMaker ( pnodeStop - > GetCommonVersion ( ) ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/ false , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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return true ;
} ) ;
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . pop_front ( ) ;
}
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connman . PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( pfrom - > GetCommonVersion ( ) ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/ true , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . push_back ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
} ) ;
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}
}
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static bool TipMayBeStale ( const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
if ( g_last_tip_update = = 0 ) {
g_last_tip_update = GetTime ( ) ;
}
return g_last_tip_update < GetTime ( ) - consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * 3 & & mapBlocksInFlight . empty ( ) ;
}
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static bool CanDirectFetch ( const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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return : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockTime ( ) > GetAdjustedTime ( ) - consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * 20 ;
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}
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static bool PeerHasHeader ( CNodeState * state , const CBlockIndex * pindex ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock & & pindex = = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetAncestor ( pindex - > nHeight ) )
return true ;
if ( state - > pindexBestHeaderSent & & pindex = = state - > pindexBestHeaderSent - > GetAncestor ( pindex - > nHeight ) )
return true ;
return false ;
}
/** Update pindexLastCommonBlock and add not-in-flight missing successors to vBlocks, until it has
* at most count entries . */
2018-06-08 14:09:08 -04:00
static void FindNextBlocksToDownload ( NodeId nodeid , unsigned int count , std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > & vBlocks , NodeId & nodeStaller , const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
if ( count = = 0 )
return ;
vBlocks . reserve ( vBlocks . size ( ) + count ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
2017-08-07 01:36:37 -04:00
assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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// Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it.
ProcessBlockAvailability ( nodeid ) ;
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork | | state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// This peer has nothing interesting.
return ;
}
2017-08-07 01:36:37 -04:00
if ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = = nullptr ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// Bootstrap quickly by guessing a parent of our best tip is the forking point.
// Guessing wrong in either direction is not a problem.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = : : ChainActive ( ) [ std : : min ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight , : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) ) ] ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
// of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock , state - > pindexBestKnownBlock ) ;
if ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock )
return ;
2016-12-19 04:03:16 -03:00
std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToFetch ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexWalk = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// Never fetch further than the best block we know the peer has, or more than BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW + 1 beyond the last
// linked block we have in common with this peer. The +1 is so we can detect stalling, namely if we would be able to
// download that next block if the window were 1 larger.
int nWindowEnd = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock - > nHeight + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW ;
int nMaxHeight = std : : min < int > ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight , nWindowEnd + 1 ) ;
NodeId waitingfor = - 1 ;
while ( pindexWalk - > nHeight < nMaxHeight ) {
// Read up to 128 (or more, if more blocks than that are needed) successors of pindexWalk (towards
// pindexBestKnownBlock) into vToFetch. We fetch 128, because CBlockIndex::GetAncestor may be as expensive
// as iterating over ~100 CBlockIndex* entries anyway.
int nToFetch = std : : min ( nMaxHeight - pindexWalk - > nHeight , std : : max < int > ( count - vBlocks . size ( ) , 128 ) ) ;
vToFetch . resize ( nToFetch ) ;
pindexWalk = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetAncestor ( pindexWalk - > nHeight + nToFetch ) ;
vToFetch [ nToFetch - 1 ] = pindexWalk ;
for ( unsigned int i = nToFetch - 1 ; i > 0 ; i - - ) {
vToFetch [ i - 1 ] = vToFetch [ i ] - > pprev ;
}
// Iterate over those blocks in vToFetch (in forward direction), adding the ones that
2018-03-18 11:26:45 -03:00
// are not yet downloaded and not in flight to vBlocks. In the meantime, update
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// pindexLastCommonBlock as long as all ancestors are already downloaded, or if it's
// already part of our chain (and therefore don't need it even if pruned).
2017-06-01 21:18:57 -04:00
for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : vToFetch ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
if ( ! pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) ) {
// We consider the chain that this peer is on invalid.
return ;
}
if ( ! State ( nodeid ) - > fHaveWitness & & IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , consensusParams ) ) {
// We wouldn't download this block or its descendants from this peer.
return ;
}
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA | | : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindex ) ) {
2018-12-03 20:14:08 -03:00
if ( pindex - > HaveTxsDownloaded ( ) )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex ;
} else if ( mapBlocksInFlight . count ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) = = 0 ) {
// The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight.
if ( pindex - > nHeight > nWindowEnd ) {
// We reached the end of the window.
if ( vBlocks . size ( ) = = 0 & & waitingfor ! = nodeid ) {
// We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if the download window was one larger.
nodeStaller = waitingfor ;
}
return ;
}
vBlocks . push_back ( pindex ) ;
if ( vBlocks . size ( ) = = count ) {
return ;
}
} else if ( waitingfor = = - 1 ) {
// This is the first already-in-flight block.
waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight [ pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ] . first ;
}
}
}
}
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
} // namespace
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
void PeerManager : : AddTxAnnouncement ( const CNode & node , const GenTxid & gtxid , std : : chrono : : microseconds current_time )
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
{
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ; // For m_txrequest
NodeId nodeid = node . GetId ( ) ;
2020-09-23 21:00:46 -03:00
if ( ! node . HasPermission ( PF_RELAY ) & & m_txrequest . Count ( nodeid ) > = MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS ) {
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
// Too many queued announcements from this peer
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
return ;
}
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
const CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
// Decide the TxRequestTracker parameters for this announcement:
// - "preferred": if fPreferredDownload is set (= outbound, or PF_NOBAN permission)
// - "reqtime": current time plus delays for:
// - NONPREF_PEER_TX_DELAY for announcements from non-preferred connections
2020-09-29 16:39:05 -03:00
// - TXID_RELAY_DELAY for txid announcements while wtxid peers are available
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
// - OVERLOADED_PEER_TX_DELAY for announcements from peers which have at least
2020-09-23 21:00:46 -03:00
// MAX_PEER_TX_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT requests in flight (and don't have PF_RELAY).
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
auto delay = std : : chrono : : microseconds { 0 } ;
const bool preferred = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
if ( ! preferred ) delay + = NONPREF_PEER_TX_DELAY ;
2020-09-29 16:39:05 -03:00
if ( ! gtxid . IsWtxid ( ) & & g_wtxid_relay_peers > 0 ) delay + = TXID_RELAY_DELAY ;
2020-09-23 21:00:46 -03:00
const bool overloaded = ! node . HasPermission ( PF_RELAY ) & &
m_txrequest . CountInFlight ( nodeid ) > = MAX_PEER_TX_REQUEST_IN_FLIGHT ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
if ( overloaded ) delay + = OVERLOADED_PEER_TX_DELAY ;
m_txrequest . ReceivedInv ( nodeid , gtxid , preferred , current_time + delay ) ;
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
}
2017-10-26 11:32:46 -03:00
// This function is used for testing the stale tip eviction logic, see
2018-05-23 08:14:58 -04:00
// denialofservice_tests.cpp
2017-10-26 11:32:46 -03:00
void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime ( NodeId node , int64_t time_in_seconds )
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( node ) ;
if ( state ) state - > m_last_block_announcement = time_in_seconds ;
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
void PeerManager : : InitializeNode ( CNode * pnode ) {
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
CAddress addr = pnode - > addr ;
std : : string addrName = pnode - > GetAddrName ( ) ;
NodeId nodeid = pnode - > GetId ( ) ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2020-07-29 03:57:15 -04:00
mapNodeState . emplace_hint ( mapNodeState . end ( ) , std : : piecewise_construct , std : : forward_as_tuple ( nodeid ) , std : : forward_as_tuple ( addr , pnode - > IsInboundConn ( ) , pnode - > IsManualConn ( ) ) ) ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
assert ( m_txrequest . Count ( nodeid ) = = 0 ) ;
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
}
2020-06-16 15:14:45 -04:00
{
PeerRef peer = std : : make_shared < Peer > ( nodeid ) ;
LOCK ( g_peer_mutex ) ;
g_peer_map . emplace_hint ( g_peer_map . end ( ) , nodeid , std : : move ( peer ) ) ;
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
}
2020-08-11 13:36:42 -04:00
if ( ! pnode - > IsInboundConn ( ) ) {
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
PushNodeVersion ( * pnode , m_connman , GetTime ( ) ) ;
2020-08-11 13:36:42 -04:00
}
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
void PeerManager : : ReattemptInitialBroadcast ( CScheduler & scheduler ) const
2020-01-29 13:19:27 -03:00
{
2020-07-28 00:30:50 -04:00
std : : set < uint256 > unbroadcast_txids = m_mempool . GetUnbroadcastTxs ( ) ;
2020-01-29 13:19:27 -03:00
2020-07-28 00:30:50 -04:00
for ( const auto & txid : unbroadcast_txids ) {
CTransactionRef tx = m_mempool . get ( txid ) ;
if ( tx ! = nullptr ) {
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2020-07-28 00:30:50 -04:00
RelayTransaction ( txid , tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) , m_connman ) ;
2020-05-01 18:48:23 -04:00
} else {
2020-07-28 00:30:50 -04:00
m_mempool . RemoveUnbroadcastTx ( txid , true ) ;
2020-05-01 18:48:23 -04:00
}
2020-01-29 13:19:27 -03:00
}
2020-04-28 17:40:05 -04:00
// Schedule next run for 10-15 minutes in the future.
// We add randomness on every cycle to avoid the possibility of P2P fingerprinting.
2020-01-29 13:19:27 -03:00
const std : : chrono : : milliseconds delta = std : : chrono : : minutes { 10 } + GetRandMillis ( std : : chrono : : minutes { 5 } ) ;
scheduler . scheduleFromNow ( [ & ] { ReattemptInitialBroadcast ( scheduler ) ; } , delta ) ;
}
2020-10-24 04:16:04 -03:00
void PeerManager : : FinalizeNode ( const CNode & node , bool & fUpdateConnectionTime ) {
NodeId nodeid = node . GetId ( ) ;
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
fUpdateConnectionTime = false ;
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
int misbehavior { 0 } ;
2020-06-16 15:14:45 -04:00
{
2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( nodeid ) ;
assert ( peer ! = nullptr ) ;
2020-06-16 16:27:34 -04:00
misbehavior = WITH_LOCK ( peer - > m_misbehavior_mutex , return peer - > m_misbehavior_score ) ;
2020-06-16 15:14:45 -04:00
LOCK ( g_peer_mutex ) ;
g_peer_map . erase ( nodeid ) ;
}
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
if ( state - > fSyncStarted )
nSyncStarted - - ;
2020-10-24 04:16:04 -03:00
if ( misbehavior = = 0 & & state - > fCurrentlyConnected & & ! node . IsBlockOnlyConn ( ) ) {
// Note: we avoid changing visible addrman state for block-relay-only peers
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
fUpdateConnectionTime = true ;
}
for ( const QueuedBlock & entry : state - > vBlocksInFlight ) {
mapBlocksInFlight . erase ( entry . hash ) ;
}
EraseOrphansFor ( nodeid ) ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
m_txrequest . DisconnectedPeer ( nodeid ) ;
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
nPreferredDownload - = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - = ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders ! = 0 ) ;
assert ( nPeersWithValidatedDownloads > = 0 ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect - = state - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ;
assert ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect > = 0 ) ;
2020-01-31 13:23:27 -03:00
g_wtxid_relay_peers - = state - > m_wtxid_relay ;
assert ( g_wtxid_relay_peers > = 0 ) ;
2017-07-06 13:40:09 -04:00
mapNodeState . erase ( nodeid ) ;
if ( mapNodeState . empty ( ) ) {
// Do a consistency check after the last peer is removed.
assert ( mapBlocksInFlight . empty ( ) ) ;
assert ( nPreferredDownload = = 0 ) ;
assert ( nPeersWithValidatedDownloads = = 0 ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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assert ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect = = 0 ) ;
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assert ( g_wtxid_relay_peers = = 0 ) ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
assert ( m_txrequest . Size ( ) = = 0 ) ;
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}
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Cleared nodestate for peer=%d \n " , nodeid ) ;
}
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bool GetNodeStateStats ( NodeId nodeid , CNodeStateStats & stats ) {
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
if ( state = = nullptr )
return false ;
stats . nSyncHeight = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock ? state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight : - 1 ;
stats . nCommonHeight = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock ? state - > pindexLastCommonBlock - > nHeight : - 1 ;
for ( const QueuedBlock & queue : state - > vBlocksInFlight ) {
if ( queue . pindex )
stats . vHeightInFlight . push_back ( queue . pindex - > nHeight ) ;
}
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}
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PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( nodeid ) ;
if ( peer = = nullptr ) return false ;
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stats . m_misbehavior_score = WITH_LOCK ( peer - > m_misbehavior_mutex , return peer - > m_misbehavior_score ) ;
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return true ;
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// mapOrphanTransactions
//
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static void AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( const CTransactionRef & tx ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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size_t max_extra_txn = gArgs . GetArg ( " -blockreconstructionextratxn " , DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN ) ;
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if ( max_extra_txn < = 0 )
return ;
if ( ! vExtraTxnForCompact . size ( ) )
vExtraTxnForCompact . resize ( max_extra_txn ) ;
vExtraTxnForCompact [ vExtraTxnForCompactIt ] = std : : make_pair ( tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) , tx ) ;
vExtraTxnForCompactIt = ( vExtraTxnForCompactIt + 1 ) % max_extra_txn ;
}
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bool AddOrphanTx ( const CTransactionRef & tx , NodeId peer ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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const uint256 & hash = tx - > GetHash ( ) ;
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if ( mapOrphanTransactions . count ( hash ) )
return false ;
// Ignore big transactions, to avoid a
// send-big-orphans memory exhaustion attack. If a peer has a legitimate
// large transaction with a missing parent then we assume
// it will rebroadcast it later, after the parent transaction(s)
// have been mined or received.
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// 100 orphans, each of which is at most 100,000 bytes big is
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// at most 10 megabytes of orphans and somewhat more byprev index (in the worst case):
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unsigned int sz = GetTransactionWeight ( * tx ) ;
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if ( sz > MAX_STANDARD_TX_WEIGHT )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " ignoring large orphan tx (size: %u, hash: %s) \n " , sz , hash . ToString ( ) ) ;
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return false ;
}
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auto ret = mapOrphanTransactions . emplace ( hash , COrphanTx { tx , peer , GetTime ( ) + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME , g_orphan_list . size ( ) } ) ;
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assert ( ret . second ) ;
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g_orphan_list . push_back ( ret . first ) ;
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// Allow for lookups in the orphan pool by wtxid, as well as txid
g_orphans_by_wtxid . emplace ( tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) , ret . first ) ;
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for ( const CTxIn & txin : tx - > vin ) {
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mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev [ txin . prevout ] . insert ( ret . first ) ;
}
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AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( tx ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " stored orphan tx %s (mapsz %u outsz %u) \n " , hash . ToString ( ) ,
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mapOrphanTransactions . size ( ) , mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . size ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
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int static EraseOrphanTx ( uint256 hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator it = mapOrphanTransactions . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( it = = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
return 0 ;
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for ( const CTxIn & txin : it - > second . tx - > vin )
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{
auto itPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( txin . prevout ) ;
if ( itPrev = = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) )
continue ;
itPrev - > second . erase ( it ) ;
if ( itPrev - > second . empty ( ) )
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . erase ( itPrev ) ;
}
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size_t old_pos = it - > second . list_pos ;
assert ( g_orphan_list [ old_pos ] = = it ) ;
if ( old_pos + 1 ! = g_orphan_list . size ( ) ) {
// Unless we're deleting the last entry in g_orphan_list, move the last
// entry to the position we're deleting.
auto it_last = g_orphan_list . back ( ) ;
g_orphan_list [ old_pos ] = it_last ;
it_last - > second . list_pos = old_pos ;
}
g_orphan_list . pop_back ( ) ;
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g_orphans_by_wtxid . erase ( it - > second . tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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mapOrphanTransactions . erase ( it ) ;
return 1 ;
}
void EraseOrphansFor ( NodeId peer )
{
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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int nErased = 0 ;
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions . begin ( ) ;
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while ( iter ! = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator maybeErase = iter + + ; // increment to avoid iterator becoming invalid
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if ( maybeErase - > second . fromPeer = = peer )
{
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nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( maybeErase - > second . tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
}
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if ( nErased > 0 ) LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx from peer=%d \n " , nErased , peer ) ;
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}
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unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize ( unsigned int nMaxOrphans )
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{
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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unsigned int nEvicted = 0 ;
static int64_t nNextSweep ;
int64_t nNow = GetTime ( ) ;
if ( nNextSweep < = nNow ) {
// Sweep out expired orphan pool entries:
int nErased = 0 ;
int64_t nMinExpTime = nNow + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME - ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL ;
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions . begin ( ) ;
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while ( iter ! = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator maybeErase = iter + + ;
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if ( maybeErase - > second . nTimeExpire < = nNow ) {
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nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( maybeErase - > second . tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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} else {
nMinExpTime = std : : min ( maybeErase - > second . nTimeExpire , nMinExpTime ) ;
}
}
// Sweep again 5 minutes after the next entry that expires in order to batch the linear scan.
nNextSweep = nMinExpTime + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL ;
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if ( nErased > 0 ) LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx due to expiration \n " , nErased ) ;
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}
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FastRandomContext rng ;
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while ( mapOrphanTransactions . size ( ) > nMaxOrphans )
{
// Evict a random orphan:
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size_t randompos = rng . randrange ( g_orphan_list . size ( ) ) ;
EraseOrphanTx ( g_orphan_list [ randompos ] - > first ) ;
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+ + nEvicted ;
}
return nEvicted ;
}
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void PeerManager : : Misbehaving ( const NodeId pnode , const int howmuch , const std : : string & message )
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{
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assert ( howmuch > 0 ) ;
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PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( pnode ) ;
if ( peer = = nullptr ) return ;
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2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
LOCK ( peer - > m_misbehavior_mutex ) ;
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peer - > m_misbehavior_score + = howmuch ;
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const std : : string message_prefixed = message . empty ( ) ? " " : ( " : " + message ) ;
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if ( peer - > m_misbehavior_score > = DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD & & peer - > m_misbehavior_score - howmuch < DISCOURAGEMENT_THRESHOLD ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Misbehaving: peer=%d (%d -> %d) DISCOURAGE THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s \n " , pnode , peer - > m_misbehavior_score - howmuch , peer - > m_misbehavior_score , message_prefixed ) ;
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peer - > m_should_discourage = true ;
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} else {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Misbehaving: peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s \n " , pnode , peer - > m_misbehavior_score - howmuch , peer - > m_misbehavior_score , message_prefixed ) ;
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}
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}
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bool PeerManager : : MaybePunishNodeForBlock ( NodeId nodeid , const BlockValidationState & state ,
bool via_compact_block , const std : : string & message )
{
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switch ( state . GetResult ( ) ) {
case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_RESULT_UNSET :
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break ;
// The node is providing invalid data:
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case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_CONSENSUS :
case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_MUTATED :
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if ( ! via_compact_block ) {
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
return true ;
}
break ;
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case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID :
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * node_state = State ( nodeid ) ;
if ( node_state = = nullptr ) {
break ;
}
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// Discourage outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
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// Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections.
if ( ! via_compact_block & & ! node_state - > m_is_inbound & & ! node_state - > m_is_manual_connection ) {
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
return true ;
}
break ;
}
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case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER :
case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_CHECKPOINT :
case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_INVALID_PREV :
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Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
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return true ;
// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
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case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_MISSING_PREV :
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// TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary)
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 10 , message ) ;
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return true ;
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case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE :
case BlockValidationResult : : BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE :
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break ;
2018-04-16 13:52:03 -03:00
}
if ( message ! = " " ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d: %s \n " , nodeid , message ) ;
}
return false ;
}
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bool PeerManager : : MaybePunishNodeForTx ( NodeId nodeid , const TxValidationState & state , const std : : string & message )
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{
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switch ( state . GetResult ( ) ) {
case TxValidationResult : : TX_RESULT_UNSET :
break ;
// The node is providing invalid data:
case TxValidationResult : : TX_CONSENSUS :
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Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
return true ;
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// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
case TxValidationResult : : TX_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE :
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case TxValidationResult : : TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD :
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case TxValidationResult : : TX_NOT_STANDARD :
case TxValidationResult : : TX_MISSING_INPUTS :
case TxValidationResult : : TX_PREMATURE_SPEND :
case TxValidationResult : : TX_WITNESS_MUTATED :
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case TxValidationResult : : TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED :
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case TxValidationResult : : TX_CONFLICT :
case TxValidationResult : : TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY :
break ;
}
if ( message ! = " " ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d: %s \n " , nodeid , message ) ;
}
return false ;
}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// blockchain -> download logic notification
//
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// To prevent fingerprinting attacks, only send blocks/headers outside of the
// active chain if they are no more than a month older (both in time, and in
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// best equivalent proof of work) than the best header chain we know about and
// we fully-validated them at some point.
