caca
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commit
c3af680506
2 changed files with 134 additions and 0 deletions
45
named.conf
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45
named.conf
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// vim:set ts=4 sw=4 et:
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options {
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directory "/var/named";
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pid-file "/run/named/named.pid";
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// Uncomment these to enable IPv6 connections support
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// IPv4 will still work:
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// listen-on-v6 { any; };
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// Add this for no IPv4:
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listen-on port 53 { 127.0.0.1; 186.64.123.31; };
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allow-recursion { any; };
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allow-query-cache { any; };
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allow-query { any; };
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allow-transfer { none; };
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max-cache-ttl 30;
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max-ncache-ttl 30;
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// version none;
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// hostname none;
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// server-id none;
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recursion yes;
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querylog yes;
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# DNSSEC disabled because the main purpose is to use it behind
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# this server DoT, dns.zzls.xyz=186.64.123.31
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dnssec-validation no;
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};
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zone "localhost" IN {
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type master;
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file "localhost.zone";
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};
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zone "0.0.127.in-addr.arpa" IN {
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type master;
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file "127.0.0.zone";
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};
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zone "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa" {
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type master;
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file "localhost.ip6.zone";
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};
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89
unbound/unbound.conf.d/caca.conf
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unbound/unbound.conf.d/caca.conf
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# Unbound config file
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server:
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# If no logfile is specified, syslog is used
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#logfile: "/var/log/unbound/unbound.log"
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verbosity: 3
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interface: 127.0.0.1
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interface: 186.64.123.31
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port: 53
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do-ip4: yes
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do-udp: yes
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do-tcp: yes
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# May be set to yes if you have IPv6 connectivity
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do-ip6: no
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# You want to leave this to no unless you have *native* IPv6. With 6to4 and
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# Terredo tunnels your web browser should favor IPv4 for the same reasons
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prefer-ip6: no
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# Use this only when you downloaded the list of primary root servers!
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# If you use the default dns-root-data package, unbound will find it automatically
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root-hints: "/etc/unbound/root.hints"
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# Trust glue only if it is within the server's authority
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harden-glue: yes
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# Require DNSSEC data for trust-anchored zones, if such data is absent, the zone becomes BOGUS
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harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
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trust-anchor-file: "/etc/unbound/trusted-key.key"
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# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
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# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
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use-caps-for-id: no
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# Reduce EDNS reassembly buffer size.
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# IP fragmentation is unreliable on the Internet today, and can cause
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# transmission failures when large DNS messages are sent via UDP. Even
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# when fragmentation does work, it may not be secure; it is theoretically
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# possible to spoof parts of a fragmented DNS message, without easy
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# detection at the receiving end. Recently, there was an excellent study
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# >>> Defragmenting DNS - Determining the optimal maximum UDP response size for DNS <<<
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# by Axel Koolhaas, and Tjeerd Slokker (https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/36/contributions/776/)
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# in collaboration with NLnet Labs explored DNS using real world data from the
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# the RIPE Atlas probes and the researchers suggested different values for
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# IPv4 and IPv6 and in different scenarios. They advise that servers should
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# be configured to limit DNS messages sent over UDP to a size that will not
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# trigger fragmentation on typical network links. DNS servers can switch
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# from UDP to TCP when a DNS response is too big to fit in this limited
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# buffer size. This value has also been suggested in DNS Flag Day 2020.
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edns-buffer-size: 1232
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# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
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# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
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prefetch: yes
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# One thread should be sufficient, can be increased on beefy machines. In reality for most users running on small networks or on a single machine, it should be unnecessary to seek performance enhancement by increasing num-threads above 1.
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num-threads: 1
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# Ensure kernel buffer is large enough to not lose messages in traffic spikes
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so-rcvbuf: 1m
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# Ensure privacy of local IP ranges
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#private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
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#private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
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#private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
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#private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
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#private-address: fd00::/8
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#private-address:0.0.0.0/0
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access-control: 0.0.0.0/0 allow
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# Hide DNS Server info
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#hide-identity: yes
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#hide-version: yes
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# Add an unwanted reply threshold to clean the cache and avoid, when possible, DNS poisoning
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#unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000000
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# Don't use Capitalization randomization as it known to cause DNSSEC issues sometimes
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# see https://discourse.pi-hole.net/t/unbound-stubby-or-dnscrypt-proxy/9378 for further details
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use-caps-for-id: no
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# Perform prefetching of close to expired message cache entries
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# This only applies to domains that have been frequently queried
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#prefetch: yes
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# Fetch the DNSKEYs earlier in the validation process, which lowers the latency of requests
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# but also uses a little more CPU
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#prefetch-key: yes
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