Routers/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC
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@ -17,27 +17,28 @@ After exploring several known vulnerabilities, I decided to delve into the searc
So, I decided to try something sneaky by adding a ";" character to my command. I executed "cat /etc/passwd" and guess what? The command ran successfully.
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/d9c780f9-649e-49a7-bb19-305abff583db)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/fb3f10b8-e877-4931-892d-6fb7c416439b)
I took it a step further and executed the "sed" command to replace the restricted shell entry in the "/etc/passwd" file with a full interactive shell.
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/729a7bf7-118b-4146-a2ec-3de32de9487e)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/2cbafaf1-c2e2-471d-9581-34498d2c6a24)
As clearly illustrated in the image below, the modifications I made have enabled me to login and freely execute commands like "uname" and "cat"
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/8ee5c6ba-b4c6-4a3f-829a-ebeb5945f18b)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/bc493a85-545c-4053-bd9a-711f029f0bde)
### Root of cause
Since I had complete admin privileges, I couldn't resist delving deeper to uncover the vulnerable component. While inspecting the browser requests, I noticed something interesting. There were two CGI files, "ping.cgi" and "DiagGeneral.cgi", being targeted by the requests.
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/4c9bd5c9-c71b-4d04-b0b1-718195067902)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/604ea667-e64d-47a3-95df-3306d1dd0c21)
After grabbing the files, I had some fun with reverse engineering using Ghidra. Here's the interesting part: in the "ping.cgi" file, I noticed that the **PingIPAddr** parameter was being directly taken from user input without any proper sanitization. The **PingIPAddr** parameter grabbed from user input was stored for future use utilizing the **tcapi_set** function.
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/1ce7c0ff-8964-4934-a5a2-1cf96990c20b)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/9566b95f-ce01-4662-aaea-0996ff0a3802)
Lastly, in the DiagGeneral.cgi file the PingIPAddr parameter was retrieved using the **tcapi_get** function and then directly used in the **system** function without any sanitization. This flaw creates a command injection vulnerability, enabling unauthorized execution of arbitrary commands on the system.
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/a02e6faf-adc3-4da9-9efa-abc58f601a4f)
![image](https://github.com/duality084/CVE-2023-33381-MitraStar-GPT-2741GNAC/assets/7117259/3ed8eb1f-dcc3-47b3-9f5d-9b814485ca57)