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static bool BlockRequestAllowed ( const CBlockIndex * pindex , const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindex ) ) return true ;
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return pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS ) & & ( pindexBestHeader ! = nullptr ) & &
2017-08-22 18:09:04 -03:00
( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) - pindex - > GetBlockTime ( ) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT ) & &
( GetBlockProofEquivalentTime ( * pindexBestHeader , * pindex , * pindexBestHeader , consensusParams ) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT ) ;
}
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PeerManager : : PeerManager ( const CChainParams & chainparams , CConnman & connman , BanMan * banman ,
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CScheduler & scheduler , ChainstateManager & chainman , CTxMemPool & pool )
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: m_chainparams ( chainparams ) ,
m_connman ( connman ) ,
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m_banman ( banman ) ,
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m_chainman ( chainman ) ,
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m_mempool ( pool ) ,
m_stale_tip_check_time ( 0 )
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{
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// Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup.
recentRejects . reset ( new CRollingBloomFilter ( 120000 , 0.000001 ) ) ;
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2020-01-17 13:43:11 -03:00
// Blocks don't typically have more than 4000 transactions, so this should
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// be at least six blocks (~1 hr) worth of transactions that we can store,
// inserting both a txid and wtxid for every observed transaction.
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// If the number of transactions appearing in a block goes up, or if we are
// seeing getdata requests more than an hour after initial announcement, we
// can increase this number.
// The false positive rate of 1/1M should come out to less than 1
// transaction per day that would be inadvertently ignored (which is the
// same probability that we have in the reject filter).
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g_recent_confirmed_transactions . reset ( new CRollingBloomFilter ( 48000 , 0.000001 ) ) ;
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// Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we
// don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we
// combine them in one function and schedule at the quicker (peer-eviction)
// timer.
static_assert ( EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL < STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL , " peer eviction timer should be less than stale tip check timer " ) ;
2020-09-08 03:03:01 -03:00
scheduler . scheduleEvery ( [ this ] { this - > CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers ( ) ; } , std : : chrono : : seconds { EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL } ) ;
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// schedule next run for 10-15 minutes in the future
const std : : chrono : : milliseconds delta = std : : chrono : : minutes { 10 } + GetRandMillis ( std : : chrono : : minutes { 5 } ) ;
scheduler . scheduleFromNow ( [ & ] { ReattemptInitialBroadcast ( scheduler ) ; } , delta ) ;
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}
2018-03-05 16:31:13 -03:00
/**
* Evict orphan txn pool entries ( EraseOrphanTx ) based on a newly connected
2020-09-23 20:39:33 -03:00
* block , remember the recently confirmed transactions , and delete tracked
* announcements for them . Also save the time of the last tip update .
2018-03-05 16:31:13 -03:00
*/
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void PeerManager : : BlockConnected ( const std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > & pblock , const CBlockIndex * pindex )
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{
{
LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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2020-01-17 13:43:11 -03:00
std : : vector < uint256 > vOrphanErase ;
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for ( const CTransactionRef & ptx : pblock - > vtx ) {
const CTransaction & tx = * ptx ;
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2020-01-17 13:43:11 -03:00
// Which orphan pool entries must we evict?
for ( const auto & txin : tx . vin ) {
auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( txin . prevout ) ;
if ( itByPrev = = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) continue ;
for ( auto mi = itByPrev - > second . begin ( ) ; mi ! = itByPrev - > second . end ( ) ; + + mi ) {
const CTransaction & orphanTx = * ( * mi ) - > second . tx ;
const uint256 & orphanHash = orphanTx . GetHash ( ) ;
vOrphanErase . push_back ( orphanHash ) ;
}
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}
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}
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// Erase orphan transactions included or precluded by this block
if ( vOrphanErase . size ( ) ) {
int nErased = 0 ;
for ( const uint256 & orphanHash : vOrphanErase ) {
nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
}
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx included or conflicted by block \n " , nErased ) ;
}
g_last_tip_update = GetTime ( ) ;
}
{
LOCK ( g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions ) ;
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for ( const auto & ptx : pblock - > vtx ) {
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g_recent_confirmed_transactions - > insert ( ptx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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if ( ptx - > GetHash ( ) ! = ptx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ) {
g_recent_confirmed_transactions - > insert ( ptx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
}
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}
}
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
for ( const auto & ptx : pblock - > vtx ) {
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( ptx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( ptx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
}
}
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}
2017-10-23 14:59:07 -03:00
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void PeerManager : : BlockDisconnected ( const std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > & block , const CBlockIndex * pindex )
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{
// To avoid relay problems with transactions that were previously
// confirmed, clear our filter of recently confirmed transactions whenever
// there's a reorg.
// This means that in a 1-block reorg (where 1 block is disconnected and
// then another block reconnected), our filter will drop to having only one
// block's worth of transactions in it, but that should be fine, since
// presumably the most common case of relaying a confirmed transaction
// should be just after a new block containing it is found.
LOCK ( g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions ) ;
g_recent_confirmed_transactions - > reset ( ) ;
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}
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// All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block
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static RecursiveMutex cs_most_recent_block ;
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static std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > most_recent_block GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static uint256 most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static bool fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
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/**
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* Maintain state about the best - seen block and fast - announce a compact block
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* to compatible peers .
*/
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void PeerManager : : NewPoWValidBlock ( const CBlockIndex * pindex , const std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > & pblock ) {
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std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > pcmpctblock = std : : make_shared < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > ( * pblock , true ) ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
static int nHighestFastAnnounce = 0 ;
if ( pindex - > nHeight < = nHighestFastAnnounce )
return ;
nHighestFastAnnounce = pindex - > nHeight ;
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bool fWitnessEnabled = IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
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uint256 hashBlock ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
most_recent_block_hash = hashBlock ;
most_recent_block = pblock ;
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most_recent_compact_block = pcmpctblock ;
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fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock = fWitnessEnabled ;
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}
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m_connman . ForEachNode ( [ this , & pcmpctblock , pindex , & msgMaker , fWitnessEnabled , & hashBlock ] ( CNode * pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( : : cs_main ) {
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ;
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// TODO: Avoid the repeated-serialization here
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if ( pnode - > GetCommonVersion ( ) < INVALID_CB_NO_BAN_VERSION | | pnode - > fDisconnect )
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return ;
ProcessBlockAvailability ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
CNodeState & state = * State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// If the peer has, or we announced to them the previous block already,
// but we don't think they have this one, go ahead and announce it
if ( state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs & & ( ! fWitnessEnabled | | state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) & &
! PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) & & PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex - > pprev ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d \n " , " PeerManager::NewPoWValidBlock " ,
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hashBlock . ToString ( ) , pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pnode , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * pcmpctblock ) ) ;
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ;
}
} ) ;
}
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/**
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* Update our best height and announce any block hashes which weren ' t previously
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* in : : ChainActive ( ) to our peers .
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*/
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void PeerManager : : UpdatedBlockTip ( const CBlockIndex * pindexNew , const CBlockIndex * pindexFork , bool fInitialDownload ) {
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const int nNewHeight = pindexNew - > nHeight ;
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m_connman . SetBestHeight ( nNewHeight ) ;
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SetServiceFlagsIBDCache ( ! fInitialDownload ) ;
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if ( ! fInitialDownload ) {
// Find the hashes of all blocks that weren't previously in the best chain.
std : : vector < uint256 > vHashes ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexToAnnounce = pindexNew ;
while ( pindexToAnnounce ! = pindexFork ) {
vHashes . push_back ( pindexToAnnounce - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
pindexToAnnounce = pindexToAnnounce - > pprev ;
if ( vHashes . size ( ) = = MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) {
// Limit announcements in case of a huge reorganization.
// Rely on the peer's synchronization mechanism in that case.
break ;
}
}
// Relay inventory, but don't relay old inventory during initial block download.
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m_connman . ForEachNode ( [ nNewHeight , & vHashes ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
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LOCK ( pnode - > cs_inventory ) ;
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if ( nNewHeight > ( pnode - > nStartingHeight ! = - 1 ? pnode - > nStartingHeight - 2000 : 0 ) ) {
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for ( const uint256 & hash : reverse_iterate ( vHashes ) ) {
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pnode - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . push_back ( hash ) ;
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}
}
} ) ;
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m_connman . WakeMessageHandler ( ) ;
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}
}
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/**
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* Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer discouragement , maintain which
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* peers announce compact blocks .
*/
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void PeerManager : : BlockChecked ( const CBlock & block , const BlockValidationState & state ) {
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
const uint256 hash ( block . GetHash ( ) ) ;
std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , bool > > : : iterator it = mapBlockSource . find ( hash ) ;
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// If the block failed validation, we know where it came from and we're still connected
// to that peer, maybe punish.
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) & &
it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) & &
State ( it - > second . first ) ) {
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MaybePunishNodeForBlock ( /*nodeid=*/ it - > second . first , state , /*via_compact_block=*/ ! it - > second . second ) ;
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}
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// Check that:
// 1. The block is valid
// 2. We're not in initial block download
// 3. This is currently the best block we're aware of. We haven't updated
// the tip yet so we have no way to check this directly here. Instead we
// just check that there are currently no other blocks in flight.
else if ( state . IsValid ( ) & &
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! : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & &
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mapBlocksInFlight . count ( hash ) = = mapBlocksInFlight . size ( ) ) {
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if ( it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) ) {
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MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs ( it - > second . first , m_connman ) ;
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}
}
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if ( it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) )
mapBlockSource . erase ( it ) ;
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Messages
//
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bool static AlreadyHaveTx ( const GenTxid & gtxid , const CTxMemPool & mempool ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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assert ( recentRejects ) ;
if ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ! = hashRecentRejectsChainTip ) {
// If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions
// might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming valid,
// or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those
// txs a second chance.
hashRecentRejectsChainTip = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
recentRejects - > reset ( ) ;
}
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const uint256 & hash = gtxid . GetHash ( ) ;
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{
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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if ( ! gtxid . IsWtxid ( ) & & mapOrphanTransactions . count ( hash ) ) {
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return true ;
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} else if ( gtxid . IsWtxid ( ) & & g_orphans_by_wtxid . count ( hash ) ) {
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return true ;
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}
}
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{
LOCK ( g_cs_recent_confirmed_transactions ) ;
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if ( g_recent_confirmed_transactions - > contains ( hash ) ) return true ;
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}
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return recentRejects - > contains ( hash ) | | mempool . exists ( gtxid ) ;
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}
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bool static AlreadyHaveBlock ( const uint256 & block_hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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return LookupBlockIndex ( block_hash ) ! = nullptr ;
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}
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void RelayTransaction ( const uint256 & txid , const uint256 & wtxid , const CConnman & connman )
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{
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connman . ForEachNode ( [ & txid , & wtxid ] ( CNode * pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( : : cs_main ) {
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ;
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CNodeState * state = State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( state = = nullptr ) return ;
if ( state - > m_wtxid_relay ) {
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pnode - > PushTxInventory ( wtxid ) ;
} else {
pnode - > PushTxInventory ( txid ) ;
}
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} ) ;
}
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static void RelayAddress ( const CAddress & addr , bool fReachable , const CConnman & connman )
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{
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if ( ! fReachable & & ! addr . IsRelayable ( ) ) return ;
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// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
// Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours
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// at a time so the m_addr_knowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
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uint64_t hashAddr = addr . GetHash ( ) ;
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const CSipHasher hasher = connman . GetDeterministicRandomizer ( RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY ) . Write ( hashAddr < < 32 ) . Write ( ( GetTime ( ) + hashAddr ) / ( 24 * 60 * 60 ) ) ;
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FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
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// Relay reachable addresses to 2 peers. Unreachable addresses are relayed randomly to 1 or 2 peers.
unsigned int nRelayNodes = ( fReachable | | ( hasher . Finalize ( ) & 1 ) ) ? 2 : 1 ;
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std : : array < std : : pair < uint64_t , CNode * > , 2 > best { { { 0 , nullptr } , { 0 , nullptr } } } ;
assert ( nRelayNodes < = best . size ( ) ) ;
auto sortfunc = [ & best , & hasher , nRelayNodes ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
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if ( pnode - > RelayAddrsWithConn ( ) ) {
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uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher ( hasher ) . Write ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) . Finalize ( ) ;
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for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < nRelayNodes ; i + + ) {
if ( hashKey > best [ i ] . first ) {
std : : copy ( best . begin ( ) + i , best . begin ( ) + nRelayNodes - 1 , best . begin ( ) + i + 1 ) ;
best [ i ] = std : : make_pair ( hashKey , pnode ) ;
break ;
}
}
}
} ;
auto pushfunc = [ & addr , & best , nRelayNodes , & insecure_rand ] {
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < nRelayNodes & & best [ i ] . first ! = 0 ; i + + ) {
best [ i ] . second - > PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
}
} ;
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connman . ForEachNodeThen ( std : : move ( sortfunc ) , std : : move ( pushfunc ) ) ;
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}
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void static ProcessGetBlockData ( CNode & pfrom , const CChainParams & chainparams , const CInv & inv , CConnman & connman )
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{
bool send = false ;
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > a_recent_block ;
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > a_recent_compact_block ;
bool fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock ;
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const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams = chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
a_recent_block = most_recent_block ;
a_recent_compact_block = most_recent_compact_block ;
fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock = fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock ;
}
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bool need_activate_chain = false ;
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{
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( inv . hash ) ;
if ( pindex ) {
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if ( pindex - > HaveTxsDownloaded ( ) & & ! pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS ) & &
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pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) ) {
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// If we have the block and all of its parents, but have not yet validated it,
// we might be in the middle of connecting it (ie in the unlock of cs_main
// before ActivateBestChain but after AcceptBlock).
// In this case, we need to run ActivateBestChain prior to checking the relay
// conditions below.
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need_activate_chain = true ;
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}
}
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} // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain
if ( need_activate_chain ) {
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BlockValidationState state ;
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if ( ! ActivateBestChain ( state , chainparams , a_recent_block ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " failed to activate chain (%s) \n " , state . ToString ( ) ) ;
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}
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}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( inv . hash ) ;
if ( pindex ) {
send = BlockRequestAllowed ( pindex , consensusParams ) ;
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if ( ! send ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block that isn't in the main chain \n " , __func__ , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
}
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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// disconnect node in case we have reached the outbound limit for serving historical blocks
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if ( send & &
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connman . OutboundTargetReached ( true ) & &
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( ( ( pindexBestHeader ! = nullptr ) & & ( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) - pindex - > GetBlockTime ( ) > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE ) ) | | inv . IsMsgFilteredBlk ( ) ) & &
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! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_DOWNLOAD ) // nodes with the download permission may exceed target
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) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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//disconnect node
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pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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send = false ;
}
// Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold
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if ( send & & ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) & & (
( ( ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) = = NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) & & ( ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_NETWORK ) ! = NODE_NETWORK ) & & ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nHeight - pindex - > nHeight > ( int ) NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */ ) )
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) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold from peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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//disconnect node and prevent it from stalling (would otherwise wait for the missing block)
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pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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send = false ;
}
// Pruned nodes may have deleted the block, so check whether
// it's available before trying to send.
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if ( send & & ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) )
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{
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > pblock ;
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if ( a_recent_block & & a_recent_block - > GetHash ( ) = = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
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pblock = a_recent_block ;
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} else if ( inv . IsMsgWitnessBlk ( ) ) {
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// Fast-path: in this case it is possible to serve the block directly from disk,
// as the network format matches the format on disk
std : : vector < uint8_t > block_data ;
if ( ! ReadRawBlockFromDisk ( block_data , pindex , chainparams . MessageStart ( ) ) ) {
assert ( ! " cannot load block from disk " ) ;
}
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : BLOCK , MakeSpan ( block_data ) ) ) ;
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// Don't set pblock as we've sent the block
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} else {
// Send block from disk
std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblockRead = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
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if ( ! ReadBlockFromDisk ( * pblockRead , pindex , consensusParams ) )
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assert ( ! " cannot load block from disk " ) ;
pblock = pblockRead ;
}
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if ( pblock ) {
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if ( inv . IsMsgBlk ( ) ) {
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS , NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
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} else if ( inv . IsMsgWitnessBlk ( ) ) {
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
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} else if ( inv . IsMsgFilteredBlk ( ) ) {
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bool sendMerkleBlock = false ;
CMerkleBlock merkleBlock ;
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if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter ) {
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sendMerkleBlock = true ;
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merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock ( * pblock , * pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter ) ;
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}
}
if ( sendMerkleBlock ) {
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : MERKLEBLOCK , merkleBlock ) ) ;
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// CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see
// This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here -
// they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block.
// Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here,
// however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs
typedef std : : pair < unsigned int , uint256 > PairType ;
for ( PairType & pair : merkleBlock . vMatchedTxn )
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS , NetMsgType : : TX , * pblock - > vtx [ pair . first ] ) ) ;
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}
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// else
// no response
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} else if ( inv . IsMsgCmpctBlk ( ) ) {
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// If a peer is asking for old blocks, we're almost guaranteed
// they won't have a useful mempool to match against a compact block,
// and we don't feel like constructing the object for them, so
// instead we respond with the full, non-compact block.
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bool fPeerWantsWitness = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ;
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int nSendFlags = fPeerWantsWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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if ( CanDirectFetch ( consensusParams ) & & pindex - > nHeight > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH ) {
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if ( ( fPeerWantsWitness | | ! fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock ) & & a_recent_compact_block & & a_recent_compact_block - > header . GetHash ( ) = = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * a_recent_compact_block ) ) ;
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} else {
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( * pblock , fPeerWantsWitness ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
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}
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} else {
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
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}
}
}
// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
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if ( inv . hash = = pfrom . hashContinue )
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{
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// Send immediately. This must send even if redundant,
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// and we want it right after the last block so they don't
// wait for other stuff first.
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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vInv . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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pfrom . hashContinue . SetNull ( ) ;
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}
}
}
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//! Determine whether or not a peer can request a transaction, and return it (or nullptr if not found or not allowed).
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static CTransactionRef FindTxForGetData ( const CTxMemPool & mempool , const CNode & peer , const GenTxid & gtxid , const std : : chrono : : seconds mempool_req , const std : : chrono : : seconds now ) LOCKS_EXCLUDED ( cs_main )
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{
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auto txinfo = mempool . info ( gtxid ) ;
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if ( txinfo . tx ) {
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// If a TX could have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request,
// or is older than UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY, permit the request
// unconditionally.
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if ( ( mempool_req . count ( ) & & txinfo . m_time < = mempool_req ) | | txinfo . m_time < = now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY ) {
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return std : : move ( txinfo . tx ) ;
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}
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}
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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// Otherwise, the transaction must have been announced recently.
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if ( State ( peer . GetId ( ) ) - > m_recently_announced_invs . contains ( gtxid . GetHash ( ) ) ) {
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// If it was, it can be relayed from either the mempool...
if ( txinfo . tx ) return std : : move ( txinfo . tx ) ;
// ... or the relay pool.
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auto mi = mapRelay . find ( gtxid . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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if ( mi ! = mapRelay . end ( ) ) return mi - > second ;
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}
}
return { } ;
}
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void static ProcessGetData ( CNode & pfrom , Peer & peer , const CChainParams & chainparams , CConnman & connman , CTxMemPool & mempool , const std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( ! cs_main , peer . m_getdata_requests_mutex )
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{
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AssertLockNotHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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std : : deque < CInv > : : iterator it = peer . m_getdata_requests . begin ( ) ;
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std : : vector < CInv > vNotFound ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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const std : : chrono : : seconds now = GetTime < std : : chrono : : seconds > ( ) ;
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// Get last mempool request time
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const std : : chrono : : seconds mempool_req = pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ? pfrom . m_tx_relay - > m_last_mempool_req . load ( )
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: std : : chrono : : seconds : : min ( ) ;
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// Process as many TX items from the front of the getdata queue as
// possible, since they're common and it's efficient to batch process
// them.
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while ( it ! = peer . m_getdata_requests . end ( ) & & it - > IsGenTxMsg ( ) ) {
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if ( interruptMsgProc ) return ;
// The send buffer provides backpressure. If there's no space in
// the buffer, pause processing until the next call.
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if ( pfrom . fPauseSend ) break ;
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const CInv & inv = * it + + ;
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if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay = = nullptr ) {
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// Ignore GETDATA requests for transactions from blocks-only peers.
continue ;
}
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CTransactionRef tx = FindTxForGetData ( mempool , pfrom , ToGenTxid ( inv ) , mempool_req , now ) ;
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if ( tx ) {
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// WTX and WITNESS_TX imply we serialize with witness
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int nSendFlags = ( inv . IsMsgTx ( ) ? SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS : 0 ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : TX , * tx ) ) ;
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mempool . RemoveUnbroadcastTx ( tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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// As we're going to send tx, make sure its unconfirmed parents are made requestable.
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std : : vector < uint256 > parent_ids_to_add ;
{
LOCK ( mempool . cs ) ;
auto txiter = mempool . GetIter ( tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
if ( txiter ) {
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const CTxMemPoolEntry : : Parents & parents = ( * txiter ) - > GetMemPoolParentsConst ( ) ;
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parent_ids_to_add . reserve ( parents . size ( ) ) ;
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for ( const CTxMemPoolEntry & parent : parents ) {
if ( parent . GetTime ( ) > now - UNCONDITIONAL_RELAY_DELAY ) {
parent_ids_to_add . push_back ( parent . GetTx ( ) . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
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}
}
}
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for ( const uint256 & parent_txid : parent_ids_to_add ) {
// Relaying a transaction with a recent but unconfirmed parent.
if ( WITH_LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_tx_inventory , return ! pfrom . m_tx_relay - > filterInventoryKnown . contains ( parent_txid ) ) ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > m_recently_announced_invs . insert ( parent_txid ) ;
}
}
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} else {
vNotFound . push_back ( inv ) ;
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}
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}
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// Only process one BLOCK item per call, since they're uncommon and can be
// expensive to process.
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if ( it ! = peer . m_getdata_requests . end ( ) & & ! pfrom . fPauseSend ) {
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const CInv & inv = * it + + ;
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if ( inv . IsGenBlkMsg ( ) ) {
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ProcessGetBlockData ( pfrom , chainparams , inv , connman ) ;
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}
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// else: If the first item on the queue is an unknown type, we erase it
// and continue processing the queue on the next call.
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}
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peer . m_getdata_requests . erase ( peer . m_getdata_requests . begin ( ) , it ) ;
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if ( ! vNotFound . empty ( ) ) {
// Let the peer know that we didn't find what it asked for, so it doesn't
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// have to wait around forever.
// SPV clients care about this message: it's needed when they are
// recursively walking the dependencies of relevant unconfirmed
// transactions. SPV clients want to do that because they want to know
// about (and store and rebroadcast and risk analyze) the dependencies
// of transactions relevant to them, without having to download the
// entire memory pool.
// Also, other nodes can use these messages to automatically request a
// transaction from some other peer that annnounced it, and stop
// waiting for us to respond.
// In normal operation, we often send NOTFOUND messages for parents of
// transactions that we relay; if a peer is missing a parent, they may
// assume we have them and request the parents from us.
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connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : NOTFOUND , vNotFound ) ) ;
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}
}
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static uint32_t GetFetchFlags ( const CNode & pfrom ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = 0 ;
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if ( ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) & & State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness ) {
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nFetchFlags | = MSG_WITNESS_FLAG ;
}
return nFetchFlags ;
}
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void PeerManager : : SendBlockTransactions ( CNode & pfrom , const CBlock & block , const BlockTransactionsRequest & req ) {
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BlockTransactions resp ( req ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < req . indexes . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
if ( req . indexes [ i ] > = block . vtx . size ( ) ) {
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 100 , " getblocktxn with out-of-bounds tx indices " ) ;
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return ;
}
resp . txn [ i ] = block . vtx [ req . indexes [ i ] ] ;
}
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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int nSendFlags = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN , resp ) ) ;
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}
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void PeerManager : : ProcessHeadersMessage ( CNode & pfrom , const std : : vector < CBlockHeader > & headers , bool via_compact_block )
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{
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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size_t nCount = headers . size ( ) ;
if ( nCount = = 0 ) {
// Nothing interesting. Stop asking this peers for more headers.
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return ;
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}
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bool received_new_header = false ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindexLast = nullptr ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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// If this looks like it could be a block announcement (nCount <
// MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE), use special logic for handling headers that
// don't connect:
// - Send a getheaders message in response to try to connect the chain.
// - The peer can send up to MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS in a row that
// don't connect before giving DoS points
// - Once a headers message is received that is valid and does connect,
// nUnconnectingHeaders gets reset back to 0.
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if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( headers [ 0 ] . hashPrevBlock ) & & nCount < MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) {
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nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders + + ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received header %s: missing prev block %s, sending getheaders (%d) to end (peer=%d, nUnconnectingHeaders=%d) \n " ,
headers [ 0 ] . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
headers [ 0 ] . hashPrevBlock . ToString ( ) ,
pindexBestHeader - > nHeight ,
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pfrom . GetId ( ) , nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders ) ;
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// Set hashLastUnknownBlock for this peer, so that if we
// eventually get the headers - even from a different peer -
// we can use this peer to download.
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UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , headers . back ( ) . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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if ( nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders % MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS = = 0 ) {
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " %d non-connecting headers " , nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders ) ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
uint256 hashLastBlock ;
for ( const CBlockHeader & header : headers ) {
if ( ! hashLastBlock . IsNull ( ) & & header . hashPrevBlock ! = hashLastBlock ) {
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , " non-continuous headers sequence " ) ;
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return ;
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}
hashLastBlock = header . GetHash ( ) ;
}
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// If we don't have the last header, then they'll have given us
// something new (if these headers are valid).
2018-01-11 21:23:09 -03:00
if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( hashLastBlock ) ) {
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received_new_header = true ;
}
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}
2019-10-24 12:35:42 -03:00
BlockValidationState state ;
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if ( ! m_chainman . ProcessNewBlockHeaders ( headers , state , m_chainparams , & pindexLast ) ) {
2018-04-16 13:52:03 -03:00
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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MaybePunishNodeForBlock ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , state , via_compact_block , " invalid header received " ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
}
}
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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if ( nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders > 0 ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d: resetting nUnconnectingHeaders (%d -> 0) \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) , nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders ) ;
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
}
nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders = 0 ;
assert ( pindexLast ) ;
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UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
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// From here, pindexBestKnownBlock should be guaranteed to be non-null,
// because it is set in UpdateBlockAvailability. Some nullptr checks
// are still present, however, as belt-and-suspenders.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( received_new_header & & pindexLast - > nChainWork > : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
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nodestate - > m_last_block_announcement = GetTime ( ) ;
}
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if ( nCount = = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
// Headers message had its maximum size; the peer may have more headers.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
// TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of ::ChainActive().Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
// from there instead.
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d) \n " , pindexLast - > nHeight , pfrom . GetId ( ) , pfrom . nStartingHeight ) ;
2020-08-24 10:51:39 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexLast ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
}
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bool fCanDirectFetch = CanDirectFetch ( m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
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// If this set of headers is valid and ends in a block with at least as
// much work as our tip, download as much as possible.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( fCanDirectFetch & & pindexLast - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) & & : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork < = pindexLast - > nChainWork ) {
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToFetch ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexWalk = pindexLast ;
// Calculate all the blocks we'd need to switch to pindexLast, up to a limit.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
while ( pindexWalk & & ! : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindexWalk ) & & vToFetch . size ( ) < = MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
if ( ! ( pindexWalk - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) & &
! mapBlocksInFlight . count ( pindexWalk - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) & &
2020-08-24 10:51:39 -04:00
( ! IsWitnessEnabled ( pindexWalk - > pprev , m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) | | State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness ) ) {
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
// We don't have this block, and it's not yet in flight.
vToFetch . push_back ( pindexWalk ) ;
}
pindexWalk = pindexWalk - > pprev ;
}
// If pindexWalk still isn't on our main chain, we're looking at a
// very large reorg at a time we think we're close to caught up to
// the main chain -- this shouldn't really happen. Bail out on the
// direct fetch and rely on parallel download instead.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( ! : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindexWalk ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Large reorg, won't direct fetch to %s (%d) \n " ,
pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
pindexLast - > nHeight ) ;
} else {
std : : vector < CInv > vGetData ;
// Download as much as possible, from earliest to latest.
for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : reverse_iterate ( vToFetch ) ) {
if ( nodestate - > nBlocksInFlight > = MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
// Can't download any more from this peer
break ;
}
uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) ;
vGetData . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
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MarkBlockAsInFlight ( m_mempool , pfrom . GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting block %s from peer=%d \n " ,
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pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
}
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > 1 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Downloading blocks toward %s (%d) via headers direct fetch \n " ,
pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pindexLast - > nHeight ) ;
}
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > 0 ) {
if ( nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion & & vGetData . size ( ) = = 1 & & mapBlocksInFlight . size ( ) = = 1 & & pindexLast - > pprev - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN ) ) {
// In any case, we want to download using a compact block, not a regular one
vGetData [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK , vGetData [ 0 ] . hash ) ;
}
2020-08-24 10:51:39 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
2017-10-26 15:46:17 -03:00
}
}
}
// If we're in IBD, we want outbound peers that will serve us a useful
// chain. Disconnect peers that are on chains with insufficient work.
2019-03-27 13:21:50 -03:00
if ( : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & nCount ! = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
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// When nCount < MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS, we know we have no more
// headers to fetch from this peer.
if ( nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork ) {
// This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help
2020-07-09 11:59:54 -04:00
// us sync -- disconnect if it is an outbound disconnection
// candidate.
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// Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
// ::ChainActive().Tip()) because we won't start block download
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// until we have a headers chain that has at least
// nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// as an anti-DoS measure.
2020-07-21 19:28:47 -04:00
if ( pfrom . IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn ( ) ) {
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LogPrintf ( " Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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}
}
}
2020-09-04 09:34:26 -04:00
// If this is an outbound full-relay peer, check to see if we should protect
// it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
// Note that outbound block-relay peers are excluded from this protection, and
// thus always subject to eviction under the bad/lagging chain logic.
// See ChainSyncTimeoutState.
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if ( ! pfrom . fDisconnect & & pfrom . IsFullOutboundConn ( ) & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ) {
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if ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork & & ! nodestate - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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nodestate - > m_chain_sync . m_protect = true ;
+ + g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect ;
}
}
}
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return ;
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}
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/**
* Reconsider orphan transactions after a parent has been accepted to the mempool .
*
* @ param [ in / out ] orphan_work_set The set of orphan transactions to reconsider . Generally only one
* orphan will be reconsidered on each call of this function . This set
* may be added to if accepting an orphan causes its children to be
* reconsidered .
*/
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void PeerManager : : ProcessOrphanTx ( std : : set < uint256 > & orphan_work_set )
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{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
AssertLockHeld ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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while ( ! orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) {
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const uint256 orphanHash = * orphan_work_set . begin ( ) ;
orphan_work_set . erase ( orphan_work_set . begin ( ) ) ;
auto orphan_it = mapOrphanTransactions . find ( orphanHash ) ;
if ( orphan_it = = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) ) continue ;
const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it - > second . tx ;
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TxValidationState state ;
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std : : list < CTransactionRef > removed_txn ;
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if ( AcceptToMemoryPool ( m_mempool , state , porphanTx , & removed_txn , false /* bypass_limits */ ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " accepted orphan tx %s \n " , orphanHash . ToString ( ) ) ;
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RelayTransaction ( orphanHash , porphanTx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) , m_connman ) ;
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for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < porphanTx - > vout . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
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auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( COutPoint ( orphanHash , i ) ) ;
if ( it_by_prev ! = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) {
for ( const auto & elem : it_by_prev - > second ) {
orphan_work_set . insert ( elem - > first ) ;
}
}
}
EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
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for ( const CTransactionRef & removedTx : removed_txn ) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( removedTx ) ;
}
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break ;
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} else if ( state . GetResult ( ) ! = TxValidationResult : : TX_MISSING_INPUTS ) {
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " invalid orphan tx %s from peer=%d. %s \n " ,
orphanHash . ToString ( ) ,
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orphan_it - > second . fromPeer ,
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state . ToString ( ) ) ;
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// Maybe punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
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MaybePunishNodeForTx ( orphan_it - > second . fromPeer , state ) ;
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}
// Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
// Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " removed orphan tx %s \n " , orphanHash . ToString ( ) ) ;
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if ( state . GetResult ( ) ! = TxValidationResult : : TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED ) {
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// We can add the wtxid of this transaction to our reject filter.
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// Do not add txids of witness transactions or witness-stripped
// transactions to the filter, as they can have been malleated;
// adding such txids to the reject filter would potentially
// interfere with relay of valid transactions from peers that
// do not support wtxid-based relay. See
// https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
// We can remove this restriction (and always add wtxids to
// the filter even for witness stripped transactions) once
// wtxid-based relay is broadly deployed.
// See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
// for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
// if we start doing this too early.
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assert ( recentRejects ) ;
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recentRejects - > insert ( porphanTx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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// If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
// then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
// failure, since this check depends only on the txid
// (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
// Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
// processing of this transaction in the event that child
// transactions are later received (resulting in
// parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
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if ( state . GetResult ( ) = = TxValidationResult : : TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD & & porphanTx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ! = porphanTx - > GetHash ( ) ) {
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// We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to
// avoid wasting entries in the rolling bloom filter.
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recentRejects - > insert ( porphanTx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
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}
EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
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break ;
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}
}
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m_mempool . check ( & : : ChainstateActive ( ) . CoinsTip ( ) ) ;
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}
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/**
* Validation logic for compact filters request handling .
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request .
*
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* @ param [ in ] peer The peer that we received the request from
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* @ param [ in ] chain_params Chain parameters
* @ param [ in ] filter_type The filter type the request is for . Must be basic filters .
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* @ param [ in ] start_height The start height for the request
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* @ param [ in ] stop_hash The stop_hash for the request
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* @ param [ in ] max_height_diff The maximum number of items permitted to request , as specified in BIP 157
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* @ param [ out ] stop_index The CBlockIndex for the stop_hash block , if the request can be serviced .
* @ param [ out ] filter_index The filter index , if the request can be serviced .
* @ return True if the request can be serviced .
