Discard short packets which could not be decrypted.
So that connections are protected from failing from on-path attacks. Decryption failure of long packets used during handshake still leads to connection close since it barely makes sense to handle them there.
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parent
4bec083118
commit
8634e4d110
2 changed files with 6 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -1830,9 +1830,11 @@ ngx_quic_app_input(ngx_connection_t *c, ngx_quic_header_t *pkt)
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ctx = ngx_quic_get_send_ctx(qc, pkt->level);
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if (ngx_quic_decrypt(pkt, c->ssl->connection, &ctx->largest_pn) != NGX_OK) {
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rc = ngx_quic_decrypt(pkt, c->ssl->connection, &ctx->largest_pn);
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if (rc != NGX_OK) {
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qc->error = pkt->error;
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return NGX_ERROR;
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return rc;
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}
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/* switch keys on Key Phase change */
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@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@ ngx_quic_decrypt(ngx_quic_header_t *pkt, ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn,
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!= NGX_OK)
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{
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pkt->error = NGX_QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION;
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return NGX_ERROR;
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return NGX_DECLINED;
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}
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if (ngx_quic_long_pkt(pkt->flags)) {
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@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ ngx_quic_decrypt(ngx_quic_header_t *pkt, ngx_ssl_conn_t *ssl_conn,
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if (rc != NGX_OK) {
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pkt->error = NGX_QUIC_ERR_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION;
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return rc;
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return NGX_DECLINED;
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}
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if (badflags) {
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