*/
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static bool PrepareBlockFilterRequest ( CNode & peer , const CChainParams & chain_params ,
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BlockFilterType filter_type , uint32_t start_height ,
const uint256 & stop_hash , uint32_t max_height_diff ,
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const CBlockIndex * & stop_index ,
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BlockFilterIndex * & filter_index )
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{
const bool supported_filter_type =
( filter_type = = BlockFilterType : : BASIC & &
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( peer . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_COMPACT_FILTERS ) ) ;
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if ( ! supported_filter_type ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer %d requested unsupported block filter type: %d \n " ,
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peer . GetId ( ) , static_cast < uint8_t > ( filter_type ) ) ;
peer . fDisconnect = true ;
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return false ;
}
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
stop_index = LookupBlockIndex ( stop_hash ) ;
// Check that the stop block exists and the peer would be allowed to fetch it.
if ( ! stop_index | | ! BlockRequestAllowed ( stop_index , chain_params . GetConsensus ( ) ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer %d requested invalid block hash: %s \n " ,
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peer . GetId ( ) , stop_hash . ToString ( ) ) ;
peer . fDisconnect = true ;
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return false ;
}
}
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uint32_t stop_height = stop_index - > nHeight ;
if ( start_height > stop_height ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer %d sent invalid getcfilters/getcfheaders with " /* Continued */
" start height %d and stop height %d \n " ,
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peer . GetId ( ) , start_height , stop_height ) ;
peer . fDisconnect = true ;
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return false ;
}
if ( stop_height - start_height > = max_height_diff ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer %d requested too many cfilters/cfheaders: %d / %d \n " ,
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peer . GetId ( ) , stop_height - start_height + 1 , max_height_diff ) ;
peer . fDisconnect = true ;
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return false ;
}
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filter_index = GetBlockFilterIndex ( filter_type ) ;
if ( ! filter_index ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Filter index for supported type %s not found \n " , BlockFilterTypeName ( filter_type ) ) ;
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
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/**
* Handle a cfilters request .
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request .
*
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* @ param [ in ] peer The peer that we received the request from
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* @ param [ in ] vRecv The raw message received
* @ param [ in ] chain_params Chain parameters
* @ param [ in ] connman Pointer to the connection manager
*/
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static void ProcessGetCFilters ( CNode & peer , CDataStream & vRecv , const CChainParams & chain_params ,
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CConnman & connman )
{
uint8_t filter_type_ser ;
uint32_t start_height ;
uint256 stop_hash ;
vRecv > > filter_type_ser > > start_height > > stop_hash ;
const BlockFilterType filter_type = static_cast < BlockFilterType > ( filter_type_ser ) ;
const CBlockIndex * stop_index ;
BlockFilterIndex * filter_index ;
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if ( ! PrepareBlockFilterRequest ( peer , chain_params , filter_type , start_height , stop_hash ,
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MAX_GETCFILTERS_SIZE , stop_index , filter_index ) ) {
return ;
}
std : : vector < BlockFilter > filters ;
if ( ! filter_index - > LookupFilterRange ( start_height , stop_index , filters ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Failed to find block filter in index: filter_type=%s, start_height=%d, stop_hash=%s \n " ,
BlockFilterTypeName ( filter_type ) , start_height , stop_hash . ToString ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
for ( const auto & filter : filters ) {
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CSerializedNetMsg msg = CNetMsgMaker ( peer . GetCommonVersion ( ) )
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. Make ( NetMsgType : : CFILTER , filter ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & peer , std : : move ( msg ) ) ;
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}
}
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/**
* Handle a cfheaders request .
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request .
*
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* @ param [ in ] peer The peer that we received the request from
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* @ param [ in ] vRecv The raw message received
* @ param [ in ] chain_params Chain parameters
* @ param [ in ] connman Pointer to the connection manager
*/
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static void ProcessGetCFHeaders ( CNode & peer , CDataStream & vRecv , const CChainParams & chain_params ,
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CConnman & connman )
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{
uint8_t filter_type_ser ;
uint32_t start_height ;
uint256 stop_hash ;
vRecv > > filter_type_ser > > start_height > > stop_hash ;
const BlockFilterType filter_type = static_cast < BlockFilterType > ( filter_type_ser ) ;
const CBlockIndex * stop_index ;
BlockFilterIndex * filter_index ;
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if ( ! PrepareBlockFilterRequest ( peer , chain_params , filter_type , start_height , stop_hash ,
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MAX_GETCFHEADERS_SIZE , stop_index , filter_index ) ) {
return ;
}
uint256 prev_header ;
if ( start_height > 0 ) {
const CBlockIndex * const prev_block =
stop_index - > GetAncestor ( static_cast < int > ( start_height - 1 ) ) ;
if ( ! filter_index - > LookupFilterHeader ( prev_block , prev_header ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Failed to find block filter header in index: filter_type=%s, block_hash=%s \n " ,
BlockFilterTypeName ( filter_type ) , prev_block - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
}
std : : vector < uint256 > filter_hashes ;
if ( ! filter_index - > LookupFilterHashRange ( start_height , stop_index , filter_hashes ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Failed to find block filter hashes in index: filter_type=%s, start_height=%d, stop_hash=%s \n " ,
BlockFilterTypeName ( filter_type ) , start_height , stop_hash . ToString ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
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CSerializedNetMsg msg = CNetMsgMaker ( peer . GetCommonVersion ( ) )
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. Make ( NetMsgType : : CFHEADERS ,
filter_type_ser ,
stop_index - > GetBlockHash ( ) ,
prev_header ,
filter_hashes ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & peer , std : : move ( msg ) ) ;
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}
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/**
* Handle a getcfcheckpt request .
*
* May disconnect from the peer in the case of a bad request .
*
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* @ param [ in ] peer The peer that we received the request from
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* @ param [ in ] vRecv The raw message received
* @ param [ in ] chain_params Chain parameters
* @ param [ in ] connman Pointer to the connection manager
*/
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static void ProcessGetCFCheckPt ( CNode & peer , CDataStream & vRecv , const CChainParams & chain_params ,
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CConnman & connman )
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{
uint8_t filter_type_ser ;
uint256 stop_hash ;
vRecv > > filter_type_ser > > stop_hash ;
const BlockFilterType filter_type = static_cast < BlockFilterType > ( filter_type_ser ) ;
const CBlockIndex * stop_index ;
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BlockFilterIndex * filter_index ;
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if ( ! PrepareBlockFilterRequest ( peer , chain_params , filter_type , /*start_height=*/ 0 , stop_hash ,
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/*max_height_diff=*/ std : : numeric_limits < uint32_t > : : max ( ) ,
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stop_index , filter_index ) ) {
return ;
}
std : : vector < uint256 > headers ( stop_index - > nHeight / CFCHECKPT_INTERVAL ) ;
// Populate headers.
const CBlockIndex * block_index = stop_index ;
for ( int i = headers . size ( ) - 1 ; i > = 0 ; i - - ) {
int height = ( i + 1 ) * CFCHECKPT_INTERVAL ;
block_index = block_index - > GetAncestor ( height ) ;
if ( ! filter_index - > LookupFilterHeader ( block_index , headers [ i ] ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Failed to find block filter header in index: filter_type=%s, block_hash=%s \n " ,
BlockFilterTypeName ( filter_type ) , block_index - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
}
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CSerializedNetMsg msg = CNetMsgMaker ( peer . GetCommonVersion ( ) )
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. Make ( NetMsgType : : CFCHECKPT ,
filter_type_ser ,
stop_index - > GetBlockHash ( ) ,
headers ) ;
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connman . PushMessage ( & peer , std : : move ( msg ) ) ;
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}
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void PeerManager : : ProcessMessage ( CNode & pfrom , const std : : string & msg_type , CDataStream & vRecv ,
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const std : : chrono : : microseconds time_received ,
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const std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( msg_type ) , vRecv . size ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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if ( gArgs . IsArgSet ( " -dropmessagestest " ) & & GetRand ( gArgs . GetArg ( " -dropmessagestest " , 0 ) ) = = 0 )
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{
LogPrintf ( " dropmessagestest DROPPING RECV MESSAGE \n " ) ;
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return ;
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}
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PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( peer = = nullptr ) return ;
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : VERSION ) {
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// Each connection can only send one version message
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if ( pfrom . nVersion ! = 0 )
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{
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 1 , " redundant version message " ) ;
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return ;
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}
int64_t nTime ;
CAddress addrMe ;
CAddress addrFrom ;
uint64_t nNonce = 1 ;
uint64_t nServiceInt ;
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ServiceFlags nServices ;
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int nVersion ;
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std : : string cleanSubVer ;
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int nStartingHeight = - 1 ;
bool fRelay = true ;
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vRecv > > nVersion > > nServiceInt > > nTime > > addrMe ;
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nServices = ServiceFlags ( nServiceInt ) ;
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if ( ! pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) )
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{
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m_connman . SetServices ( pfrom . addr , nServices ) ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . ExpectServicesFromConn ( ) & & ! HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( nServices ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d does not offer the expected services (%08x offered, %08x expected); disconnecting \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) , nServices , GetDesirableServiceFlags ( nServices ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( nVersion < MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION ) {
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// disconnect from peers older than this proto version
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) , nVersion ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
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}
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) )
vRecv > > addrFrom > > nNonce ;
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) ) {
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std : : string strSubVer ;
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vRecv > > LIMITED_STRING ( strSubVer , MAX_SUBVERSION_LENGTH ) ;
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cleanSubVer = SanitizeString ( strSubVer ) ;
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}
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) ) {
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vRecv > > nStartingHeight ;
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}
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if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) )
vRecv > > fRelay ;
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// Disconnect if we connected to ourself
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if ( pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) & & ! m_connman . CheckIncomingNonce ( nNonce ) )
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{
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LogPrintf ( " connected to self at %s, disconnecting \n " , pfrom . addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) & & addrMe . IsRoutable ( ) )
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{
SeenLocal ( addrMe ) ;
}
// Be shy and don't send version until we hear
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if ( pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) )
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PushNodeVersion ( pfrom , m_connman , GetAdjustedTime ( ) ) ;
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// Change version
const int greatest_common_version = std : : min ( nVersion , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
pfrom . SetCommonVersion ( greatest_common_version ) ;
pfrom . nVersion = nVersion ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msg_maker ( greatest_common_version ) ;
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if ( greatest_common_version > = WTXID_RELAY_VERSION ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msg_maker . Make ( NetMsgType : : WTXIDRELAY ) ) ;
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}
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msg_maker . Make ( NetMsgType : : VERACK ) ) ;
// Signal ADDRv2 support (BIP155).
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msg_maker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDADDRV2 ) ) ;
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pfrom . nServices = nServices ;
pfrom . SetAddrLocal ( addrMe ) ;
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{
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LOCK ( pfrom . cs_SubVer ) ;
pfrom . cleanSubVer = cleanSubVer ;
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}
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pfrom . nStartingHeight = nStartingHeight ;
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// set nodes not relaying blocks and tx and not serving (parts) of the historical blockchain as "clients"
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pfrom . fClient = ( ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK ) & & ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) ) ;
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// set nodes not capable of serving the complete blockchain history as "limited nodes"
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pfrom . m_limited_node = ( ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK ) & & ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) ) ;
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if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > fRelayTxes = fRelay ; // set to true after we get the first filter* message
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}
if ( ( nServices & NODE_WITNESS ) )
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness = true ;
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}
// Potentially mark this peer as a preferred download peer.
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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UpdatePreferredDownload ( pfrom , State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ) ;
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}
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if ( ! pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) & & ! pfrom . IsBlockOnlyConn ( ) ) {
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// For outbound peers, we try to relay our address (so that other
// nodes can try to find us more quickly, as we have no guarantee
// that an outbound peer is even aware of how to reach us) and do a
// one-time address fetch (to help populate/update our addrman). If
// we're starting up for the first time, our addrman may be pretty
// empty and no one will know who we are, so these mechanisms are
// important to help us connect to the network.
//
// We also update the addrman to record connection success for
// these peers (which include OUTBOUND_FULL_RELAY and FEELER
// connections) so that addrman will have an up-to-date notion of
// which peers are online and available.
//
// We skip these operations for BLOCK_RELAY peers to avoid
// potentially leaking information about our BLOCK_RELAY
// connections via the addrman or address relay.
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if ( fListen & & ! : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) )
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{
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CAddress addr = GetLocalAddress ( & pfrom . addr , pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) ) ;
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FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
if ( addr . IsRoutable ( ) )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " ProcessMessages: advertising address %s \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
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pfrom . PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
} else if ( IsPeerAddrLocalGood ( & pfrom ) ) {
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addr . SetIP ( addrMe ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " ProcessMessages: advertising address %s \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
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pfrom . PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
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}
}
// Get recent addresses
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( greatest_common_version ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETADDR ) ) ;
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pfrom . fGetAddr = true ;
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// Moves address from New to Tried table in Addrman, resolves
// tried-table collisions, etc.
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m_connman . MarkAddressGood ( pfrom . addr ) ;
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}
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std : : string remoteAddr ;
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if ( fLogIPs )
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remoteAddr = " , peeraddr= " + pfrom . addr . ToString ( ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " receive version message: %s: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d%s \n " ,
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cleanSubVer , pfrom . nVersion ,
pfrom . nStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ,
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remoteAddr ) ;
int64_t nTimeOffset = nTime - GetTime ( ) ;
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pfrom . nTimeOffset = nTimeOffset ;
AddTimeData ( pfrom . addr , nTimeOffset ) ;
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// If the peer is old enough to have the old alert system, send it the final alert.
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if ( greatest_common_version < = 70012 ) {
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CDataStream finalAlert ( ParseHex ( " 60010000000000000000000000ffffff7f00000000ffffff7ffeffff7f01ffffff7f00000000ffffff7f00ffffff7f002f555247454e543a20416c657274206b657920636f6d70726f6d697365642c2075706772616465207265717569726564004630440220653febd6410f470f6bae11cad19c48413becb1ac2c17f908fd0fd53bdc3abd5202206d0e9c96fe88d4a0f01ed9dedae2b6f9e00da94cad0fecaae66ecf689bf71b50 " ) , SER_NETWORK , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( greatest_common_version ) . Make ( " alert " , finalAlert ) ) ;
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}
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// Feeler connections exist only to verify if address is online.
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if ( pfrom . IsFeelerConn ( ) ) {
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pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . nVersion = = 0 ) {
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// Must have a version message before anything else
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 1 , " non-version message before version handshake " ) ;
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return ;
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}
// At this point, the outgoing message serialization version can't change.
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : VERACK ) {
if ( pfrom . fSuccessfullyConnected ) return ;
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if ( ! pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) ) {
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// Mark this node as currently connected, so we update its timestamp later.
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fCurrentlyConnected = true ;
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LogPrintf ( " New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s (%s) \n " ,
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pfrom . nVersion . load ( ) , pfrom . nStartingHeight ,
pfrom . GetId ( ) , ( fLogIPs ? strprintf ( " , peeraddr=%s " , pfrom . addr . ToString ( ) ) : " " ) ,
pfrom . m_tx_relay = = nullptr ? " block-relay " : " full-relay " ) ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) > = SENDHEADERS_VERSION ) {
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// Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even
// non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning
// nodes)
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDHEADERS ) ) ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) > = SHORT_IDS_BLOCKS_VERSION ) {
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// Tell our peer we are willing to provide version 1 or 2 cmpctblocks
// However, we do not request new block announcements using
// cmpctblock messages.
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because
// they may wish to request compact blocks from us
bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false ;
uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 2 ;
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if ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 1 ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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}
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pfrom . fSuccessfullyConnected = true ;
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return ;
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}
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// Feature negotiation of wtxidrelay should happen between VERSION and
// VERACK, to avoid relay problems from switching after a connection is up
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : WTXIDRELAY ) {
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if ( pfrom . fSuccessfullyConnected ) {
// Disconnect peers that send wtxidrelay message after VERACK; this
// must be negotiated between VERSION and VERACK.
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
return ;
}
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if ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) > = WTXID_RELAY_VERSION ) {
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
if ( ! State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > m_wtxid_relay ) {
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > m_wtxid_relay = true ;
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g_wtxid_relay_peers + + ;
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}
}
return ;
}
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if ( ! pfrom . fSuccessfullyConnected ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unsupported message \" %s \" prior to verack from peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( msg_type ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : ADDR | | msg_type = = NetMsgType : : ADDRV2 ) {
int stream_version = vRecv . GetVersion ( ) ;
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : ADDRV2 ) {
// Add ADDRV2_FORMAT to the version so that the CNetAddr and CAddress
// unserialize methods know that an address in v2 format is coming.
stream_version | = ADDRV2_FORMAT ;
}
OverrideStream < CDataStream > s ( & vRecv , vRecv . GetType ( ) , stream_version ) ;
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr ;
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s > > vAddr ;
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if ( ! pfrom . RelayAddrsWithConn ( ) ) {
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return ;
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}
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if ( vAddr . size ( ) > MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND )
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{
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " %s message size = %u " , msg_type , vAddr . size ( ) ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
// Store the new addresses
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddrOk ;
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int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
int64_t nSince = nNow - 10 * 60 ;
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for ( CAddress & addr : vAddr )
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{
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if ( interruptMsgProc )
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return ;
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2017-10-04 18:59:30 -03:00
// We only bother storing full nodes, though this may include
// things which we would not make an outbound connection to, in
// part because we may make feeler connections to them.
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if ( ! MayHaveUsefulAddressDB ( addr . nServices ) & & ! HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( addr . nServices ) )
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continue ;
if ( addr . nTime < = 100000000 | | addr . nTime > nNow + 10 * 60 )
addr . nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
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pfrom . AddAddressKnown ( addr ) ;
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if ( m_banman & & ( m_banman - > IsDiscouraged ( addr ) | | m_banman - > IsBanned ( addr ) ) ) {
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// Do not process banned/discouraged addresses beyond remembering we received them
continue ;
}
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bool fReachable = IsReachable ( addr ) ;
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if ( addr . nTime > nSince & & ! pfrom . fGetAddr & & vAddr . size ( ) < = 10 & & addr . IsRoutable ( ) )
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{
// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
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RelayAddress ( addr , fReachable , m_connman ) ;
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}
// Do not store addresses outside our network
if ( fReachable )
vAddrOk . push_back ( addr ) ;
}
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m_connman . AddNewAddresses ( vAddrOk , pfrom . addr , 2 * 60 * 60 ) ;
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if ( vAddr . size ( ) < 1000 )
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pfrom . fGetAddr = false ;
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if ( pfrom . IsAddrFetchConn ( ) )
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pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : SENDADDRV2 ) {
pfrom . m_wants_addrv2 = true ;
return ;
}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : SENDHEADERS ) {
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fPreferHeaders = true ;
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT ) {
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bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false ;
uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 0 ;
vRecv > > fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK > > nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ;
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if ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 1 | | ( ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) & & nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ) {
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// fProvidesHeaderAndIDs is used to "lock in" version of compact blocks we send (fWantsCmpctWitness)
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( ! State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ) {
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = true ;
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness = nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ;
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}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness = = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ) // ignore later version announces
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fPreferHeaderAndIDs = fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK ;
if ( ! State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
if ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS )
State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ;
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else
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State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 1 ) ;
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}
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
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}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : INV ) {
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std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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vRecv > > vInv ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) > MAX_INV_SZ )
{
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " inv message size = %u " , vInv . size ( ) ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
2019-03-09 14:55:06 -03:00
// We won't accept tx inv's if we're in blocks-only mode, or this is a
// block-relay-only peer
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
bool fBlocksOnly = ! g_relay_txes | | ( pfrom . m_tx_relay = = nullptr ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-07-09 11:59:54 -04:00
// Allow peers with relay permission to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode
if ( pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_RELAY ) ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
fBlocksOnly = false ;
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}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2019-06-12 15:19:02 -04:00
const auto current_time = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ;
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uint256 * best_block { nullptr } ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-08-08 08:36:26 -04:00
for ( CInv & inv : vInv ) {
2020-08-05 11:46:31 -04:00
if ( interruptMsgProc ) return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-07-22 20:19:43 -04:00
// Ignore INVs that don't match wtxidrelay setting.
// Note that orphan parent fetching always uses MSG_TX GETDATAs regardless of the wtxidrelay setting.
// This is fine as no INV messages are involved in that process.
2020-04-06 05:09:05 -04:00
if ( State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > m_wtxid_relay ) {
2020-07-26 06:12:36 -04:00
if ( inv . IsMsgTx ( ) ) continue ;
2020-04-06 05:09:05 -04:00
} else {
2020-07-26 06:12:36 -04:00
if ( inv . IsMsgWtx ( ) ) continue ;
2020-04-06 05:09:05 -04:00
}
2020-08-05 11:35:05 -04:00
if ( inv . IsMsgBlk ( ) ) {
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const bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHaveBlock ( inv . hash ) ;
2020-07-30 05:30:24 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " got inv: %s %s peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , fAlreadyHave ? " have " : " new " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , inv . hash ) ;
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if ( ! fAlreadyHave & & ! fImporting & & ! fReindex & & ! mapBlocksInFlight . count ( inv . hash ) ) {
2020-05-08 14:18:13 -04:00
// Headers-first is the primary method of announcement on
// the network. If a node fell back to sending blocks by inv,
// it's probably for a re-org. The final block hash
// provided should be the highest, so send a getheaders and
// then fetch the blocks we need to catch up.
best_block = & inv . hash ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-08-21 10:10:48 -04:00
} else if ( inv . IsGenTxMsg ( ) ) {
2020-08-08 08:36:26 -04:00
const GenTxid gtxid = ToGenTxid ( inv ) ;
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const bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHaveTx ( gtxid , m_mempool ) ;
2020-07-30 05:30:24 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " got inv: %s %s peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , fAlreadyHave ? " have " : " new " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-02-26 15:36:35 -03:00
pfrom . AddKnownTx ( inv . hash ) ;
2016-12-25 17:19:40 -03:00
if ( fBlocksOnly ) {
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol, disconnecting peer=%d \n " , inv . hash . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
} else if ( ! fAlreadyHave & & ! m_chainman . ActiveChainstate ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) ) {
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
AddTxAnnouncement ( pfrom , gtxid , current_time ) ;
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}
2020-08-21 10:10:48 -04:00
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unknown inv type \" %s \" received from peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
}
2020-05-08 14:18:13 -04:00
if ( best_block ! = nullptr ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , * best_block ) ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders (%d) %s to peer=%d \n " , pindexBestHeader - > nHeight , best_block - > ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETDATA ) {
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std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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vRecv > > vInv ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) > MAX_INV_SZ )
{
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " getdata message size = %u " , vInv . size ( ) ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received getdata (%u invsz) peer=%d \n " , vInv . size ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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2016-12-25 17:19:40 -03:00
if ( vInv . size ( ) > 0 ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received getdata for: %s peer=%d \n " , vInv [ 0 ] . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
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2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
{
LOCK ( peer - > m_getdata_requests_mutex ) ;
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peer - > m_getdata_requests . insert ( peer - > m_getdata_requests . end ( ) , vInv . begin ( ) , vInv . end ( ) ) ;
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ProcessGetData ( pfrom , * peer , m_chainparams , m_connman , m_mempool , interruptMsgProc ) ;
}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKS ) {
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CBlockLocator locator ;
uint256 hashStop ;
vRecv > > locator > > hashStop ;
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if ( locator . vHave . size ( ) > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d \n " , locator . vHave . size ( ) , MAX_LOCATOR_SZ , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
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}
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// We might have announced the currently-being-connected tip using a
// compact block, which resulted in the peer sending a getblocks
// request, which we would otherwise respond to without the new block.
// To avoid this situation we simply verify that we are on our best
// known chain now. This is super overkill, but we handle it better
// for getheaders requests, and there are no known nodes which support
// compact blocks but still use getblocks to request blocks.
{
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std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > a_recent_block ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
a_recent_block = most_recent_block ;
}
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BlockValidationState state ;
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if ( ! ActivateBestChain ( state , m_chainparams , a_recent_block ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " failed to activate chain (%s) \n " , state . ToString ( ) ) ;
2018-04-18 10:58:13 -03:00
}
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}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex ( : : ChainActive ( ) , locator ) ;
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// Send the rest of the chain
if ( pindex )
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pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) ;
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int nLimit = 500 ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks %d to %s limit %d from peer=%d \n " , ( pindex ? pindex - > nHeight : - 1 ) , hashStop . IsNull ( ) ? " end " : hashStop . ToString ( ) , nLimit , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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for ( ; pindex ; pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) )
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{
if ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) = = hashStop )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping at %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
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break ;
}
// If pruning, don't inv blocks unless we have on disk and are likely to still have
// for some reasonable time window (1 hour) that block relay might require.
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const int nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave = MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP - 3600 / m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) . nPowTargetSpacing ;
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if ( fPruneMode & & ( ! ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) | | pindex - > nHeight < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nHeight - nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
break ;
}
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WITH_LOCK ( pfrom . cs_inventory , pfrom . vInventoryBlockToSend . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
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if ( - - nLimit < = 0 )
{
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
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pfrom . hashContinue = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
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break ;
}
}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKTXN ) {
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BlockTransactionsRequest req ;
vRecv > > req ;
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std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > recent_block ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
if ( most_recent_block_hash = = req . blockhash )
recent_block = most_recent_block ;
// Unlock cs_most_recent_block to avoid cs_main lock inversion
}
if ( recent_block ) {
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SendBlockTransactions ( pfrom , * recent_block , req ) ;
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return ;
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}
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( req . blockhash ) ;
if ( ! pindex | | ! ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block we don't have \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
return ;
}
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2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
if ( pindex - > nHeight > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH ) {
CBlock block ;
bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk ( block , pindex , m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
assert ( ret ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
SendBlockTransactions ( pfrom , block , req ) ;
return ;
}
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
// If an older block is requested (should never happen in practice,
// but can happen in tests) send a block response instead of a
// blocktxn response. Sending a full block response instead of a
// small blocktxn response is preferable in the case where a peer
// might maliciously send lots of getblocktxn requests to trigger
// expensive disk reads, because it will require the peer to
// actually receive all the data read from disk over the network.
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block > %i deep \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) , MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH ) ;
CInv inv ;
WITH_LOCK ( cs_main , inv . type = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ? MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK : MSG_BLOCK ) ;
inv . hash = req . blockhash ;
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WITH_LOCK ( peer - > m_getdata_requests_mutex , peer - > m_getdata_requests . push_back ( inv ) ) ;
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// The message processing loop will go around again (without pausing) and we'll respond then
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS ) {
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CBlockLocator locator ;
uint256 hashStop ;
vRecv > > locator > > hashStop ;
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if ( locator . vHave . size ( ) > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d \n " , locator . vHave . size ( ) , MAX_LOCATOR_SZ , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2018-08-07 16:37:45 -04:00
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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if ( : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_DOWNLOAD ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because node is in initial block download \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
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CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr ;
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if ( locator . IsNull ( ) )
{
// If locator is null, return the hashStop block
2018-01-11 21:23:09 -03:00
pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hashStop ) ;
if ( ! pindex ) {
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return ;
2018-01-11 21:23:09 -03:00
}
2017-08-22 18:09:04 -03:00
2020-08-12 06:48:28 -04:00
if ( ! BlockRequestAllowed ( pindex , m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ) {
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block header that isn't in the main chain \n " , __func__ , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2017-08-22 18:09:04 -03:00
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
else
{
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex ( : : ChainActive ( ) , locator ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
if ( pindex )
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
// we must use CBlocks, as CBlockHeaders won't include the 0x00 nTx count at the end
2017-01-27 05:43:41 -03:00
std : : vector < CBlock > vHeaders ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
int nLimit = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ;
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders %d to %s from peer=%d \n " , ( pindex ? pindex - > nHeight : - 1 ) , hashStop . IsNull ( ) ? " end " : hashStop . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
for ( ; pindex ; pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
{
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
if ( - - nLimit < = 0 | | pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) = = hashStop )
break ;
}
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
// pindex can be nullptr either if we sent ::ChainActive().Tip() OR
// if our peer has ::ChainActive().Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// headers message). In both cases it's safe to update
// pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip.
2016-12-31 14:16:08 -03:00
//
// It is important that we simply reset the BestHeaderSent value here,
// and not max(BestHeaderSent, newHeaderSent). We might have announced
// the currently-being-connected tip using a compact block, which
// resulted in the peer sending a headers request, which we respond to
// without the new block. By resetting the BestHeaderSent, we ensure we
// will re-announce the new block via headers (or compact blocks again)
// in the SendMessages logic.
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
nodestate - > pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : HEADERS , vHeaders ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : TX ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// Stop processing the transaction early if
2020-05-07 11:38:10 -04:00
// 1) We are in blocks only mode and peer has no relay permission
// 2) This peer is a block-relay-only peer
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( ( ! g_relay_txes & & ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_RELAY ) ) | | ( pfrom . m_tx_relay = = nullptr ) )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
{
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2016-11-11 03:29:19 -03:00
CTransactionRef ptx ;
vRecv > > ptx ;
const CTransaction & tx = * ptx ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-01-30 13:12:56 -03:00
const uint256 & txid = ptx - > GetHash ( ) ;
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
const uint256 & wtxid = ptx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2017-12-04 19:10:45 -03:00
LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
const uint256 & hash = nodestate - > m_wtxid_relay ? wtxid : txid ;
2020-02-26 15:36:35 -03:00
pfrom . AddKnownTx ( hash ) ;
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
if ( nodestate - > m_wtxid_relay & & txid ! = wtxid ) {
// Insert txid into filterInventoryKnown, even for
// wtxidrelay peers. This prevents re-adding of
// unconfirmed parents to the recently_announced
// filter, when a child tx is requested. See
// ProcessGetData().
2020-02-26 15:36:35 -03:00
pfrom . AddKnownTx ( txid ) ;
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
}
2019-10-24 12:35:42 -03:00
TxValidationState state ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
m_txrequest . ReceivedResponse ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , txid ) ;
if ( tx . HasWitness ( ) ) m_txrequest . ReceivedResponse ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , wtxid ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2017-01-09 16:38:06 -03:00
std : : list < CTransactionRef > lRemovedTxn ;
2020-07-19 08:52:50 -04:00
// We do the AlreadyHaveTx() check using wtxid, rather than txid - in the
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
// absence of witness malleation, this is strictly better, because the
2020-07-29 11:07:23 -04:00
// recent rejects filter may contain the wtxid but rarely contains
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
// the txid of a segwit transaction that has been rejected.
// In the presence of witness malleation, it's possible that by only
// doing the check with wtxid, we could overlook a transaction which
// was confirmed with a different witness, or exists in our mempool
// with a different witness, but this has limited downside:
// mempool validation does its own lookup of whether we have the txid
// already; and an adversary can already relay us old transactions
// (older than our recency filter) if trying to DoS us, without any need
// for witness malleation.
2020-07-30 06:18:45 -04:00
if ( ! AlreadyHaveTx ( GenTxid ( /* is_wtxid=*/ true , wtxid ) , m_mempool ) & &
2019-04-12 16:22:12 -04:00
AcceptToMemoryPool ( m_mempool , state , ptx , & lRemovedTxn , false /* bypass_limits */ ) ) {
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
m_mempool . check ( & : : ChainstateActive ( ) . CoinsTip ( ) ) ;
2020-09-23 20:39:33 -03:00
// As this version of the transaction was acceptable, we can forget about any
// requests for it.
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
RelayTransaction ( tx . GetHash ( ) , tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) , m_connman ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
2020-01-30 13:12:56 -03:00
auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( COutPoint ( txid , i ) ) ;
2019-03-19 22:06:35 -03:00
if ( it_by_prev ! = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) {
for ( const auto & elem : it_by_prev - > second ) {
2020-09-13 20:29:50 -03:00
peer - > m_orphan_work_set . insert ( elem - > first ) ;
2019-03-19 22:06:35 -03:00
}
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
pfrom . nLastTXTime = GetTime ( ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2016-12-25 17:19:40 -03:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (poolsz %u txn, %u kB) \n " ,
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
pfrom . GetId ( ) ,
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
m_mempool . size ( ) , m_mempool . DynamicMemoryUsage ( ) / 1000 ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-06-25 17:26:55 -04:00
for ( const CTransactionRef & removedTx : lRemovedTxn ) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( removedTx ) ;
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
// Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one
2020-09-13 20:29:50 -03:00
ProcessOrphanTx ( peer - > m_orphan_work_set ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2019-04-28 17:26:31 -04:00
else if ( state . GetResult ( ) = = TxValidationResult : : TX_MISSING_INPUTS )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
{
bool fRejectedParents = false ; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected
2020-07-26 23:46:36 -04:00
// Deduplicate parent txids, so that we don't have to loop over
// the same parent txid more than once down below.
std : : vector < uint256 > unique_parents ;
unique_parents . reserve ( tx . vin . size ( ) ) ;
2017-06-01 21:18:57 -04:00
for ( const CTxIn & txin : tx . vin ) {
2020-07-26 23:46:36 -04:00
// We start with all parents, and then remove duplicates below.
unique_parents . push_back ( txin . prevout . hash ) ;
}
std : : sort ( unique_parents . begin ( ) , unique_parents . end ( ) ) ;
unique_parents . erase ( std : : unique ( unique_parents . begin ( ) , unique_parents . end ( ) ) , unique_parents . end ( ) ) ;
for ( const uint256 & parent_txid : unique_parents ) {
if ( recentRejects - > contains ( parent_txid ) ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
fRejectedParents = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! fRejectedParents ) {
2019-06-12 15:19:02 -04:00
const auto current_time = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ;
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
2020-07-26 23:46:36 -04:00
for ( const uint256 & parent_txid : unique_parents ) {
2020-07-22 20:19:43 -04:00
// Here, we only have the txid (and not wtxid) of the
// inputs, so we only request in txid mode, even for
// wtxidrelay peers.
// Eventually we should replace this with an improved
// protocol for getting all unconfirmed parents.
2020-08-08 08:36:26 -04:00
const GenTxid gtxid { /* is_wtxid=*/ false , parent_txid } ;
2020-07-26 23:46:36 -04:00
pfrom . AddKnownTx ( parent_txid ) ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
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if ( ! AlreadyHaveTx ( gtxid , m_mempool ) ) AddTxAnnouncement ( pfrom , gtxid , current_time ) ;
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}
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AddOrphanTx ( ptx , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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2020-09-23 20:39:33 -03:00
// Once added to the orphan pool, a tx is considered AlreadyHave, and we shouldn't request it anymore.
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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// DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded (see CVE-2012-3789)
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unsigned int nMaxOrphanTx = ( unsigned int ) std : : max ( ( int64_t ) 0 , gArgs . GetArg ( " -maxorphantx " , DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS ) ) ;
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unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize ( nMaxOrphanTx ) ;
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if ( nEvicted > 0 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " mapOrphan overflow, removed %u tx \n " , nEvicted ) ;
}
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} else {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " not keeping orphan with rejected parents %s \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
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// We will continue to reject this tx since it has rejected
// parents so avoid re-requesting it from other peers.
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// Here we add both the txid and the wtxid, as we know that
// regardless of what witness is provided, we will not accept
// this, so we don't need to allow for redownload of this txid
// from any of our non-wtxidrelay peers.
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recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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}
} else {
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if ( state . GetResult ( ) ! = TxValidationResult : : TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED ) {
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// We can add the wtxid of this transaction to our reject filter.
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// Do not add txids of witness transactions or witness-stripped
// transactions to the filter, as they can have been malleated;
// adding such txids to the reject filter would potentially
// interfere with relay of valid transactions from peers that
// do not support wtxid-based relay. See
// https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
// We can remove this restriction (and always add wtxids to
// the filter even for witness stripped transactions) once
// wtxid-based relay is broadly deployed.
// See also comments in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/18044#discussion_r443419034
// for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
// if we start doing this too early.
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assert ( recentRejects ) ;
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recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ) ;
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// If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
// then we know that the witness was irrelevant to the policy
// failure, since this check depends only on the txid
// (the scriptPubKey being spent is covered by the txid).
// Add the txid to the reject filter to prevent repeated
// processing of this transaction in the event that child
// transactions are later received (resulting in
// parent-fetching by txid via the orphan-handling logic).
if ( state . GetResult ( ) = = TxValidationResult : : TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD & & tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) ! = tx . GetHash ( ) ) {
recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
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if ( RecursiveDynamicUsage ( * ptx ) < 100000 ) {
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AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( ptx ) ;
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}
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}
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if ( pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_FORCERELAY ) ) {
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// Always relay transactions received from peers with forcerelay permission, even
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// if they were already in the mempool,
// allowing the node to function as a gateway for
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// nodes hidden behind it.
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if ( ! m_mempool . exists ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ) {
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LogPrintf ( " Not relaying non-mempool transaction %s from forcerelay peer=%d \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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} else {
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LogPrintf ( " Force relaying tx %s from peer=%d \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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RelayTransaction ( tx . GetHash ( ) , tx . GetWitnessHash ( ) , m_connman ) ;
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}
}
}
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// If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached
// this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run
// the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS
// score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
// tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
// we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In
// other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
// submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
// due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
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if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOLREJ , " %s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
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pfrom . GetId ( ) ,
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state . ToString ( ) ) ;
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MaybePunishNodeForTx ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , state ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK )
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{
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// Ignore cmpctblock received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected cmpctblock message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ;
vRecv > > cmpctblock ;
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bool received_new_header = false ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( cmpctblock . header . hashPrevBlock ) ) {
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// Doesn't connect (or is genesis), instead of DoSing in AcceptBlockHeader, request deeper headers
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if ( ! : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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2018-01-11 21:23:09 -03:00
if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ) {
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received_new_header = true ;
}
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}
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr ;
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BlockValidationState state ;
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if ( ! m_chainman . ProcessNewBlockHeaders ( { cmpctblock . header } , state , m_chainparams , & pindex ) ) {
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if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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MaybePunishNodeForBlock ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , state , /*via_compact_block*/ true , " invalid header via cmpctblock " ) ;
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return ;
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}
}
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// When we succeed in decoding a block's txids from a cmpctblock
// message we typically jump to the BLOCKTXN handling code, with a
// dummy (empty) BLOCKTXN message, to re-use the logic there in
// completing processing of the putative block (without cs_main).
bool fProcessBLOCKTXN = false ;
CDataStream blockTxnMsg ( SER_NETWORK , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
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// If we end up treating this as a plain headers message, call that as well
// without cs_main.
bool fRevertToHeaderProcessing = false ;
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// Keep a CBlock for "optimistic" compactblock reconstructions (see
// below)
std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
bool fBlockReconstructed = false ;
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{
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LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
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// If AcceptBlockHeader returned true, it set pindex
assert ( pindex ) ;
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UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
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CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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// If this was a new header with more work than our tip, update the
// peer's last block announcement time
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if ( received_new_header & & pindex - > nChainWork > : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
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nodestate - > m_last_block_announcement = GetTime ( ) ;
}
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator blockInFlightIt = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
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bool fAlreadyInFlight = blockInFlightIt ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ;
if ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) // Nothing to do here
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return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( pindex - > nChainWork < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork | | // We know something better
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pindex - > nTx ! = 0 ) { // We had this block at some point, but pruned it
if ( fAlreadyInFlight ) {
// We requested this block for some reason, but our mempool will probably be useless
// so we just grab the block via normal getdata
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
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vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
// If we're not close to tip yet, give up and let parallel block fetch work its magic
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if ( ! fAlreadyInFlight & & ! CanDirectFetch ( m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) )
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return ;
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if ( IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) & & ! nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
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// Don't bother trying to process compact blocks from v1 peers
// after segwit activates.
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return ;
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}
// We want to be a bit conservative just to be extra careful about DoS
// possibilities in compact block processing...
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if ( pindex - > nHeight < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) + 2 ) {
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if ( ( ! fAlreadyInFlight & & nodestate - > nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) | |
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( fAlreadyInFlight & & blockInFlightIt - > second . first = = pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ) {
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std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator * queuedBlockIt = nullptr ;
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if ( ! MarkBlockAsInFlight ( m_mempool , pfrom . GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex , & queuedBlockIt ) ) {
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if ( ! ( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock )
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( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock . reset ( new PartiallyDownloadedBlock ( & m_mempool ) ) ;
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else {
// The block was already in flight using compact blocks from the same peer
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer sent us compact block we were already syncing! \n " ) ;
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return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock & partialBlock = * ( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock ;
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ReadStatus status = partialBlock . InitData ( cmpctblock , vExtraTxnForCompact ) ;
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if ( status = = READ_STATUS_INVALID ) {
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MarkBlockAsReceived ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ; // Reset in-flight state in case Misbehaving does not result in a disconnect
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 100 , " invalid compact block " ) ;
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return ;
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} else if ( status = = READ_STATUS_FAILED ) {
// Duplicate txindexes, the block is now in-flight, so just request it
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
2017-05-02 04:32:21 -03:00
vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
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return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
BlockTransactionsRequest req ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < cmpctblock . BlockTxCount ( ) ; i + + ) {
if ( ! partialBlock . IsTxAvailable ( i ) )
req . indexes . push_back ( i ) ;
}
if ( req . indexes . empty ( ) ) {
// Dirty hack to jump to BLOCKTXN code (TODO: move message handling into their own functions)
BlockTransactions txn ;
txn . blockhash = cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ;
blockTxnMsg < < txn ;
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fProcessBLOCKTXN = true ;
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} else {
req . blockhash = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKTXN , req ) ) ;
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}
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
} else {
// This block is either already in flight from a different
// peer, or this peer has too many blocks outstanding to
// download from.
// Optimistically try to reconstruct anyway since we might be
// able to without any round trips.
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
PartiallyDownloadedBlock tempBlock ( & m_mempool ) ;
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ReadStatus status = tempBlock . InitData ( cmpctblock , vExtraTxnForCompact ) ;
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if ( status ! = READ_STATUS_OK ) {
// TODO: don't ignore failures
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return ;
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
}
std : : vector < CTransactionRef > dummy ;
status = tempBlock . FillBlock ( * pblock , dummy ) ;
if ( status = = READ_STATUS_OK ) {
fBlockReconstructed = true ;
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
} else {
if ( fAlreadyInFlight ) {
// We requested this block, but its far into the future, so our
// mempool will probably be useless - request the block normally
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
2017-05-02 04:32:21 -03:00
vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
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return ;
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} else {
// If this was an announce-cmpctblock, we want the same treatment as a header message
2016-12-01 12:27:12 -03:00
fRevertToHeaderProcessing = true ;
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}
}
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} // cs_main
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if ( fProcessBLOCKTXN ) {
return ProcessMessage ( pfrom , NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN , blockTxnMsg , time_received , interruptMsgProc ) ;
}
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
2017-10-26 15:54:33 -03:00
if ( fRevertToHeaderProcessing ) {
// Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be
// relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to disconnect
// the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block.
// Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that
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// will be detected and the peer will be disconnected/discouraged.
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return ProcessHeadersMessage ( pfrom , { cmpctblock . header } , /*via_compact_block=*/ true ) ;
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}
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
if ( fBlockReconstructed ) {
// If we got here, we were able to optimistically reconstruct a
// block that is in flight from some other peer.
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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mapBlockSource . emplace ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) , std : : make_pair ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , false ) ) ;
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
}
bool fNewBlock = false ;
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// Setting fForceProcessing to true means that we bypass some of
// our anti-DoS protections in AcceptBlock, which filters
// unrequested blocks that might be trying to waste our resources
// (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when
// we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement
// above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until
// we have a chain with at least nMinimumChainWork), and we ignore
// compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to treat
// reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested.
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m_chainman . ProcessNewBlock ( m_chainparams , pblock , /*fForceProcessing=*/ true , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom . nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
2017-08-08 21:44:02 -04:00
} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
2016-12-14 16:42:04 -03:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ; // hold cs_main for CBlockIndex::IsValid()
if ( pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS ) ) {
// Clear download state for this block, which is in
// process from some other peer. We do this after calling
// ProcessNewBlock so that a malleated cmpctblock announcement
// can't be used to interfere with block relay.
MarkBlockAsReceived ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN )
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{
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// Ignore blocktxn received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected blocktxn message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2019-03-13 21:59:37 -03:00
}
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BlockTransactions resp ;
vRecv > > resp ;
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std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
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bool fBlockRead = false ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator it = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( resp . blockhash ) ;
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if ( it = = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) | | ! it - > second . second - > partialBlock | |
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
it - > second . first ! = pfrom . GetId ( ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us block transactions for block we weren't expecting \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
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}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock & partialBlock = * it - > second . second - > partialBlock ;
2016-12-04 05:17:30 -03:00
ReadStatus status = partialBlock . FillBlock ( * pblock , resp . txn ) ;
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if ( status = = READ_STATUS_INVALID ) {
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MarkBlockAsReceived ( resp . blockhash ) ; // Reset in-flight state in case Misbehaving does not result in a disconnect
2020-06-19 12:05:31 -04:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 100 , " invalid compact block/non-matching block transactions " ) ;
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return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
} else if ( status = = READ_STATUS_FAILED ) {
// Might have collided, fall back to getdata now :(
std : : vector < CInv > invs ;
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invs . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , resp . blockhash ) ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , invs ) ) ;
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} else {
// Block is either okay, or possibly we received
// READ_STATUS_CHECKBLOCK_FAILED.
// Note that CheckBlock can only fail for one of a few reasons:
// 1. bad-proof-of-work (impossible here, because we've already
// accepted the header)
// 2. merkleroot doesn't match the transactions given (already
// caught in FillBlock with READ_STATUS_FAILED, so
// impossible here)
// 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase,
// block is too big, too many legacy sigops, etc).
// So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility.
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// Under BIP 152, we don't discourage the peer unless proof of work is
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// invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have
// been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as
// though the block was successfully read, and rely on the
// handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is
2019-10-10 12:28:22 -03:00
// updated, etc.
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MarkBlockAsReceived ( resp . blockhash ) ; // it is now an empty pointer
fBlockRead = true ;
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// mapBlockSource is used for potentially punishing peers and
// updating which peers send us compact blocks, so the race
// between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
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// BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after validating
// the header only; we should not punish peers if the block turns
// out to be invalid.
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mapBlockSource . emplace ( resp . blockhash , std : : make_pair ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , false ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
} // Don't hold cs_main when we call into ProcessNewBlock
if ( fBlockRead ) {
bool fNewBlock = false ;
// Since we requested this block (it was in mapBlocksInFlight), force it to be processed,
// even if it would not be a candidate for new tip (missing previous block, chain not long enough, etc)
2017-10-19 21:52:30 -03:00
// This bypasses some anti-DoS logic in AcceptBlock (eg to prevent
// disk-space attacks), but this should be safe due to the
// protections in the compact block handler -- see related comment
// in compact block optimistic reconstruction handling.
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m_chainman . ProcessNewBlock ( m_chainparams , pblock , /*fForceProcessing=*/ true , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom . nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : HEADERS )
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{
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// Ignore headers received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected headers message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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std : : vector < CBlockHeader > headers ;
// Bypass the normal CBlock deserialization, as we don't want to risk deserializing 2000 full blocks.
unsigned int nCount = ReadCompactSize ( vRecv ) ;
if ( nCount > MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
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Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " headers message size = %u " , nCount ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
headers . resize ( nCount ) ;
for ( unsigned int n = 0 ; n < nCount ; n + + ) {
vRecv > > headers [ n ] ;
ReadCompactSize ( vRecv ) ; // ignore tx count; assume it is 0.
}
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return ProcessHeadersMessage ( pfrom , headers , /*via_compact_block=*/ false ) ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : BLOCK )
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{
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// Ignore block received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected block message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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return ;
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}
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std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
vRecv > > * pblock ;
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2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received block %s peer=%d \n " , pblock - > GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
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bool forceProcessing = false ;
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const uint256 hash ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// Also always process if we requested the block explicitly, as we may
// need it even though it is not a candidate for a new best tip.
forceProcessing | = MarkBlockAsReceived ( hash ) ;
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// mapBlockSource is only used for punishing peers and setting
// which peers send us compact blocks, so the race between here and
// cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
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mapBlockSource . emplace ( hash , std : : make_pair ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , true ) ) ;
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}
bool fNewBlock = false ;
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m_chainman . ProcessNewBlock ( m_chainparams , pblock , forceProcessing , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom . nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETADDR ) {
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// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
// the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
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if ( ! pfrom . IsInboundConn ( ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring \" getaddr \" from %s connection. peer=%d \n " , pfrom . ConnectionTypeAsString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2019-04-05 14:35:15 -03:00
}
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// Only send one GetAddr response per connection to reduce resource waste
// and discourage addr stamping of INV announcements.
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if ( pfrom . fSentAddr ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring repeated \" getaddr \" . peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
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}
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pfrom . fSentAddr = true ;
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pfrom . vAddrToSend . clear ( ) ;
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr ;
if ( pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_ADDR ) ) {
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vAddr = m_connman . GetAddresses ( MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND , MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND ) ;
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} else {
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vAddr = m_connman . GetAddresses ( pfrom , MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND , MAX_PCT_ADDR_TO_SEND ) ;
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}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
2019-03-18 02:05:49 -03:00
for ( const CAddress & addr : vAddr ) {
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pfrom . PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : MEMPOOL ) {
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if ( ! ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) & & ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_MEMPOOL ) )
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{
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if ( ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " mempool request with bloom filters disabled, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( m_connman . OutboundTargetReached ( false ) & & ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_MEMPOOL ) )
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{
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if ( ! pfrom . HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_tx_inventory ) ;
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > fSendMempool = true ;
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}
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return ;
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}
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if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : PING ) {
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if ( pfrom . GetCommonVersion ( ) > BIP0031_VERSION ) {
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uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
vRecv > > nonce ;
// Echo the message back with the nonce. This allows for two useful features:
//
// 1) A remote node can quickly check if the connection is operational
// 2) Remote nodes can measure the latency of the network thread. If this node
// is overloaded it won't respond to pings quickly and the remote node can
// avoid sending us more work, like chain download requests.
//
// The nonce stops the remote getting confused between different pings: without
// it, if the remote node sends a ping once per second and this node takes 5
// seconds to respond to each, the 5th ping the remote sends would appear to
// return very quickly.
2020-08-12 07:13:53 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PONG , nonce ) ) ;
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}
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return ;
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}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : PONG ) {
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const auto ping_end = time_received ;
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uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
size_t nAvail = vRecv . in_avail ( ) ;
bool bPingFinished = false ;
std : : string sProblem ;
if ( nAvail > = sizeof ( nonce ) ) {
vRecv > > nonce ;
// Only process pong message if there is an outstanding ping (old ping without nonce should never pong)
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( pfrom . nPingNonceSent ! = 0 ) {
if ( nonce = = pfrom . nPingNonceSent ) {
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// Matching pong received, this ping is no longer outstanding
bPingFinished = true ;
2020-04-14 13:24:18 -04:00
const auto ping_time = ping_end - pfrom . m_ping_start . load ( ) ;
2020-10-07 23:40:42 -03:00
if ( ping_time . count ( ) > = 0 ) {
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// Successful ping time measurement, replace previous
2020-04-14 13:24:18 -04:00
pfrom . nPingUsecTime = count_microseconds ( ping_time ) ;
pfrom . nMinPingUsecTime = std : : min ( pfrom . nMinPingUsecTime . load ( ) , count_microseconds ( ping_time ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
} else {
// This should never happen
sProblem = " Timing mishap " ;
}
} else {
// Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
sProblem = " Nonce mismatch " ;
if ( nonce = = 0 ) {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true ;
sProblem = " Nonce zero " ;
}
}
} else {
sProblem = " Unsolicited pong without ping " ;
}
} else {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true ;
sProblem = " Short payload " ;
}
if ( ! ( sProblem . empty ( ) ) ) {
2016-12-25 17:19:40 -03:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " pong peer=%d: %s, %x expected, %x received, %u bytes \n " ,
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
pfrom . GetId ( ) ,
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sProblem ,
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pfrom . nPingNonceSent ,
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nonce ,
nAvail ) ;
}
if ( bPingFinished ) {
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pfrom . nPingNonceSent = 0 ;
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}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : FILTERLOAD ) {
2020-06-12 16:21:18 -04:00
if ( ! ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) ) {
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
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return ;
2020-06-12 16:21:18 -04:00
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
CBloomFilter filter ;
vRecv > > filter ;
if ( ! filter . IsWithinSizeConstraints ( ) )
{
// There is no excuse for sending a too-large filter
2020-06-19 12:05:31 -04:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 100 , " too-large bloom filter " ) ;
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}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
else if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr )
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{
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter . reset ( new CBloomFilter ( filter ) ) ;
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > fRelayTxes = true ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : FILTERADD ) {
2020-06-12 16:21:18 -04:00
if ( ! ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) ) {
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2020-06-12 16:21:18 -04:00
}
2017-01-27 05:43:41 -03:00
std : : vector < unsigned char > vData ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
vRecv > > vData ;
// Nodes must NEVER send a data item > 520 bytes (the max size for a script data object,
// and thus, the maximum size any matched object can have) in a filteradd message
bool bad = false ;
if ( vData . size ( ) > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE ) {
bad = true ;
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
} else if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter ) {
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter - > insert ( vData ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
} else {
bad = true ;
}
}
if ( bad ) {
2020-06-19 12:05:31 -04:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , 100 , " bad filteradd message " ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : FILTERCLEAR ) {
2020-06-03 19:28:43 -04:00
if ( ! ( pfrom . GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) ) {
pfrom . fDisconnect = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2020-06-03 19:28:43 -04:00
}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay = = nullptr ) {
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2019-03-08 17:48:41 -03:00
}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
2020-06-03 19:28:43 -04:00
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > pfilter = nullptr ;
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > fRelayTxes = true ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : FEEFILTER ) {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
CAmount newFeeFilter = 0 ;
vRecv > > newFeeFilter ;
if ( MoneyRange ( newFeeFilter ) ) {
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
if ( pfrom . m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pfrom . m_tx_relay - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
pfrom . m_tx_relay - > minFeeFilter = newFeeFilter ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received: feefilter of %s from peer=%d \n " , CFeeRate ( newFeeFilter ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2019-06-30 09:42:13 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETCFILTERS ) {
2020-08-12 06:48:28 -04:00
ProcessGetCFilters ( pfrom , vRecv , m_chainparams , m_connman ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2019-06-30 09:42:13 -04:00
}
2020-05-04 19:47:26 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETCFHEADERS ) {
2020-08-12 06:48:28 -04:00
ProcessGetCFHeaders ( pfrom , vRecv , m_chainparams , m_connman ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2020-05-04 19:47:26 -04:00
}
2019-06-30 10:19:40 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : GETCFCHECKPT ) {
2020-08-12 06:48:28 -04:00
ProcessGetCFCheckPt ( pfrom , vRecv , m_chainparams , m_connman ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2019-06-30 10:19:40 -04:00
}
2020-04-05 15:00:31 -04:00
if ( msg_type = = NetMsgType : : NOTFOUND ) {
2019-04-16 15:13:29 -04:00
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
vRecv > > vInv ;
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
if ( vInv . size ( ) < = MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS + MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
LOCK ( : : cs_main ) ;
2019-04-16 15:13:29 -04:00
for ( CInv & inv : vInv ) {
2020-07-26 06:12:36 -04:00
if ( inv . IsGenTxMsg ( ) ) {
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
// If we receive a NOTFOUND message for a tx we requested, mark the announcement for it as
// completed in TxRequestTracker.
m_txrequest . ReceivedResponse ( pfrom . GetId ( ) , inv . hash ) ;
2019-04-16 15:13:29 -04:00
}
}
}
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2018-08-12 08:55:01 -03:00
// Ignore unknown commands for extensibility
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unknown command \" %s \" from peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( msg_type ) , pfrom . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
return ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
bool PeerManager : : MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect ( CNode & pnode )
2017-02-07 14:02:02 -03:00
{
2020-07-24 03:03:48 -04:00
const NodeId peer_id { pnode . GetId ( ) } ;
2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( peer_id ) ;
if ( peer = = nullptr ) return false ;
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
{
2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
LOCK ( peer - > m_misbehavior_mutex ) ;
2017-02-07 14:02:02 -03:00
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
// There's nothing to do if the m_should_discourage flag isn't set
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if ( ! peer - > m_should_discourage ) return false ;
2017-02-07 14:02:02 -03:00
2020-06-16 16:12:13 -04:00
peer - > m_should_discourage = false ;
} // peer.m_misbehavior_mutex
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
if ( pnode . HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) ) {
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// We never disconnect or discourage peers for bad behavior if they have the NOBAN permission flag
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
LogPrintf ( " Warning: not punishing noban peer %d! \n " , peer_id ) ;
return false ;
}
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if ( pnode . IsManualConn ( ) ) {
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// We never disconnect or discourage manual peers for bad behavior
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
LogPrintf ( " Warning: not punishing manually connected peer %d! \n " , peer_id ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( pnode . addr . IsLocal ( ) ) {
2020-07-24 03:03:48 -04:00
// We disconnect local peers for bad behavior but don't discourage (since that would discourage
// all peers on the same local address)
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
LogPrintf ( " Warning: disconnecting but not discouraging local peer %d! \n " , peer_id ) ;
pnode . fDisconnect = true ;
2017-02-07 14:02:02 -03:00
return true ;
}
2020-06-15 11:33:14 -04:00
// Normal case: Disconnect the peer and discourage all nodes sharing the address
LogPrintf ( " Disconnecting and discouraging peer %d! \n " , peer_id ) ;
if ( m_banman ) m_banman - > Discourage ( pnode . addr ) ;
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
m_connman . DisconnectNode ( pnode . addr ) ;
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return true ;
2017-02-07 14:02:02 -03:00
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
bool PeerManager : : ProcessMessages ( CNode * pfrom , std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
{
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bool fMoreWork = false ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-09-13 20:29:50 -03:00
PeerRef peer = GetPeerRef ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( peer = = nullptr ) return false ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
{
LOCK ( peer - > m_getdata_requests_mutex ) ;
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if ( ! peer - > m_getdata_requests . empty ( ) ) {
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ProcessGetData ( * pfrom , * peer , m_chainparams , m_connman , m_mempool , interruptMsgProc ) ;
}
2020-09-13 21:11:24 -03:00
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-09-13 20:34:52 -03:00
{
2019-03-20 19:26:21 -03:00
LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
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if ( ! peer - > m_orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) {
ProcessOrphanTx ( peer - > m_orphan_work_set ) ;
}
2019-03-20 19:26:21 -03:00
}
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if ( pfrom - > fDisconnect )
return false ;
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// this maintains the order of responses
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// and prevents m_getdata_requests to grow unbounded
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
{
LOCK ( peer - > m_getdata_requests_mutex ) ;
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if ( ! peer - > m_getdata_requests . empty ( ) ) return true ;
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
}
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{
LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
if ( ! peer - > m_orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) return true ;
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
// Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway
if ( pfrom - > fPauseSend )
return false ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
std : : list < CNetMessage > msgs ;
{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_vProcessMsg ) ;
if ( pfrom - > vProcessMsg . empty ( ) )
2016-12-31 04:05:26 -03:00
return false ;
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
// Just take one message
msgs . splice ( msgs . begin ( ) , pfrom - > vProcessMsg , pfrom - > vProcessMsg . begin ( ) ) ;
2019-06-13 05:07:50 -04:00
pfrom - > nProcessQueueSize - = msgs . front ( ) . m_raw_message_size ;
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pfrom - > fPauseRecv = pfrom - > nProcessQueueSize > m_connman . GetReceiveFloodSize ( ) ;
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
fMoreWork = ! pfrom - > vProcessMsg . empty ( ) ;
}
CNetMessage & msg ( msgs . front ( ) ) ;
2020-06-05 03:22:53 -04:00
msg . SetVersion ( pfrom - > GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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const std : : string & msg_type = msg . m_command ;
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// Message size
2019-06-13 04:39:44 -04:00
unsigned int nMessageSize = msg . m_message_size ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2020-06-16 06:58:06 -04:00
try {
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ProcessMessage ( * pfrom , msg_type , msg . m_recv , msg . m_time , interruptMsgProc ) ;
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if ( interruptMsgProc ) return false ;
{
LOCK ( peer - > m_getdata_requests_mutex ) ;
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if ( ! peer - > m_getdata_requests . empty ( ) ) fMoreWork = true ;
2020-09-13 21:34:41 -03:00
}
2019-12-17 11:43:12 -03:00
} catch ( const std : : exception & e ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' (%s) caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( msg_type ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) , typeid ( e ) . name ( ) ) ;
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
} catch ( . . . ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Unknown exception caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( msg_type ) , nMessageSize ) ;
2017-03-06 13:54:08 -03:00
}
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
2016-12-31 04:05:26 -03:00
return fMoreWork ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
void PeerManager : : ConsiderEviction ( CNode & pto , int64_t time_in_seconds )
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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CNodeState & state = * State ( pto . GetId ( ) ) ;
2020-06-05 03:22:53 -04:00
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pto . GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
2020-07-21 19:28:47 -04:00
if ( ! state . m_chain_sync . m_protect & & pto . IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn ( ) & & state . fSyncStarted ) {
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
// This is an outbound peer subject to disconnection if they don't
// announce a block with as much work as the current tip within
// CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds (note: if
// their chain has more work than ours, we should sync to it,
// unless it's invalid, in which case we should find that out and
// disconnect from them elsewhere).
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
if ( state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout ! = 0 ) {
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = 0 ;
state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header = nullptr ;
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = false ;
}
} else if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = = 0 | | ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > nChainWork ) ) {
// Our best block known by this peer is behind our tip, and we're either noticing
// that for the first time, OR this peer was able to catch up to some earlier point
// where we checked against our tip.
// Either way, set a new timeout based on current tip.
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = time_in_seconds + CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT ;
2019-03-27 12:14:25 -03:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = false ;
} else if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout > 0 & & time_in_seconds > state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout ) {
// No evidence yet that our peer has synced to a chain with work equal to that
// of our tip, when we first detected it was behind. Send a single getheaders
// message to give the peer a chance to update us.
if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders ) {
// They've run out of time to catch up!
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrintf ( " Disconnecting outbound peer %d for old chain, best known block = %s \n " , pto . GetId ( ) , state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ? state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) : " <none> " ) ;
pto . fDisconnect = true ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
} else {
2017-11-10 11:22:54 -03:00
assert ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header ) ;
2020-05-22 11:52:08 -04:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " sending getheaders to outbound peer=%d to verify chain work (current best known block:%s, benchmark blockhash: %s) \n " , pto . GetId ( ) , state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ? state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) : " <none> " , state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
m_connman . PushMessage ( & pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > pprev ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 14:55:43 -03:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = true ;
constexpr int64_t HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME = 120 ; // 2 minutes
// Bump the timeout to allow a response, which could clear the timeout
// (if the response shows the peer has synced), reset the timeout (if
// the peer syncs to the required work but not to our tip), or result
// in disconnect (if we advance to the timeout and pindexBestKnownBlock
// has not sufficiently progressed)
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = time_in_seconds + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME ;
}
}
}
}
2020-08-29 05:31:11 -04:00
void PeerManager : : EvictExtraOutboundPeers ( int64_t time_in_seconds )
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
{
// Check whether we have too many outbound peers
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
int extra_peers = m_connman . GetExtraOutboundCount ( ) ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
if ( extra_peers > 0 ) {
// If we have more outbound peers than we target, disconnect one.
// Pick the outbound peer that least recently announced
// us a new block, with ties broken by choosing the more recent
// connection (higher node id)
NodeId worst_peer = - 1 ;
int64_t oldest_block_announcement = std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ;
2020-09-19 05:56:28 -03:00
m_connman . ForEachNode ( [ & ] ( CNode * pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( : : cs_main ) {
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ;
2018-06-08 14:09:08 -04:00
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
// Ignore non-outbound peers, or nodes marked for disconnect already
2020-07-21 19:28:47 -04:00
if ( ! pnode - > IsOutboundOrBlockRelayConn ( ) | | pnode - > fDisconnect ) return ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
CNodeState * state = State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( state = = nullptr ) return ; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case
// Don't evict our protected peers
if ( state - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ) return ;
2019-03-09 14:55:06 -03:00
// Don't evict our block-relay-only peers.
if ( pnode - > m_tx_relay = = nullptr ) return ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
if ( state - > m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement | | ( state - > m_last_block_announcement = = oldest_block_announcement & & pnode - > GetId ( ) > worst_peer ) ) {
worst_peer = pnode - > GetId ( ) ;
oldest_block_announcement = state - > m_last_block_announcement ;
}
} ) ;
if ( worst_peer ! = - 1 ) {
2020-09-19 05:56:28 -03:00
bool disconnected = m_connman . ForNode ( worst_peer , [ & ] ( CNode * pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( : : cs_main ) {
AssertLockHeld ( : : cs_main ) ;
2018-06-08 14:09:08 -04:00
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
// Only disconnect a peer that has been connected to us for
// some reasonable fraction of our check-frequency, to give
// it time for new information to have arrived.
// Also don't disconnect any peer we're trying to download a
// block from.
CNodeState & state = * State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( time_in_seconds - pnode - > nTimeConnected > MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME & & state . nBlocksInFlight = = 0 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " disconnecting extra outbound peer=%d (last block announcement received at time %d) \n " , pnode - > GetId ( ) , oldest_block_announcement ) ;
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " keeping outbound peer=%d chosen for eviction (connect time: %d, blocks_in_flight: %d) \n " , pnode - > GetId ( ) , pnode - > nTimeConnected , state . nBlocksInFlight ) ;
return false ;
}
} ) ;
if ( disconnected ) {
// If we disconnected an extra peer, that means we successfully
// connected to at least one peer after the last time we
// detected a stale tip. Don't try any more extra peers until
// we next detect a stale tip, to limit the load we put on the
// network from these extra connections.
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
m_connman . SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( false ) ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
}
}
}
}
2020-09-08 03:03:01 -03:00
void PeerManager : : CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers ( )
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
{
2018-08-22 20:29:01 -03:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
int64_t time_in_seconds = GetTime ( ) ;
EvictExtraOutboundPeers ( time_in_seconds ) ;
if ( time_in_seconds > m_stale_tip_check_time ) {
// Check whether our tip is stale, and if so, allow using an extra
// outbound peer
2020-09-08 03:03:01 -03:00
if ( ! fImporting & & ! fReindex & & m_connman . GetNetworkActive ( ) & & m_connman . GetUseAddrmanOutgoing ( ) & & TipMayBeStale ( m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ) {
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
LogPrintf ( " Potential stale tip detected, will try using extra outbound peer (last tip update: %d seconds ago) \n " , time_in_seconds - g_last_tip_update ) ;
2020-08-12 06:38:56 -04:00
m_connman . SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( true ) ;
} else if ( m_connman . GetTryNewOutboundPeer ( ) ) {
m_connman . SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( false ) ;
2017-10-24 17:56:07 -03:00
}
m_stale_tip_check_time = time_in_seconds + STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL ;
}
}
2018-06-08 15:09:20 -04:00
namespace {
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
class CompareInvMempoolOrder
{
CTxMemPool * mp ;
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
bool m_wtxid_relay ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
public :
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explicit CompareInvMempoolOrder ( CTxMemPool * _mempool , bool use_wtxid )
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
{
mp = _mempool ;
2020-01-30 11:35:00 -03:00
m_wtxid_relay = use_wtxid ;
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}
bool operator ( ) ( std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator a , std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator b )
{
/* As std::make_heap produces a max-heap, we want the entries with the
* fewest ancestors / highest fee to sort later . */
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return mp - > CompareDepthAndScore ( * b , * a , m_wtxid_relay ) ;
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}
} ;
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}
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bool PeerManager : : SendMessages ( CNode * pto )
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{
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const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams = m_chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ;
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[net processing] Only call MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect from SendMessages
`nMisbehavior` is a tally in `CNodeState` that can be incremented from
anywhere. That almost always happens inside a `ProcessMessages()` call
(because we increment the misbehavior score when receiving a bad
messages from a peer), but not always. See, for example, the call to
`MaybePunishNodeForBlock()` inside `BlockChecked()`, which is an
asynchronous callback from the validation interface, executed on the
scheduler thread.
As long as `MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` is called regularly for the
node, then the misbehavior score exceeding the 100 threshold will
eventually result in the peer being punished. It doesn't really matter
where that `MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` happens, but it makes most
sense in `SendMessages()` which is where we do general peer
housekeeping/maintenance.
Therefore, remove the `MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` call in
`ProcessMessages()` and move the `MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` call
in `SendMessages()` to the top of the function. This moves it out of the
cs_main lock scope, so take that lock directly inside
`MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()`.
Historic note: `MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` was previously
`SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned()`, and before that was just sending
rejects. All of those things required cs_main, which is why
`MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect()` was called after the ping logic.
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// We must call MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect first, to ensure that we'll
// disconnect misbehaving peers even before the version handshake is complete.
if ( MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect ( * pto ) ) return true ;
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// Don't send anything until the version handshake is complete
if ( ! pto - > fSuccessfullyConnected | | pto - > fDisconnect )
return true ;
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// If we get here, the outgoing message serialization version is set and can't change.
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pto - > GetCommonVersion ( ) ) ;
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//
// Message: ping
//
bool pingSend = false ;
if ( pto - > fPingQueued ) {
// RPC ping request by user
pingSend = true ;
}
if ( pto - > nPingNonceSent = = 0 & & pto - > m_ping_start . load ( ) + PING_INTERVAL < GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ) {
// Ping automatically sent as a latency probe & keepalive.
pingSend = true ;
}
if ( pingSend ) {
uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
while ( nonce = = 0 ) {
GetRandBytes ( ( unsigned char * ) & nonce , sizeof ( nonce ) ) ;
}
pto - > fPingQueued = false ;
pto - > m_ping_start = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ;
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if ( pto - > GetCommonVersion ( ) > BIP0031_VERSION ) {
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pto - > nPingNonceSent = nonce ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PING , nonce ) ) ;
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} else {
// Peer is too old to support ping command with nonce, pong will never arrive.
pto - > nPingNonceSent = 0 ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PING ) ) ;
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}
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}
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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CNodeState & state = * State ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// Address refresh broadcast
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auto current_time = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ;
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if ( pto - > RelayAddrsWithConn ( ) & & ! : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & pto - > m_next_local_addr_send < current_time ) {
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AdvertiseLocal ( pto ) ;
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pto - > m_next_local_addr_send = PoissonNextSend ( current_time , AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
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}
//
// Message: addr
//
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if ( pto - > RelayAddrsWithConn ( ) & & pto - > m_next_addr_send < current_time ) {
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pto - > m_next_addr_send = PoissonNextSend ( current_time , AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr ;
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vAddr . reserve ( pto - > vAddrToSend . size ( ) ) ;
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assert ( pto - > m_addr_known ) ;
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const char * msg_type ;
int make_flags ;
if ( pto - > m_wants_addrv2 ) {
msg_type = NetMsgType : : ADDRV2 ;
make_flags = ADDRV2_FORMAT ;
} else {
msg_type = NetMsgType : : ADDR ;
make_flags = 0 ;
}
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for ( const CAddress & addr : pto - > vAddrToSend )
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{
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if ( ! pto - > m_addr_known - > contains ( addr . GetKey ( ) ) )
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{
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pto - > m_addr_known - > insert ( addr . GetKey ( ) ) ;
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vAddr . push_back ( addr ) ;
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// receiver rejects addr messages larger than MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND
if ( vAddr . size ( ) > = MAX_ADDR_TO_SEND )
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{
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( make_flags , msg_type , vAddr ) ) ;
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vAddr . clear ( ) ;
}
}
}
pto - > vAddrToSend . clear ( ) ;
if ( ! vAddr . empty ( ) )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( make_flags , msg_type , vAddr ) ) ;
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// we only send the big addr message once
if ( pto - > vAddrToSend . capacity ( ) > 40 )
pto - > vAddrToSend . shrink_to_fit ( ) ;
}
// Start block sync
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if ( pindexBestHeader = = nullptr )
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pindexBestHeader = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
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bool fFetch = state . fPreferredDownload | | ( nPreferredDownload = = 0 & & ! pto - > fClient & & ! pto - > IsAddrFetchConn ( ) ) ; // Download if this is a nice peer, or we have no nice peers and this one might do.
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if ( ! state . fSyncStarted & & ! pto - > fClient & & ! fImporting & & ! fReindex ) {
// Only actively request headers from a single peer, unless we're close to today.
if ( ( nSyncStarted = = 0 & & fFetch ) | | pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) > GetAdjustedTime ( ) - 24 * 60 * 60 ) {
state . fSyncStarted = true ;
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state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = count_microseconds ( current_time ) + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER * ( GetAdjustedTime ( ) - pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) ) / ( consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing ) ;
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nSyncStarted + + ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexStart = pindexBestHeader ;
/* If possible, start at the block preceding the currently
best known header . This ensures that we always get a
non - empty list of headers back as long as the peer
is up - to - date . With a non - empty response , we can initialise
the peer ' s known best block . This wouldn ' t be possible
if we requested starting at pindexBestHeader and
got back an empty response . */
if ( pindexStart - > pprev )
pindexStart = pindexStart - > pprev ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d) \n " , pindexStart - > nHeight , pto - > GetId ( ) , pto - > nStartingHeight ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexStart ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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}
}
//
// Try sending block announcements via headers
//
{
// If we have less than MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE in our
// list of block hashes we're relaying, and our peer wants
// headers announcements, then find the first header
// not yet known to our peer but would connect, and send.
// If no header would connect, or if we have too many
// blocks, or if the peer doesn't want headers, just
// add all to the inv queue.
LOCK ( pto - > cs_inventory ) ;
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std : : vector < CBlock > vHeaders ;
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bool fRevertToInv = ( ( ! state . fPreferHeaders & &
( ! state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs | | pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . size ( ) > 1 ) ) | |
pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . size ( ) > MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pBestIndex = nullptr ; // last header queued for delivery
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ProcessBlockAvailability ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) ; // ensure pindexBestKnownBlock is up-to-date
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if ( ! fRevertToInv ) {
bool fFoundStartingHeader = false ;
// Try to find first header that our peer doesn't have, and
// then send all headers past that one. If we come across any
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// headers that aren't on ::ChainActive(), give up.
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for ( const uint256 & hash : pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce ) {
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hash ) ;
assert ( pindex ) ;
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) [ pindex - > nHeight ] ! = pindex ) {
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// Bail out if we reorged away from this block
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
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if ( pBestIndex ! = nullptr & & pindex - > pprev ! = pBestIndex ) {
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// This means that the list of blocks to announce don't
// connect to each other.
// This shouldn't really be possible to hit during
// regular operation (because reorgs should take us to
// a chain that has some block not on the prior chain,
// which should be caught by the prior check), but one
// way this could happen is by using invalidateblock /
// reconsiderblock repeatedly on the tip, causing it to
// be added multiple times to vBlockHashesToAnnounce.
// Robustly deal with this rare situation by reverting
// to an inv.
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
pBestIndex = pindex ;
if ( fFoundStartingHeader ) {
// add this to the headers message
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
} else if ( PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) ) {
continue ; // keep looking for the first new block
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} else if ( pindex - > pprev = = nullptr | | PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex - > pprev ) ) {
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// Peer doesn't have this header but they do have the prior one.
// Start sending headers.
fFoundStartingHeader = true ;
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
} else {
// Peer doesn't have this header or the prior one -- nothing will
// connect, so bail out.
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
}
}
if ( ! fRevertToInv & & ! vHeaders . empty ( ) ) {
if ( vHeaders . size ( ) = = 1 & & state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs ) {
// We only send up to 1 block as header-and-ids, as otherwise
// probably means we're doing an initial-ish-sync or they're slow
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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int nSendFlags = state . fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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bool fGotBlockFromCache = false ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
if ( most_recent_block_hash = = pBestIndex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
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if ( state . fWantsCmpctWitness | | ! fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * most_recent_compact_block ) ) ;
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else {
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( * most_recent_block , state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
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}
fGotBlockFromCache = true ;
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}
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}
if ( ! fGotBlockFromCache ) {
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CBlock block ;
bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk ( block , pBestIndex , consensusParams ) ;
assert ( ret ) ;
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( block , state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) ;
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
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}
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex ;
} else if ( state . fPreferHeaders ) {
if ( vHeaders . size ( ) > 1 ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: %u headers, range (%s, %s), to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . size ( ) ,
vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
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vHeaders . back ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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} else {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: sending header %s to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : HEADERS , vHeaders ) ) ;
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex ;
} else
fRevertToInv = true ;
}
if ( fRevertToInv ) {
// If falling back to using an inv, just try to inv the tip.
// The last entry in vBlockHashesToAnnounce was our tip at some point
// in the past.
if ( ! pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . empty ( ) ) {
const uint256 & hashToAnnounce = pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . back ( ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hashToAnnounce ) ;
assert ( pindex ) ;
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// Warn if we're announcing a block that is not on the main chain.
// This should be very rare and could be optimized out.
// Just log for now.
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) [ pindex - > nHeight ] ! = pindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Announcing block %s not on main chain (tip=%s) \n " ,
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hashToAnnounce . ToString ( ) , : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
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}
// If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back.
if ( ! PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) ) {
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pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend . push_back ( hashToAnnounce ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: sending inv peer=%d hash=%s \n " , __func__ ,
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pto - > GetId ( ) , hashToAnnounce . ToString ( ) ) ;
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}
}
}
pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . clear ( ) ;
}
//
// Message: inventory
//
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std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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{
LOCK ( pto - > cs_inventory ) ;
vInv . reserve ( std : : max < size_t > ( pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend . size ( ) , INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX ) ) ;
// Add blocks
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for ( const uint256 & hash : pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend ) {
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vInv . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , hash ) ) ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
}
pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend . clear ( ) ;
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if ( pto - > m_tx_relay ! = nullptr ) {
LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_tx_inventory ) ;
// Check whether periodic sends should happen
bool fSendTrickle = pto - > HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) ;
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if ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > nNextInvSend < current_time ) {
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fSendTrickle = true ;
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if ( pto - > IsInboundConn ( ) ) {
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > nNextInvSend = std : : chrono : : microseconds { m_connman . PoissonNextSendInbound ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) , INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) } ;
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} else {
// Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them.
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend ( current_time , std : : chrono : : seconds { INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL > > 1 } ) ;
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}
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}
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// Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions.
if ( fSendTrickle ) {
LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( ! pto - > m_tx_relay - > fRelayTxes ) pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . clear ( ) ;
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}
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// Respond to BIP35 mempool requests
if ( fSendTrickle & & pto - > m_tx_relay - > fSendMempool ) {
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auto vtxinfo = m_mempool . infoAll ( ) ;
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > fSendMempool = false ;
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CFeeRate filterrate ;
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{
LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
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filterrate = CFeeRate ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > minFeeFilter ) ;
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}
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LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
for ( const auto & txinfo : vtxinfo ) {
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const uint256 & hash = state . m_wtxid_relay ? txinfo . tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) : txinfo . tx - > GetHash ( ) ;
CInv inv ( state . m_wtxid_relay ? MSG_WTX : MSG_TX , hash ) ;
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . erase ( hash ) ;
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// Don't send transactions that peers will not put into their mempool
if ( txinfo . fee < filterrate . GetFee ( txinfo . vsize ) ) {
continue ;
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}
if ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > pfilter ) {
if ( ! pto - > m_tx_relay - > pfilter - > IsRelevantAndUpdate ( * txinfo . tx ) ) continue ;
}
pto - > m_tx_relay - > filterInventoryKnown . insert ( hash ) ;
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// Responses to MEMPOOL requests bypass the m_recently_announced_invs filter.
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vInv . push_back ( inv ) ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
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}
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > m_last_mempool_req = GetTime < std : : chrono : : seconds > ( ) ;
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}
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// Determine transactions to relay
if ( fSendTrickle ) {
// Produce a vector with all candidates for sending
std : : vector < std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator > vInvTx ;
vInvTx . reserve ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . size ( ) ) ;
for ( std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator it = pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . begin ( ) ; it ! = pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . end ( ) ; it + + ) {
vInvTx . push_back ( it ) ;
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}
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CFeeRate filterrate ;
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{
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LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
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filterrate = CFeeRate ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > minFeeFilter ) ;
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}
// Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons.
// A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent.
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CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder ( & m_mempool , state . m_wtxid_relay ) ;
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std : : make_heap ( vInvTx . begin ( ) , vInvTx . end ( ) , compareInvMempoolOrder ) ;
// No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity,
// especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays.
unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0 ;
LOCK ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > cs_filter ) ;
while ( ! vInvTx . empty ( ) & & nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX ) {
// Fetch the top element from the heap
std : : pop_heap ( vInvTx . begin ( ) , vInvTx . end ( ) , compareInvMempoolOrder ) ;
std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator it = vInvTx . back ( ) ;
vInvTx . pop_back ( ) ;
uint256 hash = * it ;
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CInv inv ( state . m_wtxid_relay ? MSG_WTX : MSG_TX , hash ) ;
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// Remove it from the to-be-sent set
pto - > m_tx_relay - > setInventoryTxToSend . erase ( it ) ;
// Check if not in the filter already
if ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > filterInventoryKnown . contains ( hash ) ) {
continue ;
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}
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// Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it.
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auto txinfo = m_mempool . info ( ToGenTxid ( inv ) ) ;
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if ( ! txinfo . tx ) {
continue ;
}
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auto txid = txinfo . tx - > GetHash ( ) ;
auto wtxid = txinfo . tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) ;
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// Peer told you to not send transactions at that feerate? Don't bother sending it.
if ( txinfo . fee < filterrate . GetFee ( txinfo . vsize ) ) {
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continue ;
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}
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if ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > pfilter & & ! pto - > m_tx_relay - > pfilter - > IsRelevantAndUpdate ( * txinfo . tx ) ) continue ;
// Send
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State ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) - > m_recently_announced_invs . insert ( hash ) ;
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vInv . push_back ( inv ) ;
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nRelayedTransactions + + ;
{
// Expire old relay messages
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while ( ! vRelayExpiration . empty ( ) & & vRelayExpiration . front ( ) . first < count_microseconds ( current_time ) )
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{
mapRelay . erase ( vRelayExpiration . front ( ) . second ) ;
vRelayExpiration . pop_front ( ) ;
}
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auto ret = mapRelay . emplace ( txid , std : : move ( txinfo . tx ) ) ;
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if ( ret . second ) {
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vRelayExpiration . emplace_back ( count_microseconds ( current_time + std : : chrono : : microseconds { RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME } ) , ret . first ) ;
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}
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// Add wtxid-based lookup into mapRelay as well, so that peers can request by wtxid
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auto ret2 = mapRelay . emplace ( wtxid , ret . first - > second ) ;
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if ( ret2 . second ) {
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vRelayExpiration . emplace_back ( count_microseconds ( current_time + std : : chrono : : microseconds { RELAY_TX_CACHE_TIME } ) , ret2 . first ) ;
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}
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}
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if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
pto - > m_tx_relay - > filterInventoryKnown . insert ( hash ) ;
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if ( hash ! = txid ) {
// Insert txid into filterInventoryKnown, even for
// wtxidrelay peers. This prevents re-adding of
// unconfirmed parents to the recently_announced
// filter, when a child tx is requested. See
// ProcessGetData().
pto - > m_tx_relay - > filterInventoryKnown . insert ( txid ) ;
}
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}
}
}
}
if ( ! vInv . empty ( ) )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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// Detect whether we're stalling
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current_time = GetTime < std : : chrono : : microseconds > ( ) ;
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if ( state . nStallingSince & & state . nStallingSince < count_microseconds ( current_time ) - 1000000 * BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT ) {
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// Stalling only triggers when the block download window cannot move. During normal steady state,
// the download window should be much larger than the to-be-downloaded set of blocks, so disconnection
// should only happen during initial block download.
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LogPrintf ( " Peer=%d is stalling block download, disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
// In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for 2 + 0.5 * N times the block interval
// (with N the number of peers from which we're downloading validated blocks), disconnect due to timeout.
// We compensate for other peers to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
// to unreasonably increase our timeout.
if ( state . vBlocksInFlight . size ( ) > 0 ) {
QueuedBlock & queuedBlock = state . vBlocksInFlight . front ( ) ;
int nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads = nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - ( state . nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders > 0 ) ;
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if ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) > state . nDownloadingSince + consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * ( BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER * nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads ) ) {
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LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting \n " , queuedBlock . hash . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
}
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// Check for headers sync timeouts
if ( state . fSyncStarted & & state . nHeadersSyncTimeout < std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ) {
// Detect whether this is a stalling initial-headers-sync peer
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if ( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) < = GetAdjustedTime ( ) - 24 * 60 * 60 ) {
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if ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) > state . nHeadersSyncTimeout & & nSyncStarted = = 1 & & ( nPreferredDownload - state . fPreferredDownload > = 1 ) ) {
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// Disconnect a peer (without the noban permission) if it is our only sync peer,
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// and we have others we could be using instead.
// Note: If all our peers are inbound, then we won't
// disconnect our sync peer for stalling; we have bigger
// problems if we can't get any outbound peers.
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if ( ! pto - > HasPermission ( PF_NOBAN ) ) {
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LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading headers from peer=%d, disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
} else {
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LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading headers from noban peer=%d, not disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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// Reset the headers sync state so that we have a
// chance to try downloading from a different peer.
// Note: this will also result in at least one more
// getheaders message to be sent to
// this peer (eventually).
state . fSyncStarted = false ;
nSyncStarted - - ;
state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0 ;
}
}
} else {
// After we've caught up once, reset the timeout so we can't trigger
// disconnect later.
state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ;
}
}
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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// Check that outbound peers have reasonable chains
// GetTime() is used by this anti-DoS logic so we can test this using mocktime
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ConsiderEviction ( * pto , GetTime ( ) ) ;
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//
// Message: getdata (blocks)
//
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std : : vector < CInv > vGetData ;
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if ( ! pto - > fClient & & ( ( fFetch & & ! pto - > m_limited_node ) | | ! : : ChainstateActive ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) ) & & state . nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
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std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToDownload ;
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NodeId staller = - 1 ;
FindNextBlocksToDownload ( pto - > GetId ( ) , MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER - state . nBlocksInFlight , vToDownload , staller , consensusParams ) ;
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for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : vToDownload ) {
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( * pto ) ;
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vGetData . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
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MarkBlockAsInFlight ( m_mempool , pto - > GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d \n " , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
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pindex - > nHeight , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
if ( state . nBlocksInFlight = = 0 & & staller ! = - 1 ) {
if ( State ( staller ) - > nStallingSince = = 0 ) {
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State ( staller ) - > nStallingSince = count_microseconds ( current_time ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Stall started peer=%d \n " , staller ) ;
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}
}
}
//
// Message: getdata (non-blocks)
//
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std : : vector < std : : pair < NodeId , GenTxid > > expired ;
auto requestable = m_txrequest . GetRequestable ( pto - > GetId ( ) , current_time , & expired ) ;
for ( const auto & entry : expired ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " timeout of inflight %s %s from peer=%d \n " , entry . second . IsWtxid ( ) ? " wtx " : " tx " ,
entry . second . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , entry . first ) ;
}
for ( const GenTxid & gtxid : requestable ) {
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
if ( ! AlreadyHaveTx ( gtxid , m_mempool ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting %s %s peer=%d \n " , gtxid . IsWtxid ( ) ? " wtx " : " tx " ,
gtxid . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
vGetData . emplace_back ( gtxid . IsWtxid ( ) ? MSG_WTX : ( MSG_TX | GetFetchFlags ( * pto ) ) , gtxid . GetHash ( ) ) ;
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > = MAX_GETDATA_SZ ) {
m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
vGetData . clear ( ) ;
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}
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
m_txrequest . RequestedTx ( pto - > GetId ( ) , gtxid . GetHash ( ) , current_time + GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL ) ;
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} else {
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// We have already seen this transaction, no need to download. This is just a belt-and-suspenders, as
// this should already be called whenever a transaction becomes AlreadyHaveTx().
Change transaction request logic to use txrequest
This removes most transaction request logic from net_processing, and
replaces it with calls to a global TxRequestTracker object.
The major changes are:
* Announcements from outbound (and whitelisted) peers are now always
preferred over those from inbound peers. This used to be the case for the
first request (by delaying the first request from inbound peers), and
a bias afters. The 2s delay for requests from inbound peers still exists,
but after that, if viable outbound peers remain for any given transaction,
they will always be tried first.
* No more hard cap of 100 in flight transactions per peer, as there is less
need for it (memory usage is linear in the number of announcements, but
independent from the number in flight, and CPU usage isn't affected by it).
Furthermore, if only one peer announces a transaction, and it has over 100
in flight and requestable already, we still want to request it from them.
The cap is replaced with an additional 2s delay (possibly combined with the
existing 2s delays for inbound connections, and for txid peers when wtxid
peers are available).
Includes functional tests written by Marco Falke and Antoine Riard.
2020-09-21 01:20:06 -03:00
m_txrequest . ForgetTxHash ( gtxid . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
}
2019-02-07 01:25:27 -03:00
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if ( ! vGetData . empty ( ) )
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
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//
// Message: feefilter
//
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if ( pto - > m_tx_relay ! = nullptr & & pto - > GetCommonVersion ( ) > = FEEFILTER_VERSION & & gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -feefilter " , DEFAULT_FEEFILTER ) & &
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! pto - > HasPermission ( PF_FORCERELAY ) // peers with the forcerelay permission should not filter txs to us
) {
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CAmount currentFilter = m_mempool . GetMinFee ( gArgs . GetArg ( " -maxmempool " , DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE ) * 1000000 ) . GetFeePerK ( ) ;
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static FeeFilterRounder g_filter_rounder { CFeeRate { DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE } } ;
if ( m_chainman . ActiveChainstate ( ) . IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) ) {
// Received tx-inv messages are discarded when the active
// chainstate is in IBD, so tell the peer to not send them.
currentFilter = MAX_MONEY ;
} else {
static const CAmount MAX_FILTER { g_filter_rounder . round ( MAX_MONEY ) } ;
if ( pto - > m_tx_relay - > lastSentFeeFilter = = MAX_FILTER ) {
// Send the current filter if we sent MAX_FILTER previously
// and made it out of IBD.
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter = count_microseconds ( current_time ) - 1 ;
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}
}
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if ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) > pto - > m_tx_relay - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter ) {
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CAmount filterToSend = g_filter_rounder . round ( currentFilter ) ;
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// We always have a fee filter of at least minRelayTxFee
filterToSend = std : : max ( filterToSend , : : minRelayTxFee . GetFeePerK ( ) ) ;
2019-03-08 17:30:36 -03:00
if ( filterToSend ! = pto - > m_tx_relay - > lastSentFeeFilter ) {
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m_connman . PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : FEEFILTER , filterToSend ) ) ;
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > lastSentFeeFilter = filterToSend ;
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}
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pto - > m_tx_relay - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter = PoissonNextSend ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) , AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
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}
// If the fee filter has changed substantially and it's still more than MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY
// until scheduled broadcast, then move the broadcast to within MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY.
2020-09-27 18:43:27 -03:00
else if ( count_microseconds ( current_time ) + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY * 1000000 < pto - > m_tx_relay - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter & &
2019-03-08 17:30:36 -03:00
( currentFilter < 3 * pto - > m_tx_relay - > lastSentFeeFilter / 4 | | currentFilter > 4 * pto - > m_tx_relay - > lastSentFeeFilter / 3 ) ) {
2020-09-27 18:43:27 -03:00
pto - > m_tx_relay - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter = count_microseconds ( current_time ) + GetRandInt ( MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY ) * 1000000 ;
2016-12-01 20:45:50 -03:00
}
}
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} // release cs_main
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return true ;
}
class CNetProcessingCleanup
{
public :
CNetProcessingCleanup ( ) { }
~ CNetProcessingCleanup ( ) {
// orphan transactions
mapOrphanTransactions . clear ( ) ;
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . clear ( ) ;
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g_orphans_by_wtxid . clear ( ) ;
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}
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} ;
static CNetProcessingCleanup instance_of_cnetprocessingcleanup ;